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The Commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) has identified 
junior officer retention within the Naval Special Warfare community as a significant 
problem. In 1997, the community experienced the highest number of resignations on record, 
and this trend has continued in 1998. NSWC has taken several steps to identify the cause 
of recent retention trends, one of which was to provide support for this study. The purpose 
of this study was to identify the factors that lead to resignation of junior Sea-Air-Land 
(SEAL) officers. Three data sources were developed specifically for this study: an Active 
Duty Survey of junior officers serving in SEAL billets, a Resignation Survey of officers who 
requested resignation in FY98 and FY99, and focused interviews with SEAL officers who 
recently separated or were awaiting separation from the Navy. The results of the research 
show that the majority of SEAL officers greatly enjoyed their job. Nevertheless, family 
separation, improper utilization by operational commanders, minimal chances for conducting 
combat operations, and the perceived lack of vision of senior SEAL leadership contribute 
significantly to a service member's decision to leave. Additionally, the study found that pay 
and marital status did not affect the decision to leave service as long as the service member 
was satisfied with job-related factors. Once a service member became dissatisfied with the 
job, pay and marital status were found to playa significant role in the stay/leave decision. 
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Retention of Naval Special Warfare Officers has been identified as a problem by 
senior Naval Special Warfare leadership. (Richards, 1997) Fiscal year 1997 had the 
highest level of Sea Air and Land (SEAL) officer resignations on record. For the Naval 
Special Warfare community to fulfill its assigned mission within the Department of the 
Navy, it must recruit, train, and retain qualified personnel. As recruiting and training 
costs rise, it is becoming increasingly important that the community retain qualified 
officers to maximize its return on investment in h?-l11an capital. 
There are several critical reasons why current retention rates should be of great 
concern to the Navy. One ofthese reasons is that, if recent rates are an indicator of future 
retention, a shortage of Lieutenant Commanders will likely occur over the next few years. 
At the same time, the SEAL community is faced with a growing number of 
commitments. An increased emphasis on low intensity conflicts and the recognition of 
the requirement for a crisis response capability have resulted in an increased demand for 
special-operations-capable forces. (USSOCOM, 1997) 
Additional reasons support the need to retain qualified officers besides simply 
filling billets. SEAL platoons are continually finding themselves in high-visibility, 
potentially hostile environments. Recent examples include Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. 
Increasing demands placed on SEAL Teams, coupled with the use of new technologically 
advanced equipment, will require greater expertise on the part of SEAL officers. 
Advanced weapon systems, the growing threat of terrorism, and the potential 
proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons will require officers to be 
highly-trained in sophisticated systems. (USSOCOM, 1997) 
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B. RETENTION PICTURE 
The increase in joint billet requirements that took place in 1987 created a gap 
between the number of Lieutenant Commanders required and the number existing within 
the Naval Special Warfare community. In response to this, the community increased the 
number of officer accessions considerably in 1989 and 1990 to over 60 during each year. 
In 1990, as the Department of Defense began its force drawdown, the overall number of 
officer accessions decreased to roughly fifty. Given input from Basic Underwater 
Demolition/Seal (BUD/S) training of fifty officers a year, a cumulative (CCR) 
continuation rate (or the product of the annual continuation rates for the desired range of 
years-of-service) of 79.9 percent is required to· meet current requirements. (Campion, 
1997) Actual rates are compared with required cumulative continuation rates since 1989 
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Source: CDR Campion, SEAL Officer Community Manager, 1997. 
Figure 1. Required and Actual Cumulative Continuation Rates For 
SEAL Officers Since 1989 
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To meet current Lieutenant Commander manning requirements, the SEAL 
community must promote twenty-one officers to 0-4 annually. Based on past promotion 
history (eighty-percent selection rate), that means the community must retain, on average, 
twenty-six officers in each year-group to the ten-year point. Year-groups 1993 and 1994 
currently number in the low twenties. This should be cause for concern, particularly 
since the 1994 year-group has not yet reached its Minimum Service Requirement (MSR). 
In Fiscal Year 1997, officer resignations reached thirty-eight--the highest level of SEAL 
resignations on record. This is a reduction of greater than nineteen percent in the 
Lieutenant inventory. (Campion, 1997) Current annual accession plans call for twenty 
resignations per year. For Fiscal Year 1998, the SEAL community has received thirty-
eight resignation letters, and already there have been ten letters submitted requesting 
resignation in 1999. Officer resignation trends since 1990 are shown in Figure 2. 
c. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that have caused the recent 
decline in SEAL officer retention rates. Using survey and interview data, this research 
examines factors that may' be leading to the recent decline in junior officer retention rates. 
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Figure 2. Officer Resignation Trends Since 1990 
D. SOURCES OF DATA USED IN THE STUDY 
Data for the study are derived from three sources. The first source of data is a 
survey of SEAL officers (0-3 and below) currently serving in SEAL billets. The second 
source of data is a survey of SEAL officers who have requested resignation from active 
duty. The third source of data is personal interviews with SEAL officers who have 
recently (1998) resigned from active duty, or who were awaiting separation at the time of 
this study. 
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The following chapter attempts to provide some background and insight about the 
SEAL community and explores the question "What type of Person becomes a SEAL?" It 
also addresses issues regarding the cost of personnel turnover, and the effect excessive 
turnover can have on both officer quality and recruiting efforts. 
Chapter III contains a review of literature and previous studies regarding both 
civilian and military turnover. In this chapter, the relationships between job satisfaction 
and turnover, human capital and turnover, performance and turnover, and demographics 
and retention are examined. The chapter concludes by examining prior military studies 
on retention. 
Chapters IV, V, and VI contain the analysis of the study and examine the results 
of the Active Duty Survey, The Resignation Survey, and the Resignation Interviews, 
respectively. The final chapter, chapter VII, contains both conclusions and 




A. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE: A UNIQUE COMMUNITY 
The Naval Special Warfare community is characterized by a strong culture that is 
rooted in a tradition of heroic service. Since its early beginnings, before the 
commissioning of SEAL Teams, the men who made up the Underwater Demolition 
Teams where characterized as adventurous and daring. After the official commissioning 
of the SEAL Teams in 1962 by President Kennedy, SEALs distinguished themselves in 
the jungles of Vietnam, earning themselves a reputation as deadly effective 
unconventional warriors. In the Post-Cold War era, the SEAL community has struggled 
to define its new role within the Department of Defense. As Admiral Cathal "Irish" 
Flynn, USN (Ret.), the first regular U.S. SEAL Admiral, wrote in the forward of Orr 
Kelly's book Brave Men, Dark Waters: 
Once again, as Orr Kelly aptly expresses it, naval special operations forces 
must answer the question, "Who are we?" Their predecessor units were 
created or expanded in wartime, following identification of specific 
operational needs to which resourceful men readily adapted themselves. 
In those days there was little in the way of preexisting organizations, 
material, or career considerations to fetter their adaptability. Now, 
however, the expansion is taking place within a framework of established 
organizations and force structures, accompanied by long-range, expensive 
programs for acquisition of equipment. Unlike their predecessors, today's 
naval special warriors have the assurance of sustained and adequate 
resources, but their adaptability is programmatically constrained, and they 
have neither the actualities of an ongoing conflict nor the received 
certainties of the Cold War to guide their planning. On balance, it is 
probably more difficult than ever to determine the niche of operational 
capabilities that the expanded naval component of the U.S. Special 
Operations Command should fill, and toward which its development 
should be directed. (Flynn quoted from Kelly, 1992) 
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The SEAL community is unique in that it is administratively controlled by the 
Navy but operationally commanded by the Anny. In 1987, Naval Special Warfare 
Command came under the operational command of the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM). This has been the cause of some tension, as the SEAL culture 
has been forced to amalgamate with those of the Anny and Air Force. Despite the 
organizational change created when Naval Special Warfare was subsumed by the 
USSOCOM, SEALs still deploy in support of Navy Commanders while deployed on 
Navy ships and submarines. Working for different chains of command (and frequently 
for an operational commander without a background in Special Operations) has been 
identified as the cause of frustration among many SEALs. SEAL officers have 
repeatedly expressed concern that, while deployed, regardless of operational capability, 
they unfavorably compete for missions with both the Anny Special Forces A-Teams and 
the Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance Teams. (Based on responses to the Active Duty 
Surveys and Resignation Interviews collected for this study.) 
It is not unusual for a SEAL Lieutenant to be assigned as a Task Unit Commander 
while deployed in support of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), or while deployed to a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). While this provides young officers with 
uniquely challenging roles (for which they are not formally trained), it results in a junior 
Naval officer having to compete for employment with a Marine Colonel in the case of the 
ARG, and an Anny or Air Force Colonel at a JSOTF. This situation is clearly unique to 
this community. 
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B. OFFICER PIPELINE 
The Naval Special Warfare Community has the luxury of choosing its candidates 
from a large, highly skilled pool of applicants. This suggests that, on average, the quality 
of an officer who is selected for, and completes, the required training should be higher 
than that of the average officer within the Navy. If this is true, then the selection rate to 
Lieutenant Commander should be, on average, greater in the SEAL community than in 
the rest of the Navy. Past data support this notion. Historical promotion rates for Seal 
officers have hovered at around 80 percent. In 1996, the "in-zone" (scheduled) selection 
rate for SEAL officers to Lieutenant Commander was 82.4 percent (28 of 34 eligible 
officers); but, in 1998 the community was below the average with only 22 out of 34 
selected for promotion. There are several possible reasons for this variation. One 
possibility is that the large number of voluntary resignations in 1998 may have skewed 
the selection rate. That is, officers seeking voluntary separation are required to inform 
the selection board of their intentions prior to the board convening; and these officers 
would not be considered for promotion. A second possibility is that the large variation in 
annual promotion rates may be largely explained by the small sample size--normally 
fewer than thirty five. 
The first significant obstacle in the community pipeline comes after selection to 
Lieutenant Commander, when a SEAL officer must screen successfully for Executive 
Officer (XO). Prior to 1998, the Naval Special Warfare community allowed its XO 
selection to be conducted predominantly by members from other warfare communities, 
with at least one Special Warfare officer on the board providing representation. Non-
SEAL screening board members cannot be counted on to understand the implications of 
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the different billets that SEAL officers hold. This implies that some officers may not be 
rewarded for accepting more challenging assignments. The average percentage of 
eligible officers who have successfully screened for XO since 1990 is approximately 70 
percent. 
C. OFFICER TRAINING 
Organizational theory suggests that how a person becomes a group member is an 
important element in determining commitment to the organization (Bolman and Deal, 
1991, p. 293). Arguably, SEAL training is the most difficult training in the US military. 
In a letter to the editor of Proceedings of the lJ.S. Naval Institute in September 1989, 
Rear Adm. Irish Flynn and Master Chief Rudolph Boesch commented on the rigorous 
training: 
We have not found another training course in the armed services that 
produces men ready to reconnoiter and clear beaches when walls of surf 
plunge repeatedly in a quarter-mile zone of white water over a reef-
studded nearshore. No other course selects those who endure the hours in 
almost complete darkness during the swimmer delivery vehicle's transit, 
shuddering constantly as the surrounding water and compressed gas they 
breathe suck body heat from them, while still ahead loom struggles with 
claustrophobia and real perils under a ship. Then-much later, when 
everyone is at the limit of strain and hypothermia - an underwater 
rendezvous and reentry with a submarine. Compared to the water-
associated work, the SEALs' other responsibilities - parachuting, explosive 
demolition, land operations, close-quarter battle - seem safe, almost 
carefree endeavors. (Flynn and Boesch, 1989) 
By surviving the training each individual has made a sacred declaration: "I want 
to do this job and I'll give my heart and soul." (Kidder, 1981, p. 63) Perhaps as a result 
of this, many SEALs articulate their loyalty to the SEAL community first and then to the 
Navy. Clearly, "want-to-be" SEAL officers put their heart and soul into training or leave 
the program. Where then does the organization lose this level of commitment? 
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As a result of the intense training and unique mission, the SEAL Teams share a 
strong, cohesive culture. Many of the SEALs surveyed and interviewed in this study felt 
that it is often this strong, invisible force that gives the SEAL Platoons, and ultimately the 
community, their drive. Peer pressure was cited as an effective motivator for top 
performance as were performance appraisals. In a community of such small numbers, an 
officer establishes his reputation very early in his career--usually during his tour as a 
platoon commander. 
Similar to the Naval Aviation pipeline, a great deal of warfare-specific skill 
training occurs in the first few years of a SEAL officer's career. In the case of the SEAL 
officer, this firm-specific training represents a large investment in human capital for the 
Navy. An officer typically spends at least a year in a training pipeline before he is ever 
placed in an operational SEAL platoon. Even then, he is not considered deployable and 
is not Warfare qualified. From the beginning of BUD/S training, it can take more than 
two years before an officer is in a platoon that is designated an overall rating of C-l: 
Ready to Deploy. An officer's training continues throughout a platoon work-up and 
deployment, including advanced schools ranging from High Altitude Low Opening 
(HALO) Military Free-Fall School to Joint Mission Planning courses. The "bottom line" 
is that, by the time an officer reaches MSR, he represents a significant investment to the 
Navy, and his voluntary separation from the Navy at MSR represents a major loss to the 
organization. 
D. WHAT TYPE OF PERSON BECOMES A SEAL? 
SEAL officers are·often considered different than other Navy officers as a result 
of the tough screening process and the unique mission requirements of the Special 
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Operations community. Clearly, a person who selects a career involving strenuous 
physical activities, and a job description that includes parachuting, diving, the demolition 
of explosives, as well as a host of other hazardous tasks, may not find the proposition of 
office work very appealing. A common theme among SEAL officers is their desire to 
"remain operational." On average, the typical SEAL officer's "operational life" comes to 
a close near the point where he has completed his MSR. By "operational," most SEAL 
junior officers are referring to leading SEAL platoons into harm's way. Although there 
are a number of billets for more senior SEAL officers that are considered "operational," 
these billets do not meet this definition of operational. If we accept the notion that most 
SEAL officers are bright, highly motivated risk-takers who display a greater-than-
average degree of what might be termed "stick-to-it-iveness," then clearly these officers 
represent a valuable commodity within the civilian labor market. Perhaps more than in 
other communities, SEAL officers may be more willing to change careers at a point 
where they are no longer able to serve in the capacity for which they had originally 
volunteered. 
E. COST OF PERSONNEL TURNOVER 
Included in the cost of personnel turnover are recruiting, educating, and training 
costs. These costs occur in the form of dollars expended and lost productivity. Loss of 
productivity occurs while a new officer learns his job and continues until such time as he 
is as productive as the person whom he replaced. Additionally, the concept of net 
productivity suggests that the measurement of lost productivity should also consider the 
loss in productivity of the "trainer" of the new service member who gives up productive 
time to train the new officer. In dollar tenns, the cost of putting an officer through 
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BUD/S is roughly $40,000, while the average cost of training a SEAL officer up to the 
five-year point has been estimated at $487,000. (Bernardo, 1998) This training cost does 
not include any reduction in net productivity due to on-the-job training. 
F. EFFECT ON QUALITY 
Most SEAL officer separations are voluntary. This implies that, unlike many 
civilian organizations, the Navy is not selecting who stays or leaves. To assume the 
Navy is retaining the top 30-40 percent of its performers would be foolish. In fact, a 
1995 study by Bowman on the "Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies" found that 
" ... the average quality of academy stayers (t4ose who stayed to be considered for 
promotion to 0-4) differ only slightly compared to the leavers (those who self-select out 
of active duty)." The implications for the Navy are that many top performers may be 
initiating separation from active duty. The Naval Special Warfare community must be 
concerned not only with the number of officers who leave, but also with the quality of 
those departing officers. 
G. EFFECTS ON RECRUITING 
The Navy spends a great deal of money annually on its officer recruiting efforts. 
The Navy competes with the civilian job market and with other branches of the armed 
services for labor. Officers, by virtue of their educational backgrounds, tend to have a 
large number of job choices. During the period of job search, the individual will 
normally attempt to obtain as much information as possible about various job 
opportunities. Severely low retention rates are considered a symptom of job 
dissatisfaction. As potential job applicants search for information about Navy life, they 
will undoubtedly ask people currently in the Navy or those with past Navy experience 
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about the job. With retention rates so low, the probability is increased that they 
encounter a service member who expresses considerable dissatisfaction with Navy life. 
The potential service member will likely search elsewhere for employment, thereby 
making recruiting efforts more difficult. While this is particularly ominous for many 
warfare communities (such as Surface Warfare), the SEAL community currently enjoys 
the luxury of drawing from a large pool of highly-qualified applicants, allowing that 
community to be highly-selective. In the short tenn, therefore, high turnover is not 
anticipated to adversely affect recruiting. In the long tenn, low retention caused by job 
dissatisfaction can be expected to negatively affect recruiting efforts. 
H. TURNOVER AS A SYMPTOM 
As previously stated, low junior officer retention rates have been identified as a 
problem within the Naval Special Warfare community. Junior officer turnover may, 
however, be a symptom of a greater problem within the community. Organizational 
theory suggests that high turnover is an indication of a "poor fit" between fonnal 
organizational requirements and individual needs (Muchinsky, 1997). Poor retention 
rates should signal the need for a community evaluation to identify factors that are 
causing low retention rates. 
A commonly held belief is that money can fix personnel retention problems. The 
apparent shortcoming of this approach is twofold: first, people may not be leaving for 
monetary reasons; and, second, even if an increase in pay results in greater retention, 
organizational deficiencies that originally led to poor retention may not be addressed. 
The exodus of US Air Force pilots in 1998 demonstrates this point. In 1996, 
approximately six out of ten Air Force pilots accepted a $60,000 bonus to remain in 
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service for an additional five years. Today, fewer than three out often are willing to stay 
even when offered a bonus of $110,000. (Tampa Tribune, 1998) The Air Force has 
addressed the pecuniary issues, but not the organizational ones. Naval Special Warfare 
should learn from the lessons of the Air Force: to effectively manage personnel turnover, 
senior leadership must address not only the symptoms of a problem, but the underlying 
causes as well; and money alone may not be the solution to retaining good people. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
UpQn cQmmissiQning, new Ensigns in the Navy agree to. remain Qn active duty fQr 
a specified periQd Qf time. This cQmmitment Qf service varies based Qn QccupatiQnal 
specialty and cQmmissiQning SQurce, but in the case Qf SEALs is usually 3-5 years. Once 
an Qfficer reaches the MSR, he Qr she may decide to. remain in service withQut any 
further QbligatiQn. FQr this reaSQn, it is difficult to. track Qfficers at their "decisiQn 
PQints," since the decisiQn to. leave active duty can QCcur any time after MSR. Enlisted 
sailQrs, Qn the Qther hand, have mQre clearly defined reenlistment dates. Perhaps as a 
result Qf this, the majQrity Qf studies regarding the factQrs that affect an individual's 
decisiQn to. stay Qn active duty have fQcused Qn enlisted service members. 
TurnQver, Qr the separatiQn Qf emplQyees frQm an QrganizatiQn, is a CQmmQn and 
Qften useful phenQmenQn within an QrganizatiQn. As previQusly discussed, the turnQver 
process helps to. ensure a better "fit" between the emplQyee and the QrganizatiQn. The 
challenge to. manpQwer planners is to. manage the turnQver prQcess as efficiently as 
PQssible. The significant lQSS that excessive turnover can represent to. QrganizatiQns has 
prQvided the impetus fQr a great deal Qf research Qn the tQpic, bQth in the civilian and 
military sectQrs. Detailed research Qn the turnQver process is by no. means new. In 1957, 
Herzberg, Mausner, PetersQn, and Capwell cQnducted a review Qf research Qn jQb 
attitudes, including the effect Qf attitudes Qn turnQver and absenteeism. Since that time, 
turnQver has been the subject Qf study by many industrial/QrganizatiQnal (I/O) 
psychQIQgists and labQr eCQnQmists. I/O psychQIQgists have studied a variety Qf factQrs 
and their relatiQnship to. turnQver to. include: jQb satisfactiQn, jQb expectatiQns, wQrk 
environment, reward systems, realistic jQb previews, and cQmpensatiQn. LabQr 
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economists have focused more on the influence of money and labor market variables on 
the turnover process. The relationship of biographic and demographic characteristics on 
turnover has been researched as well. 
The remainder of this chapter contains a review of past literature regarding the 
turnover process. Section A explores research regarding the turnover decision process. 
Section B looks at the relationship between job satisfaction and turnover. Section C 
explores the economic relationship between investment in human capital and job 
separation. Section D uncovers past studies regarding the correlation between 
performance and turnover, also known as the "functionality" of turnover. Section E 
looks at past research regarding the effect of demographic characteristics on retention. 
The final section of this Chapter, section F, provides an overview of past studies focused 
specifically on military retention. The chapter concludes with a Table that summarizes 
the major findings in turnover research uncovered during this literature review. 
A. JOB TURNOVER 
Upon completion of their initial obligation, junior Naval Special Warfare officers 
are able to choose from competing alternatives for employment. Once MSR has been 
reached, the military competes with alternative employers for contracting labor services. 
In economic terms, each employee (SEAL) attempts to maximize his personal well-being 
or utility. In so doing, each service member compares whether or not the discounted 
present value of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is greater for civilian 
employment than for military employment. If the discounted present value is greater for 
civilian employment, the service member will initiate a separation from the military. In 
simplified terms, this means that, if the marginal cost (measured in both monetary and 
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psychic costs) of staying in service is greater than the marginal benefit, a service member 
will quit the military. 
Several studies have attempted to model the individual service member's 
staylleave decision using the Annualized Cost of Leaving or "ACOL" model. The theory 
behind the ACOL model is that an individual decides to stay in or leave active service 
based on the perceived costs and benefits of staying or leaving. The individual will make 
the decision that maximizes his or her utility, again measured in both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary dimensions. Warner and Goldberg (1984) utilized the ACOL model to 
estimate the reenlistment decisions of Navy enlisted personnel. The results of their study 
suggest that" sea duty exerts a significant influence on the reenlistment supply functions 
of Navy enlisted personnel. Additional sea duty serves to both reduce the elasticity of the 
reenlistment supply function and to shift it leftward." (Warner and Goldberg, 1984) An 
additional significant finding of the Warner and Goldberg study is that the negative effect 
of sea duty on first term reenlistment appears to be controlled by bonuses. That is, 
although sea duty appears to have a negative influence on a service member's decision to 
reenlist, this negative influence is overcome by monetary compensation in the form of 
reenlistment bonuses. . 
B. JOB SATISFACTION AND TURNOVER 
Job satisfaction is viewed as "the affective response to evaluation of a job" and is 
a function of a person's perception of the job relative to individual values. (Mobley, 
Homer, and Hollingsworth, 1978) It should be noted that job satisfaction is a present-
oriented rather than future-oriented variable. (Mobley et al., 1978) Herzberg et al. 
(1957) found in a research and opinion review that a common finding of previous studies 
19 
is that job dissatisfaction is directly related to turnover, and the greater the level of 
dissatisfaction, the greater the likelihood of turnover. Arnold and Feldman (1982) 
conducted a multivariate analysis of the determinants of turnover. In their study, the 
authors found that overall job satisfaction is one of the most predictive variables of 
turnover, and is negatively related to the turnover decision. 
According to a review of studies involving overall job satisfaction by Mobley et 
al. (1978): 
[T]hese studies indicate a negative relationship between overall 
satisfaction and turnover. It is important to note, however, that the amount 
of variance accounted for is consistently less than 14%. As noted in 
subsequent sections, when satisfaction is included in multiple regressions 
with variables such as intention and commitment, its effect on turnover 
may become nonsignificant. (Marsh and Mannari, 1977; Mobley, Homer, 
and Hollingsworth, 1978) (Mobley, 1978) 
Attempts have been made to determine the link between job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment. It is postulated that the greater an individual's satisfaction, 
the higher the level of his or her commitment to the organization. Conversely, if an 
individual is dissatisfied, his or her commitment will diminish and, at some point, the 
individual will initiate an alternative job search. (Herzberg et al., 1957) We have already 
recognized the tremendous commitment required to endure the basic SEAL training. At 
some point, then, the organization must be losing this level of commitment, because 
organizational theory suggests that the greater an individual's commitment, the less likely 
he or she will be to initiate a separation. (Schultz and Henderson, 1985) 
The current increase in voluntary separations among SEAL officers has occurred 
during a significant military drawdown. According to organizational theory, a 
"downsizing" that takes place within an organization may be viewed by surviving 
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members as a breach in the psychological contract that exists between the worker and the 
firm. This perceived "breach" weakens the level of commitment the survivors have for 
their organization. (Muchinski, 1997, p. 289) A study by Wong and McNally (1994) on 
the effect of the downsizing process on Army officers found a significant decrease in the 
level of organizational commitment of officers surveyed. 
C. HUMAN CAPITAL AND JOB SEPARATION 
The military differs from most civilian firms in that it invests in both general and 
specific training for its junior-level managers (or officers). An organization will usually 
be willing to invest in firm-specific training fot: its employees, because the employees 
will be learning skills that will increase productivity within the firm, but those gained 
skills will not increase the individual's productivity with other firms. In theory, firms 
will be willing to pay a wage up to the point where the marginal productivity of a worker 
just equals the marginal cost. In fact, in perfect competition, the wage is exactly equal to 
the marginal revenue product. Payment above this point is a loss to the firm, and 
payment much below this point will provide incentive for the employee to find work 
elsewhere. The Navy spends a great deal of money providing junior SEALs with firm-
specific training. This is evident through programs such as SEAL Tactical Training 
(STT), SEAL Junior Officer Training, and a plethora of advanced training schools. 
During this training period, the Navy is paying its officers a wage above their Marginal 
Revenue Product (MRP). This represents an initial loss to the Navy. At the completion 
of the training, however, the MRP of the individual officer should be above that of the 
wage rate. To capture the training costs and realize a positive return on its investment, 
the Navy must retain people for some period of time, usually beyond the MSR. 
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Studies of large commercial firms that, like the military, hire workers at entry-
level positions and then carefully observe those workers for desirable attributes, tend to 
pay a premium wage. Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) explained this phenomenon: 
Large firms, then, establish "internal labor markets" ... ; that is they hire 
workers at entry-level jobs and carefully observe such hard-to-screen 
attributes as reliability, motivation, and attention to detail. Once having 
invested time and effort in selecting the best workers for the operation, a 
large firm finds it costly for such workers to quit. Thus, large firms pay 
high wages to reduce the probability of quitting because they have 
substantial firm-specific screening investments in their workers. 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, p. 341) 
Due to the increase in MRP from the firm-specific skills, the Navy should also be 
able to pay a greater wage to the individual officer than would a competitor. The amount 
paid by the Navy above any competing wage would then be a premium to the officer. At 
first, it may appear that all of the firm-specific training would allow the Navy to pay a 
wage greater than that of competitors, and therefore largely reduce the risk of turnover. 
This would be true if all· other job characteristics were similar. However, wages are only 
one element of the equation. Wages must be weighed against a number of competing 
factors, including working conditions, job satisfaction, and a host of items that, taken 
together, define a worker's utility. 
Theory suggests that, as time spent by a person in an organization increases, the 
chances of separation decrease. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994, p. 45) In the case of junior 
Special Warfare Officers, they must remain with the Navy until they reach their MSR, so 
the number of years with the organization in this case is not a relevant predictor of 
retention probability. After MSR has been reached, studies do support the theory that the 
longer an individual remains in the Navy (and therefore the greater the Navy's 
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investment in human capital), the less likely it is that the individual will initiate a 
voluntary separation. According to Buddin (1984), "the firm specific human capital 
hypothesis suggests that job separation is a function of job tenure, individual and firm 
characteristics, and investments in finn specific human capital." 
I/O psychologists have looked at the effect of a Realistic Job Preview (RJP)-that 
is, an honest portrayal of a job--on turnover. One belief is that a major reason why 
people quit their jobs is disillusionment. The majority of the research seems to indicate 
that an RJP has very little if any effect on turnover. Zaharia and Baumeister (1981), and 
Reilly, Brown, Blood, and Malesta (1981) found that RJPs had no effect on turnover. 
Although there is considerable infonnation. available on SEAL training, the unique job 
characteristics and secret nature of the job do not allow for a realistic preview of life 
beyond BUD/S. 
Other studies have tried to explain retention. by the match between worker and 
firm. For example, Johnson (1978) and Wilde (1979) looked at an individual's choice to 
remain with a finn by using a learning or experience model. This model proposes that 
each job represents a unique set of characteristics, and the only way an individual can 
determine the true value of a job is through experience. This theory would seem 
particularly appropriate for the Navy where the effects of family separation and life at sea 
can only be realized over time. New infonnation gained through experience on the job 
causes the employee to reevaluate the employment contract. 
A second model related to job matching and job separations used by Javonovic 
(1977), Martenson (1978), and Wilde (1979) is known as the search model. This model 
says that, when a worker accepts employment, he or she may be uncertain about 
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alternative job offers. As new information becomes available about alternative 
employment opportunities, an individual will then reevaluate the employment contract. 
Job separation results if alternative employment offers greater total returns than does the 
current job match. In the case of the junior officers, this may have some relevance. 
During the initial period of commitment, the officers receive considerable general 
training in middle management skills, which may enhance their civilian employment 
opportunities. Unlike specific training, the skills acquired through general training are 
transferable to outside firms. If the general training increases an individual's marginal 
revenue product at other firms, the wage other firms may be willing to pay increases, 
thereby making alternative offers more attractive. An abundance of alternative job 
opportunities promising significant increases in pay may be attracting junior officers 
away from military service. As SEAL officers leave the Navy and are successful in the 
civilian labor market, they may serve as a model for others entertaining the stay/leave 
decision. These cohorts and the continuing strong economy have probably served to 
enlighten SEAL officers about their potential ease of movement into civilian employment 
opportunities. 
D. WHAT IS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND 
TURNOVER? 
An analysis of turnover within an organization would not be complete without 
addressing the functionality of employee turnover. Functionality refers to the quality of 
the people who are retained as compared with those who leave. Organizational theory 
suggests that a certain degree of turnover is beneficial, as employees obtain greater 
information about their job fit. Theoretically, employees with the best job fit will remain, 
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and the organization will remove others who are not well suited to their job. The 
problem unique to the military, and particularly the SEAL community, is that by the time 
service members reach MSR, they must have displayed a good fit or they would have 
never survived to that point. Recall from a previous discussion that Bowman (1995) 
found little variation in performance between Naval Academy graduates who stayed to 
the Lieutenant Commander board and those who did not. In the case of the Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates, 
Bowman found that "the average quality of the ROTC, end even more 'so OCS, graduate 
leavers is far below that of stayers from these two sources." (Bowman, 1995) 
Other studies have indicated a positive performance-turnover relationship. 
Schwab (1991) studied 259 social science faculty members. His results indicate that, 
among tenured faculty, higher performers were more likely to leave, but for untenured 
faculty, low performers h~d the greatest chance of turnover. A meta-analysis conducted 
by McEvoy and Cascio in 1987 indicated good performers were less likely to quit an 
organization than were poor performers. 
Conversely, a 1994 meta-analysis by Williams and Livingston examined 56 
civilian studies regarding the link between turnover and performance. The results of the 
meta-analysis "indicated an inverse relationship between performance and voluntary 
turnover." (Williams and Livingstone, 1994) That is, the better performers were more 
likely to leave than poor performers. However, they found this inverse relationship to be 
weaker when rewards were linked to performance. 
Some researchers have hypothesized that top and bottom performers are both the 
most likely to leave an organization, implying a curvilinear relationship between 
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performance and turnover. The logic is that the bottom performers recognize their "poor 
fit" with the organization or job and may likewise recognize their limited promotion 
potential. At the same time, the "middle-of-the-road" performers remain because their 
opportunities elsewhere tend to be limited. Additionally, it is assumed that the top 
performers will have a tendency to depart because they enjoy ease of movement into the 
civilian labor market. This is a particularly interesting notion when one considers where 
SEALs are headed once they leave the Naval Special Warfare community. Many are 
accepted to top-ranking business schools such as Harvard, while others are quickly hired 
with large firms. 
Jackofsky, Ferris, and Breckenridg~ (1986) tested the notion of a curvilinear 
relationship between performance and turnover. In an effort to study two diverse 
populations, accountants and truck drivers were chosen as subjects of their study. The 
authors found a curvilinear, albeit asymmetric, relationship for both populations. 
High performance would be expected to increase one's expectancy for rewards 
while poor performance may result in negative attitudes concerning the intrinsic worth of 
the job. Marsh and Manari, 1977) The results of a study by Harrison, Virick, and 
William (1996) on the determinants of the functionality of turnover suggest that the 
organizational reward system does play a significant role. The authors found that the 
greater the difference in rewards given to sales representatives who performed well and 
those who did not perform as well, the greater the positive correlation between staying 
and performance. That is, in organizations that rewarded great performance, better 
performers tended to remain with the organization. The basic underlying principle is that 
the increased reward for better performance results in a greater degree of job satisfaction. 
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In a system where the best performers are rewarded, poor performers would receive 
lower job satisfaction and therefore would be more likely to quit. A system that does not 
reward top performers, however, may have the opposite effect. The best performers may 
become dissatisfied by the lack of rewards for their efforts and therefore would be more 
likely to quit. 
The reward system within the Navy does not readily allow for better performers 
to be instantly rewarded. Promotion is virtually automatic through MSR. Pay and 
benefits are set by law based on time and rank, but not by performance per se. Awarding 
of medals is often cited as a method to recognize top performers, but the system is 
commonly viewed as inconsistent, and is often a better reflection of how an officer's boss 
views the award system rather than individual performance. 
What are the implications of these research findings regarding the performance-
turnover relationship to the SEAL community? Particular attention should be given not 
only to how many people are getting out (which is currently the case), but also to the 
quality of those people exiting the organization. Based on prior research, and given the 
current reward system in the Navy, it is feasible to conclude that the SEAL community 
may be losing many of its top performers. 
E. THE EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS ON RETEN-
TION 
There have been numerous studies on the effect of demographic characteristics on 
retention behavior in both the civilian and military labor forces. ·Por example, the age of 
an employee has been shown to playa significant role in his or her retention. Meyer, 
Beville, Magedanz, and Hackert (1979) found that younger employees had a significantly 
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higher turnover rate than did older employees in South Dakota. "Possible explanations 
for the relationship between quit rates and youth include indecision by younger 
employees regarding preferred career paths and region of residence, as well as the 
possible absence of increased family responsibilities and/or financial obligations that may 
constrain decisions." (Kellough and Osuna, 1995) 
The possible effect of race on retention has varied across studies. It is commonly 
postulated that, due to racial bias, minorities experience a lower degree of job flexibility 
than others do and, therefore, their ease of movement in the labor market is reduced. 
According to Holmlond and Lang (1985) and Zax (1989), "some research suggests that 
racial/ethnical discrimination in labor markets, which has the effect of making job 
searches more difficult for minorities, also works to deter members of minority groups 
quitting." Kellough and Osuna, 1995) Despite publicized problems regarding racial 
tension, the military is considered to be ahead of the civilian labor market with regard to 
equal opportunity, potentially making it a favorable work environment for minorities. 
Conversely, in the SEAL community, with few minority role models, the work 
environment may be less than desirable for minority officers. (As of 30 June 1998, four 
out of the 93 0-5 and above SEAL officers, and one out of the 29 0-6 and above SEAL 
officers were minorities). 
Marital status is another demographic variable that may have an impact on 
retention behavior. According to a literature review by Glaser (1996), "research has 
generally investigated the effects of work on family and not the reverse." There have 
been a number of military studies, however, on the effects of dependents on turnover. 
With an increasing percentage of military spouses pursuing a professional career, the 
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influence of a spouse on the stay/leave decision of the military member is postulated to 
be increasing. A 1981 Navy study by Mohr, Holzbach, and Morrison on the role of 
spouses on the career decisions of junior Surface Warfare Officers found that "officers, in 
general, felt their wives were supportive of their Navy careers. Wives who worked 
outside the home were less supportive of a Navy career than those who worked within the 
home." An additional finding was that wives with jobs where relocation was perceived 
to be difficult were less supportive of a Navy career for their spouse than were wives in 
most other jobs. This may be significant in that more married women are participants in 
the professional work force today than in years past. (Ehrenburg and Smith, 1994, p. 
165) While the Navy is currently adopting a policy of "home-basing" for its enlisted 
members, officers are still required to move frequently. These moves may represent the 
loss of a substantial income for the spouse not in the service, and therefore may play a 
significant role in the member's decision to leave active duty. Mohr et aI. (1981) also 
found that "the least favorable aspect of a Navy career, according to the wives, was 
separations. Pay, benefits, and location changes were viewed as equal, somewhat 
positive factors .... Wives who found the JO's superior officers helpful in adjusting to a 
new location tended to be more supportive of a Navy career." 
The effect of having children on a service member's decision to remain on active 
duty is unclear. If family separation is one of the most significant factors influencing an 
individual's decision to resign, as several past studies have indicated, then having 
children should have a negative influence on a member's decision to remain in service. 
The longer an individual remains on active duty, we would expect that, for job security 
reasons, having children would have a positive effect on an individual's decision to 
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remain on active duty. Job security used to be considered a major benefit of Navy life, 
but with the considerable downsizing of the force that has taken place in the past several 
years, and with the "zero defect" policy, this may no longer be true. 
F. ADDITIONAL MILITARY STUDIES ON RETENTION 
Cook and Morrison (1983) studied the relationship between career intentions and 
the professional development of junior Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs). They found 
that "controlling for time in service, career intentions of junior SWOs were positively 
related to SWO PQS (Personal Qualification System) progress. In addition, expeditious 
completion of SWO PQS was positively related ~o junior SWO performance evaluations 
(fitness reports)." (Cook and Morrison, 1983) The Cook and Morrison study also looked 
at the relationship between a person's billet, PQS progress, and career intentions. 
Significant differences were found between different billets with regard to career 
intentions. (Cook and Morrison, 1983) A parallel in the SEAL community might be the 
initial assignment of SEAL officers to SEAL or Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams. 
In the same study, Cook and Morrison examined the relationship between first sea 
tour factors and SWO retention. The authors found that an officer's perception of his 
first tour significantly affected the retention decision. This has interesting implications 
for the SEAL community. An ongoing problem within the community is the employment 
of very junior officers (Ensign and LTjg). Some SEAL teams have attempted to place 
these officers into platoons as a third officer, essentially in charge of nothing, with the 
sole responsibility of learning the trade. Other teams "stash" their Ensigns in 
departments to do administrative work. This problem will only be exacerbated if the 
SEAL community is forced to bring in more junior officers to offset the recent increase in 
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voluntary separations. Another significant finding was that "career intent was found to 
be the single best predictor (of retention), accounting for 25 percent of the variance in the . 
criterion when used by itself." (Cook and Morrison, 1983) Also significant was the 
finding that "officers receiving a split first assignment were more likely to resign than 
those not receiving a split assignment." (Cook and Morrison, 1983) 
Nakada, Mackin, and Mackie conducted a study for the Navy in 1996 on nuclear 
officer retention. The study focused on determining the pay elasticity for retention 
bonuses. Using an ACOL model, this study attempted to quantify the impact of the 
Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) retention bonus program on ten retention 
decisions. Separate models were created for both Submariners and Surface Warfare 
Officers. Results of the study indicated that the pay elasticity for both cohorts was small 
but significant, suggesting that "pay does matter." The study also found that economic 
conditions were not an important factor in predicting retention. Specifically, the authors 
found that "unemployment effects were not particularly strong, and were not significant 
at the 0.05 level in most cases." (Nakada et aI., 1996) 
Clearly, nuclear-trained officers and SEAL officers are very different cohorts with 
different motivations· and skill sets. However, because officers in both communities 
receive intense training and undergo a rigorous screening process, the average 
unemployment rate may have little impact on the specific labor market for persons in 
these categories. Additionally, the nuclear-trained officers would be expected to be more 
financially motivated than their SEAL counterparts. 
Nakada (1984) utilized the Cox regression method to analyze survival 
probabilities of Navy enlisted personnel. His purpose was to provide a "detailed 
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description of a new approach taken to estimate force behavior and to provide some 
preliminary results." Nakada concluded that using the Cox regression model was, in fact, 
feasible for analyzing survival probabilities. Using the Cox regression, he obtained an 
estimate of the effect of sea duty on retention and concluded that higher consecutive 
quarters of sea duty are associated with lower survival rates for single people, but had no 
significant effect on service members with dependents. 
In a 1996 study, Nakada and Boyle attempted to quantify the effect of the Nuclear 
Officer Incentive Pay program on nuclear officer retention at the end of their minimum 
service requirement. The authors estimated separate models for submarine and surface 
warfare nuclear officers. F or both groups the retention elasticities with respect to 
Continuation Pay (variable labeled COPAY) and the Annual Incentive Bonus (AlB) were 
small but statistically significant. For submarine officers, the results indicated a retention 
rate elasticity of .11, which means that for a 10 percent increase/decrease in COPAY, a 
1.1 percent increase/decrease in the MSR retention rate was estimated. The retention rate 
elasticity for SWOs was estimated to be .39. For the Annual Incentive Bonus, the 
elasticities for submariners and SWO were .11 and .48, respectively. 
Zinner (1997) analyzed the factors that influenced the retention of male, junior 
Marine Corps officers within their initial period of obligated service. Using a 
multivariate logistic regression model, the author found the following characteristics to 
significantly influence Marine officers' decisions to remain on active duty: 
commissioning source, occupational specialty, deployment to Operation Desert Shield! 
Storm, satisfaction with various intrinsic aspects of life in the Marine Corps, concerns 
with the force drawdown, whether or not the officer searched for civilian employment in 
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the last twelve months, whether or not the officer believed that the skills he had acquired 
in the Marine Corps would be transferable to the civilian market, and the influence on the 
career decision of the officer's spouse. 
In his Master's Thesis on Junior Officer Retention, Robert du Mont attempted to 
identify factors that lead to the resignation of junior Surface Warfare officers. The author 
surveyed both active duty and reserve officers to determine differing levels of satisfaction 
between the two groups. Additionally, he compiled civilian salary data from the 
reservists to determine the pay differential between the Navy and civilian jobs for former 
SWOs. From the fleet survey for conventional SWOs, the results indicated quality of 
family life, working hours, Navy leadership, and potential for command all significant in 
explaining career decisions. Interestingly, the study found that, on average, junior SWOs 
experienced a 20 percent pay cut after leaving active duty, but pay returned to its pre-
departure level within two. to three years. (duMont, 1997) 
In summary, there has been extensive research on both civilian and military labor 
market turnover. Table 3.1 summarizes the major findings of both military and civilian 
turnover research presented in this chapter. 
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Table 3.1. A Summary of Major Findings in Turnover Research 
Author Finding 
Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, Capwell (1957) Relationship exists between turnover and 
dissatisfaction. 
March and Simon (1958) Turnover largely influenced by satisfaction, 
desirability of leaving, and ease of movement. 
Porter and Steers (1973) Satisfaction is related to turnover. Major influences 
on turnover: personal characteristics, job, work 
environment, and organization. 
Price (1977) Turnover is influenced by dissatisfaction and 
opportunity to leave. 
Mobley (1977) Dissatisfaction leads to thinking about quitting, 
intention to search, intention to leave, and actual 
turnover. 
Javonovic (1977), Martenson (1978), Johnson Examined individual's choice to remain with a fIrm 
(1978), Wilde (1979) through the use of a learning/experience/search 
model. Individuals are able to ascertain the true 
value of a job only through experience. 
Meyer, Beville, Magedanz, and Hackert (1979) Age found to be a signifIcant variable for turnover, 
with younger employees having a signifIcantly 
higher turnover rate than older ones. 
Zaharia and Baumeister (1981) / Reilly, Brown, Found that a Realistic Job Preview had no 
Blood, and Malesta (1981) signifIcant effect on the turnover decision. 
Arnold and Feldman (1982) Overall job satisfaction was found to be one of the 
most predictive variables of turnover and was 
negatively related to turnover. 
Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982) Turnover model should include variables 
measuring: job expectations and attitudes; intent to 
leave; available alternatives. Organizational 
commitment is a reliable predictor of turnover. 
Jackofsky, Ferris, and Breckenridge (1986) A study of both accountants and truck drivers 
indicate the existence of a curvilinear relationship 
between performance and turnover, with both low 
and high performers more likely to voluntarily 
separate than average performers .. 
McEvoy and Cascio (1987) Meta-analysis indicated good performers were more 
likely to quit an organization than poor performers. 
Schwab (1991) Among 259 social science faculty members, the 
higher performing tenured faculty were more likely 
to leave, while amongst untenured faculty the lower 
performers were more likely to separate. 
Williams and Livingston (1994) A meta-analysis of 56 civilian studies reported that 
the analysis indicated an inverse relationship 
between performance and voluntary turnover. 
Glaser (1996) A literature review concluded that the majority of 
research has generally investigated the effects of 
work on family and not the reverse. 
Harrison, Virick, and William (1996) The greater the difference in rewards for sales 
representatives who performed well and those who 
did not, the greater the positive correlation between 
staying and performance. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Military Research: 
Holzbach, Mohr, and Morrison (1981) Spousal influence affects career decisions of junior 
SWO officers. Wives who worked outside the 
home were less supportive of a Navy career than 
those who worked at home. According to wives, the 
least favorable aspect of a Navy career was 
separations. 
Cook and Morrison (1983) Studied the relationship between career intention 
and professional development. Significant 
differences were found between different billets 
with regard to career intentions. The study also 
found career intent to be the best single predictor of 
retention. 
Warner and Goldberg (1984) ACOL model used to predict retention. Additional 
sea duty causes left shift in reenlistment supply 
function. 
Nakada (1984) Used the Cox Regression Model to analyze survival 
probabilities. Findings included that higher 
consecutive quarters of sea duty are associated with 
lower survival rates for single people, but had no 
significant effect on service members with 
dependents. 
Ashcraft (1987) Sea-duty, perceived probability offmding a civilian 
job, and satisfaction with extrinsic aspects of 
military are most important factors in predicting 
retention intention of junior Naval officers. 
Thielmann (1989) Commissioning source, marital status, occupational 
specialty, race, intrinsic, and extrinsic factors 
influence junior Marine officer turnover. 
Buddin (1984) Firm specific human capital model suggests job 
separation is a function of job tenure, individual and 
firm characteristics, and investments in firm specific 
human capital. 
Bowman (1995) Average quality of ROTC and OCS graduate 
leavers was found to be below that of stayers from 
the same two sources. 
Nakada, Mackin, and Mackie (1996) Using separate ACOL models for nuclear officers in 
both the Surface Warfare and Submarine Warfare 
communities, the authors found the retention 
elasticities with respect to the Nuclear Officer 
Incentive Pay (NOJP) retention bonus program were 
small but significant indicating that "pay does 
matter". 
Nakada, Boyle (1996) Authors developed a model of retention behavior at 
MSR and then estimated and validated the model. 
Like the study mentioned above, the results 
indicated a small but statistically significant impact 





Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Using a multivariate logistic regression model, the 
author found the following to significantly influence 
Marine officers decision to remain on active duty: 
commissioning source, occupational specialty, 
deployment to Operation Desert ShieldlStonn, 
satisfaction with various intrinsic aspects of life in 
the Marine Corps, concerns with the force 
draw down, whether or not the officer has searched 
for civilian employment in the last twelve months, 
whether or not the officer believed that the skills he 
had acquired in the Marine Corps would be 
transferable to the civilian market, and the influence 
on the career decision of the officer's spouse. 
~-----ll Quality offamily life, working hours, Navy 
leadership, and potential for command all 
significant in explaining career decisions. On 
average, junior SWOs were found to experience a 
20 percent pay cut after leaving active duty, but pay 
returned to its pre-departure level within two to 
three years. 
Source: Based on work by Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982), p. 120, Zinner (1997), p. 28, with 
additional entries by the author. 
The considerable amount of prior research that has been conducted on the 
turnover process provides us with a point of departure from which we can begin to 





This thesis incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data from multiple 
sources. The first data source is survey questionnaires created by the author and 
administered to a random sample of junior (01-03) SEAL officers serving in SEAL 
billets during the end of 1997 and the first half of 1998. The Active Duty Survey 
attempted to capture information on a number of factors, including: service member's 
satisfaction with aspects of military life, demographic and biographic data, operational 
experience, and opinions on a variety of issues- unique to the SEAL community. An 
analysis of variance procedure was used to determine if significant differences existed 
between the means of the responses to satisfaction questions for members with different 
_ career intentions. Additionally, a regression analysis was performed to determine the 
explanatory power of various demographic and attitudinal characteristics on a 
respondent's intention to leave or remain in service. A more comprehensive description 
ofthe methodology and results is provided in the chapter titled "Active Duty Survey." 
In addition, a Resignation Survey was administered to SEAL officers who had 
requested resignation from active duty. A comparison of the Active Duty Survey results 
with those of the Resignation Survey was undertaken to reveal any differences in levels 
of satisfaction, demographic variables, and opinions between the two groups. Although 
the results of the Active Duty Survey are both valuable and interesting, it is the factors 
that distinguish the "stayers" from the "leavers" that are most germane to a study of 
retention behavior. 
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In the course of the research, the author attended an East Coast junior officer 
conference that examined the cause of the recent increase in SEAL junior officer 
resignations. The minutes of that conference, and two similar conferences (West Coast 
and Hawaii), were also incorporated into this thesis. In particular, recurrent themes 
presented by the junior officers were extracted and used to devdop questions for a 
Resignation Interview. The Resignation Interview represents the final source of data for 
the study. 
Much insight can be gained from surveying the general population of SEAL 
officers. The most important sources of information for this study of turnover, however, 
are the attitudes and opinions of officers ;who have decided to resign. Although the 
Active Duty Survey attempts to model the effect of certain variables on an officer's stated 
"career intention," the Resignation Survey and Resignation Interviews enable us to model 
the effects of select independent variables on the actual decision to quit. Clearly, there 
may be systematic differences between officers who remain on active duty and those who 
choose voluntary separation. Unlike the Active Duty and Resignation Surveys, the 
Resignation Interviews contain predominantly open-ended questions that allow officers 
to freely discuss topics and relate experiences relevant to their resignation decision. It 
was hoped that, through the course of interviews, themes would develop to substantiate 
and better explain the statistical analysis of survey results. A more complete discussion 
of the methodology is presented in Chapter VII. 
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v. ACTIVE DUTY SURVEY 
A. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS 
A survey was conducted of 100 SEAL junior officers. Recall that, for purposes of 
this study, a junior SEAL officer is defined as an 0-1 (Ensign) through 0-3 (Lieutenant). 
Officers from the East Coast, West Coast, and Hawaii were surveyed. The sample size of 
100 may at first appear small; however, it represents approximately 30 percent of the 
junior SEAL officer population. A copy of the Active Duty Survey questionnaire is 
included as Appendix A. 
The Active Duty Survey was pre-tested on several students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School to ensure that the questions were straightforward and unambiguous. 
An East Coast SEAL junior officer conference was used to collect initial survey data and 
to further test the survey instrument. No major problems with the initial survey were 
found, but one result of that conference was the addition of several questions to the 
original survey regarding officer detailing. The initial sample was small (n=32); 
however, it did provide some valuable information about what amount of variation could 
be expected for variables of interest. It is worth noting that, despite the small size of the 
initial sample, the responses of officers in the initial administration of the survey are very 
similar to those found in the total sample. A frequency distribution of the characteristics 
of respondents is provided in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Frequency Distribution of Survey Respondents, By Selected 
Characteristics (N = 100) 
Characteristic (Name) Percent 
Paygrade 
Ensign 10 










Three or More 3 
Commissioning Source 
OCS/AOCS 38 
NROTC Scholarship 22 
NROTC Non-Scholarship 3 
Naval Academy 32 
Other (ECP, Seaman-to-Admiral) 5 
Graduate Education 
With Master's Degree 5 
Without Master's Degree 95 
Geographic Location 
East Coast 51 
West Coast 42 
Hawaii 7 
* OCS = Officer Candidate School, AOCS = Aviation Officer Candidate School, 
NROTC = Naval Reserve Officer Training Center, ECP = Enlisted 
Commissioning Program. 
Based on the sample size and that of the relevant population, these selected 
characteristics are fairly representative of the population as a whole. Statistically 
speaking, the reader can be 95 percent confident that the results fall within a plus or 
minus 10 percent sampling error. 
40 
B. PROBLEMS WITH SAMPLING SMALL POPULATIONS 
Sampling small populations can be problematic. The required sample size is 
dependent upon a number of factors, including: the amount of sampling error that can be 
tolerated, the actual population size, the amount of population variance with regard to the 
characteristic of interest, and the smallest subgroup within the sample for which estimates 
are needed. (Salant and Dillman, 1994) 
Many of the variables in the Active Duty Survey can be expressed in terms of 
proportions. For example, several questions require a response of yes or no. To 
determine the required sample size for variables that can be expressed as a proportion, 
one must have an idea about the amount of variation that exists within the population 
with regard to the variables of interest. If no prior knowledge is available, a proportion 
value of .5 may be used. This, however, will require the sample size to be larger for a 
given confidence level. (Salant and Dillman, 1994) 
The survey incorporates questions that elicit ordinal responses. Examples of these 
variables include questions that may be answered on a scale ranging from "Very 
Satisfied" (assigned a numerical value or 1) to "Very Dissatisfied" (a value of 5). For 
purposes of analysis, an interval scale between the responses was assumed. This scale, 
known as the Likert scale, is believed to work especially well when the objective is to 
elicit attitudinal information about a particular variable of interest. (Rea and Parker, 
1992,p.74) 
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The following formula is used to calculate the sample size for a finite population 
when variables are expressed in proportions: 
n = Z2 (p(l- p)N]/ Z2 (p(P-l)] + (N-l)C 2 1 
Where n = the sample population 
z = the Z value for various levels of confidence based on a normal distribution 
p = the proportion of occurrence (.5 for purposes of this study) 
c = is the confidence interval in terms of proportions 
N = true population 
Determining sample sizes for interval- scale variables is slightly different. 
However, in most instances a survey administrator can select a sample size based on 
proportions that are associated with an overall margin of error and level of confidence by 
using the aforementioned formula. According to Rea and Parker (1992), "this sample 
size will generally satisfy the most stringent requirement of the interval scale variables." 
A sample size of 81, given a target population of 500 and assuming the greatest 
amount of variation possible (worst possible conditions), is necessary to obtain a 95 
percent confidence level that the results fall within a plus or minus ten percent sampling 
error. This calculation leaves a considerable margin for error, since the relevant officer 
population is considerably smaller than 500 and the initial survey data suggest that a 
proportion more forgiving than .5 can be used. As previously noted, the actual sample 
size was 100, placing the study well within these requirements. The SEAL officer 
popUlation, including all ranks from 0-1 to 0-8, numbers approximately 529. The 
I For a more detailed description of sample size determination see "Designing and Conducting Survey 
Research" by Louis M. Rea and Richard A. Parker, 1992. . 
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population of interest to this study does not include officers who have reached the rank of 
Lieutenant Commander (0-4) or greater, or officers who were awaiting separation from 
the Navy. This reduces the relevant population to approximately 250 officers. 
c. RESULTS OF THE SATISFACTION SURVEY 
The first set of questions requested that respondents "Indicate your satisfaction 
with the following aspects of the Navy." For purposes of statistical analysis, an interval 
scale was used, with the following numbers assigned to the possible responses: 
l=Very Satisfied, 2=Somewhat Satisfied, 3=Neither, 4=Somewhat Dissatisfied, 
and 5= Very Dissatisfied. 
The aspect with the highest average satisfaction was "Enjoyment of Job." A 
mean value of 1.98 indicates that, on average, the respondents enjoy what they do. This 
. finding is different from what studies on Surface Warfare retention indicate. (duMont, 
1997) Past retention studies of Surface Warfare Junior officers have found that many 
junior officers do not enjoy the day-to-day activities of their job. This situation may be 
more closely compared to what is occurring in the naval aviation community, where 
pilots are leaving despite the possibility that they may still enjoy flying. Interestingly, 
average satisfaction with "Promotion Opportunities" was the second highest aspect in the 
survey, but was considerably lower with a mean value of 2.45. "Team Leadership" was a 
close third, with a mean of 2.50, a bi-modal distribution, and the largest amount of 
variance of any category in this section (Standard Deviation = 1.28). A complete listing 
of the mean values and standard deviations to the Satisfaction Survey questions is 
provided in Appendix B. 
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The aspect with the lowest average satisfaction was "Amount of Family 
Separation," with a mean of3.62. This factor has also been identified as one of the areas 
causing most dissatisfaction among Surface Warfare Officers in recent retention studies. 
(duMont, 1997) "Quality of Family Life" was another factor with which people were not 
satisfied. The factors with the two highest and two lowest mean scores are presented in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses: "Indicate 
your satisfaction with the following aspects of the Navy" 
Satisfaction n= % Very % % Neither % % Very 
With the: Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied nor Somewhat Dissatisfied 
Satisfie~ Dissatisfied Dissatisfied 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Enjoyment of 10 36 45 7 9 3 
Job 0 
Mean = 1.98 
Promotion 10 15 42 27 15 1 
Opportunities 0 
Mean = 2.45 
Family 10 3 7 35 35 20 
Separation 0 
Mean = 3.62 
Quality of 10 3 19 30 37 11 
Family Life 0 
Mean = 3.34 
* Level of satisfaction, based on frequency of response, where "Very Satisfied" = 1, 
"Somewhat Satisfied" = 2, "Neither" = 3, "Somewhat Dissatisfied" = 4, and "Very 
Dissatisfied" = 5. 
The question, "What are your current career plans?," was included to determine 
respondents' career intentions. Based on their response, the respondents were classified 
as one ofthe following: 
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Careerist - Serve 20 or more years with my current designator 
Transfer - Lateral transfer to a second designator 
Undecided - Undecided 
Resigner- Keep my designator and resign before 20 years 
Recall from the literature review that Cook and Morrison (1983) found career 
intent to be the single best predictor of retention behavior. This cannot be good news for 
the SEAL community, since a considerably greater percentage or respondents intend to 
resign rather than make the service a career. The largest single category is the 
"Undecided" one. This suggests that a large p~rcentage of officers are still evaluating 
their career intentions, and may yet be influenced by organizational improvements. A 
frequency distribution of stated career intentions is provided in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. P'ercentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses By Stated 
Career Intentions 
Stated Career Intentions n = Percent of Total 
---==---~====~~----~----==----~--====--~I Careerist 100 26 
Transfer 100 1 
Undecided 100 39 
Resign 100 34 
These categories of career intentions were developed to compare the level of 
satisfaction with the different factors in the satisfaction survey based on stated career 
intention. After all, when conducting an analysis of turnover, factors that distinguish 
"Resigners" from the others are the most useful. 
A one-way analysis of variance (AN OVA) was performed on the responses to the 
satisfaction survey using career intention as the independent variable. Recall that an 
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interval scale was assumed for purposes of analysis. When conducting an analysis of 
variance on responses that are assumed to be on an interval scale, but may not be, 
significant differences might not be detected. Put another way, significant differences 
would not be detected unless they exist, but even if they do exist, they may go 
undetected. 
The purpose of the ANOV A was to determine if any statistically significant 
differences existed for the various responses to satisfaction questions for people with 
different career intentions. The first ANOVA was done on three of the four possible 
career intention groups. Since only one respondent indicated an intention to "Transfer," 
he was considered an outlier and not included in this analysis. The one satisfaction 
question with a statistically significant (p<.05) response is shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Analysis of Variance of Satisfaction Factors By Career Intentions 
Satisfaction ANOVA MEAN 
with the: p-value All Officers Careerists Resigners Undecided 
Operational 
Tempo 0.040914 2.850 2.423077 3.117647 2.897436 
Although several responses appeared to differ between the three groups, only 
"Operational Tempo" proved to be statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. There are several possible explanations for this result. As previously stated, some 
of the significance may have been lost by assuming an interval scale for ordinal 
responses. Second, the largest group, "Undecided," had a lot of variation in their 
responses, making statistical significance difficult to obtain. Since Table 5.4 contains the 
results of the ANOVA for three groups, it is not possible from these results to determine 
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where the significant differences lie. Because of this, further analysis of variance was 
conducted. 
A second ANOVA was performed to determine which, if any, mean values were 
significantly different for "Careerists" and "Resigners". This analysis revealed several 
factors that distinguish "stayers" from "leavers". Satisfaction with "Operational Tempo," 
"Quality of Family Life," and "Family Separation" were all statistically significantly 
different for the two groups. 
Further analysis of variance tests were conducted to determine if significant 
differences existed between those who were "Careerists" and "Undecided," and between 
"Resigners" and "Undecided" respondents. "Operational Tempo" was the only factor 
that distinguished "Careerists" from those who were "Undecided" (p-value = .088). 
Certainly, in a community where operational tempo is extremely high, we would expect 
greater satisfaction with this factor to be highly correlated with the career decision. "Job 
Enjoyment" was the only factor that significantly distinguished (p-value = .808) 
"Resigners" from "Undecided" respondents. Unsurprisingly, it appears that service 
members who intend on resigning, on average, enjoy their job less than those who remain 
unsure of their employment future. 
As seen in Table 5.5, the mean values of the "Resigners" are higher (indicating 
greater dissatisfaction) in all categories than those of the "Careerists." This finding 
supports the theory that dissatisfaction and the decision to quit are correlated. 
Interestingly, many factors previously thought to influence the staylleave decision did not 
appear significantly different for members intending to stay or go. For example, 
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satisfaction with "Total Pay" and "Number of Hours at Work" did not appear to be 
significantly different for the two groups. 
Table 5.5. Comparison of Means of Satisfaction Factors by Career Intentions 
Satisfaction p-value MEAN 
with the: All Officers Careerists Resigners 
Total Pay .453812 2.79 2.615385 2.823529 
Promotion .266064 2.45 2.230769 2.50 
Opportunity 
Operational .007595* 2.85 2.423077 3.117647 
Tempo 
Command .184348 2.82 2.576923 2.911765 
Opportunity 
Quality of .037146* 3.34 3.038462 3.617647 
Family Life 
Number of .516125 2.9 2.846154 3.00 
Hours at Work 
Amount of .040415* 3.62 3.307692 3.852941 
Family 
Separation 
TeamJUnit CO .44374 2.48 2.346154 2.617647 
Leadership 
SEAL Flag .135456 2.96 2.730769 3.176471 
Leadership 
Postgraduate .719014 3.11 3.076923 3.176471 
Education 
Opportunities 
Enjoyment of .127499 1.98 1.807692 2.264706 
Job 
* Indicates mean value that is significantly different from the other mean, p < .05. 
D. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF THE ACTIVE DUTY SURVEY 
A number of other questions on the active duty survey made use of the Likert 
scale. For example, several questions asked the respondents how they would rate a 
particular characteristic, or how strongly they agreed with a particular statement. Again, 
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a five-point scale was used: Strongly Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Neither Agree nor 
Disagree = 3, Somewhat Agree = 4, and Strongly Disagree = 5. 
1. Leadership Vision 
Responses to the statement, "The senior leadership (W ARCOM and Group 
commanders) within the SEAL community have a clearly defined vision," were 
distributed as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses To the 
Statement: "The Senior Leadership (WARCOM and Group Commanders) Within 
the SEAL Community Have a Clearly Defined Vision" 
Senior % % % % % 
Leadership Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly 
has a Clear Agree Agree Agree nor Disagree Disagree 
Vision Disagree 
% of Total 2 13 20 37 28 
Strongly Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Neither = 3, Somewhat Disagree = 4, and 
Strongly Disagree = 5 
As seen in Table 5.6, 85 percent of the junior officers surveyed do not agree that 
WARCOM and/or GROUP level leadership has a "clearly defined vision." A number of 
the officers surveyed indicated that they have had little dealings with W ARC OM, and 
therefore felt they could not respond. This fmding may indicate that, although 
W ARCOM and/or the GROUP Commanders may actually have a clear vision, it is not 
being clearly communicated to middle managers and the operating core of the SEAL 
Teams. Several respondents indicated that a community newsletter (other than Full 
Mission Profile), or a Web Page could be used to address Junior Officer's questions 
regarding roles and missions as well as community vision. 
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2. Promotion, Career Path, and Command Potential 
Nearly 70 percent of respondents indicated that they were likely to command a 
SEAL Team or Unit if they remain on active duty. This finding would suggest that the 
majority of officers surveyed felt they were competitive performers and were not overly 
concerned about the "zero-defect" mentality that has been thought to weigh heavily on 
decisions to remain in the service. 
When asked if they had a "clearly defined career path," only 36 percent of 
respondents agreed. Of those, only 5 percent strongly agreed. It appears that most junior 
officers .understand their career progression in so far as they need an Assistant and 
Platoon Commander tour. Most officers recognized an Operations Officer tour was 
desirable, but many thought that it was not crucial for advancement. Several officers 
commented that the Naval Special Warfare Development Group seems to be for "fast-
tracking" officers, although they provided examples of officers who were not selected for 
XO after having gone there. 
Questions regarding detailing were added after the first round of surveys was 
administered, so responses to these questions were skewed toward West Coast officers. 
Many responses indicated the need for a published billet list that includes information on 
when jobs are due to become available and a brief description of the job. A large 
percentage of respondents felt the current detailing process works, but is not fair and 
needs considerable revision. The perception is that the billet an officer receives is a 
function of both timing and "who you know." Many comments included words to the 
effect of, "If you get along with certain people in that office, you'll get good orders, 
otherwise you're headed to Guam or SDV Team." 
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In response to the statement, "The most qualified and deserving SEAL officers 
get ranked high and pro:rnote well," 40 percent agreed and slightly over 40 percent 
disagreed. Once again, we see a bi-modal distribution, with very few junior officers 
feeling strongly either way, and few responding to neither. It is likely that junior officers 
use their COs and XOs as a model for answering this question. Since virtually everybody 
gets promoted to Lieutenant, there are no performance-based promotions prior to 
selection for Lieutenant Commander. The bi-modal distribution suggests that junior 
officers feel that about half of the COs and XOs are qualified and most deserving for their 
position. This would help explain several other findings of the study. Recall that 
responses to the satisfaction question regarding "TeamlUnit CO Leadership" also had a 
bi-modal distribution. This trend was repeated in the response to the statement, "SEAL 
Team CO's play an active role in the professional development of their junior officers," 
where over 50 percent of the responses were either "somewhat agree" or "somewhat . 
disagree." 
3. Operational Employment, Utilization, and Work Hours 
One survey statement asked the officers to indicate their agreement with the 
following statement: "I am willing to move geographically to increase my operational 
opportunities." As seen in Table 5.7, respondents overwhelmingly agreed, with 85 
percent reporting they would be willing to move to remain operational. 
The fact that 85 percent of the sample is willing to move to remain operational 
might have implications for the type of officer pipeline or career path that could be 
designed to retain officers. This finding is considerably different from previous fmdings 
51 
Table 5.7. Percentage Distribution Of SEAL Junior Officer Responses To the 
Statement: "I Am Willing To Move Geographically To Increase My Operational 
Opportunities" 
Willing to % % % 0/0 % 
Move to Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewh at Strongly 
Stay Agree Agree Agree nor Disagre e Disagree 
Operational Disagree 
% of Total 57 28 9 5 1 
Strongly Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Neither = 3, Somewhat Disagree = 4, and 
Strongly Disagree = 5 
that suggest sea duty can have a negative effect on retention and satisfaction. (Nakada, 
1984, Warner and Goldberg, 1984) At first, this might seem at odds with the earlier 
finding that the greatest cause of dissatisfaction was "Amount of Family Separation." 
Although family separation is the cause of much dissatisfaction, it is postulated that, for 
many SEAL officers, spending time in a non-operational job might be equally 
dissatisfying. It was explained to the author that family separation is an element of 
"being operational"; but, to the extent that separation can be planned or is for a 
worthwhile cause, it does not cause dissatisfaction. Once the separation is excessive or 
perceived not to be for good reason, it becomes a source of dissatisfaction (based on 
personal interviews conducted for this study). 
What would cause the junior officers to perceive that their time spent away from 
home is not worthwhile? The answer to this question is believed to be much different for 
SEAL officers than for officers from other Navy communities. Most SEALs have 
indicated the desire to "get in the show," test themselves in combat, or simply do the 
things for which they have been trained. Being operationally employed in this manner 
should, therefore, playa significant role in influencing officer perceptions. This was the 
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motivation behind the survey statement, "Overall, SEALs are properly utilized by 
operational commanders." The responses to this statement were eye-opening, and may 
provide insight into why we have witnessed the recent decline in SEAL officer retention. 
The mean value (using the five-point scale) was 3.83, indicating that respondents tend to 
disagree that SEALs are properly utilized. Table 5.8. provides the responses by 
percentage. 
Table 5.8. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses To the 
Statement: "Overall, Seals Are Properly Utilized By Operational Commanders" 
SEALs % % % % % 
Properly Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly 
Utilized by Agree Agree Agree nor Disagree Disagree 
Operational Disagree 
Commanders 
% of Total 
0 13 20 38 29 
Strongly Agree = 1, Somewhat Agree = 2, Neither = 3, Somewhat Disagree = 4, and 
Strongly Disagree = 5 
It is interesting that, of the one hundred respondents, not a single SEAL said he 
strongly agreed; yet, almost one-third indicated strong disagreement. This problem may 
be unique to this community. In most warfare specialties, it is the forward-deployed 
operational commanders who best understand how to employ forces. It may be that, due 
to the SEALs' unconventional role, most operational commanders are not familiar with 
how to properly employ them. Several East Coast respondents qualified their response 
by indicating that European Command (EUCOM) commanders properly utilized them, 
but Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) commanders did not. This led to the question, 
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"How satisfied are SEAL officers with various types of deployments?," which IS 
addressed in the next section. 
There were several questions on the survey that required a response only from 
officers intending to resign. One such question asked, "Would the option to remain 
operational within your community change your mind?" Surprisingly, over two-thirds 
responded "yes." If it were true that nearly 70 percent of the population planning to 
resign would choose to stay in service if they could remain "operational," then it is 
possible that this information could be used to change current retention trends. This 
further supports the notion of exploring modifications to the officer pipeline and career 
progression. 
The majority of officers surveyed reported to be working between 50-70 hours a 
week while at their last sea-duty command. Nevertheless, "hours at work" was not found 
to be a significant predictor of career intention (based on an analysis of variance 
discussed previously and regression models discussed later in this chapter). 
4. Junior Officer Satisfaction with Deployments 
As stated previously, many of the active duty surveys contained written remarks 
in the margins regarding differences between deployments in support of a Special 
Operations Command and those in support of the Fleet. More specifically, many 
reflected the fact that SEALs are not properly used when deployed with an ARG.· To 
determine what percentage of officers shared this view of the ARG, and to determine 
how officers viewed other types of deployments, the survey asked respondents to indicate 
their satisfaction with the various deployments they had completed. Respondents had 
three choices: Satisfied, Undecided, or Dissatisfied. The results are shown in Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.9. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Satisfaction With 
Various Types Of Deployment 
Satisfaction with the: n= 0/0 Satisfied % Undecided % Dissatisfied 
Special Operations 62 89 6 5 
Deployment 
Amphibious Ready Group 46 39 7 54 
Deployment 
CVBG Deployment (East 15 80 20 0 
Coast only) 
From Table 5.9,. it appears that the preferred deployment is as a Special 
Operations platoon, with 89 percent of those having completed a Special Operations 
deployment expressing satisfaction with it. This is not surprising, since Special 
Operations cruises tend to include exercises with foreign nationals, per diem additions to 
pay, and forward deployment to a shore base. Perhaps more significantly, Special 
Operations platoons work for a commander with special operations experience--typically 
a SEAL at a deployed Unit, or in the case of a Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF), an Army or Air Force special operations officer. 
The ship-based deployment of choice appears to be the CVBG deployment, with 
80 percent of the officers satisfied and none dissatisfied. It should be noted that carrier 
deployments are conducted on the East Coast only. Further more, SEAL Team 8 is the 
only Team on the East Coast to conduct carrier deployments, which explains why the the 
n value for CVBG Deployment in Table 5.9 is only 15. 
Why does a CVBG deployment seem to be so much more satisfying than an 
ARG? After all, in both cases of the CVBG and the ARG, SEALs are working for a 
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Navy Commander without a Special Operations background. First of all, CVBG 
Platoons deploy with a Task Unit Commander who has completed a tour as an XO, 
meaning that he is at least a Lieutenant Commander and possibly a full Commander. 
This also tends to mean that the officer is a "front runner" in his community, having 
screened successfully for XO. Furthermore, the officer has probably had some staff 
experience by this point in his career and is comfortable with staff work. Let us compare 
this to what happens on an ARG deployment. Here, the East and West Coasts differ to 
some degree. The East Coast has repeatedly sent out Lieutenants as Task Unit 
Commanders on the ARG. The West Coast has traditionally been better at sending 
Lieutenant Commanders, but has also deployed Lieutenants in that billet. Comments 
written in the margins of several surveys alluded to the fact that the ARG Platoons are 
viewed as second-class citizens. As one officer put it: "Why else would Group Two send 
us a Lieutenant for a Task Unit Commander who was fired as a platoon commander and 
has already failed to select for 0-4 once? In fact, I think the last several ARG Task Unit 
Commanders have failed to select. What signal does that send to the platoon? This is not 
the varsity." Occasionally, the Lieutenant has been properly screened for the job, but 
according to discussions with several SEAL Team Platoon Commanders and Operations 
Officers, the most important criteria for selection are "who is available" and "who can we 
talk into doing it." 
There are other distinguishing characteristics between the ARG and CVBG 
deployments that might help us to understand the previous results. On the carrier, 
SEALS work for an Admiral (that is, a "decision-maker"), and on the ARG they work for 
a Captain. On the carrier, the SEAL platoon is the ground force of choice. First of all, 
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they work directly for an Admiral and second, they have conducted extensive pre-
deployment training with the Carrier Airwing assets. Unfortunately, this does not seem 
to be the case on the ARG. The perception is that SEALs compete (mostly unfavorably) 
with the Marines for employment. Junior officers commonly believe that the ARG 
Commodore has difficulty distinguishing differences in the capabilities between the 
Marine Force Reconnaissance Teams and the SEAL Platoons. Therefore, it is up to the 
SEAL Lieutenant to challenge the Marine Colonel (Commander Landing Forces) 
concerning mission employment. Another major difference between the two 
deployments is that, on the carrier, the SEALs have access to battle-group aircraft, ships, 
and submarines. On the ARG, the SEALs have 30-foot Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats 
(RHIBs), but must request airlift from the Marines. All that said, there are a number of 
SEALs who have had positive ARG experiences. The ARGs have been used for a 
number of missions in recent years, and SEALs have been able to playa role. Examples 
include Somalia and Haiti. 
The results regarding satisfaction with the various deployments were further 
broken down and analyzed by coast. It was hypothesized that, because East Coast 
Special Operations platoons have been working in Bosnia for the past several years, and 
West Coast platoons have been deploying to Guam, satisfaction would generally be 
greater on the East Coast. The results support this hypothesis. While 97 percent of East 
Coast officers surveyed were satisfied with their Special Operations Deployment, 87 
percent of West Coast officers were satisfied. 
57 
The same analysis was done regarding the ARG deployment. The exact opposite 
finding was expected for the ARG-that is, greater satisfaction on the West Coast. The 
reason for this expectation was that the West Coast, on average, sends out more senior 
officers as Task Unit Commanders to represent the platoons. Additionally, when 
compared with deploying to Guam (as opposed to Europe on the East Coast), the ARG 
may not appear so unattractive. Once again, the results support this hypothesis. Over 
three-fourths of the officers from the East Coast were dissatisfied, while the majority of 
officers on the West Coast expressed satisfaction with the ARG. The results for both the 
Special Operations deployment and the ARG deployment broken down by coast are 
provided in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Satisfaction With 
CVBG and ARG Deployments By Coast 
East Coast West Coast 
Satisfaction % % % % % % 
with Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfi ed 
deployment: 
Special 97 0 3 81 14 5 
Operations 
Amphibious 23 0 77 61 11 28· 
Ready Group 
5. Satisfaction with Assignments/Billets 
Since a junior officer normally completes the Assistant Platoon Commander 
(AOIC) tour and frequently the Platoon Commander (OIC) tour prior to the Minimum 
Service Requirement (and therefore before voluntary separation), an analysis was 
conducted to determine satisfaction with different billets. The effect of dissatisfaction 
with the AOIC tour with regard to retention is unclear. It may be that the source of 
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dissatisfaction was a poor OIC. The lure of commanding a SEAL platoon in the future 
might offset the temporary dissatisfaction with the assistant tour. Dissatisfaction with an 
OIC tour, it is postulated, would have considerable influence on the turnover decision. 
The results indicate that most junior officers are satisfied as both an assistant platoon 
commander (82 percent) and as a platoon commander (89 percent). 
Satisfaction with two other jobs, Training Officer and ARG Task Unit 
Commander, was ~so analyzed. Of the officers surveyed who previously held these 
billets, 49 percent were satisfied with their role as a Training Officer while no officers 
surveyed expressed satisfaction as an ARG Task Unit Commander. 
6. Team Morale 
Morale of the work force is thought to influence retention behavior in any 
organization. That is, workers having high morale are generally thought to be more loyal 
to the organization, and therefore have a lower probability of quitting, whereas low 
morale is expected to have the opposite effect. (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982) 
What is it in the SEAL Teams that plays a significant role in raising and lowering 
morale? The two factors found to have the greatest influence in raising morale at a Team 
were "Command Leadership" and "Performance of platoon/squad on exercises." 
Conversely, the two factors having the largest negative influence on morale were 
"Command Leadership" and "Other." Unfortunately, "Other" provides us with little 
insight. However, it is interesting that, in both cases, command leadership had the largest 
single effect on morale, considerably greater than "Amount of time at home" or 
"Deployment schedule." In response to the question, "How would you describe the 
overall wardroom morale at your most recent sea duty command?," 47 percent said 
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morale was high, 23 percent felt it was neither high nor low, and the remaining 30 
percent indicated low morale. 
If there is a correlation between retention behavior and geographic location, it is 
not known. This would be difficult to study, since officers frequently move from coast to 
coast and even overseas. However, this study did attempt to examine the differences in 
morale between the East Coast, West Coast, and Hawaii. Overall, morale appears to drop 
as one moves from east to west. Once again, using a five-point scale: (1 = very high, 2 = 
somewhat high, 3 = neither, 4 = somewhat low, 5 = very low), the mean scores for the 
East Coast, West Coast, and Hawaii were 2.647, 2.853, and 4.143, respectively. It should 
be noted that only seven officers from Hawaii were included in the survey (there is only 
one Team located there). All respondents from Hawaii indicated that morale was low. 
7. Graduate Education 
Ninety-five percent of the officers surveyed did not have a Master's degree. Of 
that 95 percent, 87 percent indicated that they "intend on pursuing graduate education." 
The mean response to the question regarding Graduate Education in the satisfaction 
survey examined earlier was 3.11, indicating that, on average, respondents are neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied with the opportunity to obtain a MaSter's degree. This is not 
surprising, considering how few SEALs have exposure to graduate education programs. 
The fact that such a large percentage of SEAL officers intend on pursuing graduate 
education was not anticipated. 
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8. Pay 
Two questions on the survey addressed the issue of pay. The first asked, "If you 
could increase the pay of SEAL officers, which ONE option would you 
choose?(assuming the total cost to the Navy is the same for each alternative)." The 
results were almost evenly split between two responses. Forty-eight percent chose "Start 
a 'SEAL pay' that would pay a monthly amount while on sea duty and shore duty and 
would begin upon Warfare Qualification." At the same time, 47 percent said, "Pay an 
annual 'SEAL bonus' in return for a commitment to stay in the Navy for a specified 
length of time." The Navy is considering implementing this second option for SEAL 
junior officers meeting certain criteria. 
The second question regarding compensation was directed at "Resigners," or 
officers indicating their intention to resign. The question asked, "If the Navy offered you 
an annual bonus what is the LEAST amount that would persuade you to remain on active 
duty?" The responses to the various choices are displayed in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses to the 
Question "What is the LEAST Amount that Would Persuade you to Remain?" 
Annual Amount Required: % of Responses 
No bonus is required to keep me 13 
$8,000 per year 5 
$12,000 per year 50 
$16,000 per year 24 
No bonus can convince me to stay 8 
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The planned "SEAL bonus" is scheduled to be $10,000 per year for a six-year 
commitment. The majority of officers who intend to resign said that $12,000 would be 
the least amount that would persuade them to remain in service. It will be interesting to 
see how the bonus actually affects retention rates. Recall that the largest proportion of 
officers (39 percent) stated that their intentions were "Undecided." If the bonus is used, 
its success may be the result of influencing this large group who remain "on the fence" 
with regard to their career plans. Clearly, this program will come at considerable cost. 
The "economic rent" involved in such a program would be significant, as 26 percent of 
the population (Careerists) would have to be paid this bonus, but would have stayed in 
service regardless of receiving it. The other 39 percent who are undecided would get 
paid this amount as well, but may have been persuaded to stay with non-pecuniary 
measures. 
E. A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS BASED ON SATISFACTION 
SURVEY RESULTS 
A regression model was created to investigate the explanatory power of responses 
to satisfaction factors on career intention. The initial model included career intentions 
comprised of three groups ("Careerists," "Undecided," and "Resigners") as the dependent 
variable. 
The first model lacked significant explanatory power (R 2 = .1208). It is not 
surprising that a model of career intentions that lacked biographic and demographic 
information, and was solely based on satisfiers, had limited explanatory power. None of 
the satisfaction factors were significant, even at the 90 percent confidence level (p < .10). 
Results of the regression model are shown in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12. Regression of Career Intention by Satisfiers 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R .347523 
R Square .120772 
Adjusted R Square .009606 
Standard Error .774487 
Observations 99 
ANOVA df SS MS F Sig F 
Regression 11 7.168264 .651660 1.086407 .3816402 
Residual 87 52.185272 .599831 
Total 98 59.353535 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation T P 
Constant 1.013379 .454336 2.230462 .028289 
Total Pay .002735322 .082068 .033330 .9734877 
Promotion .037527 .094647 .396493 .6927123 
Opportunity 
Operational Tempo .122801 .081296 1.510545 .134528 
Opportunity for .043109 .087464 .492886 .623334 
Command 
Quality of Family .061918 .108344 .571494 .569138 
Life 
Hours at Work - .094305 .102756 -.917753 .361285 
Family Separation .112794 .106518 1.058918 .292568 
TeamJUnit CO -.0460525 .073584 -.625847 .533054 
Leadership 
Flag Leadership .066022 .079037 .835338 .405816 
Opportunity for -.033988 .081556 -.416742 .677893 
Graduate Education 
Enjoyment of the .090683 .087317 1.038549 .301892 
Job 
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The lack of statistical significance in the model is at least partially attributed to 
the large variation in responses by the "Undecided" respondents. To determine if any 
satisfaction factors explained the career intentions of service members committed to the 
organization (Stayers) and those planning to leave (Leavers), a second regression model 
was created. This model included responses from the "Careerists" and "Resigners." This 
second model contained more explanatory power than the first (R 2 = .2118), but was still 
not very powerful. Once again, none of the factors were significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level, although satisfaction with "Operational Tempo" was close, with a p-
value of .107789. Results of the regression model are shown in Table 5.13. 
In both models, three of the coefficients contained signs that were unexpectedly 
negative: "Number of Hours at Work," "TeamlUnit CO Leadership," and "Opportunity 
for Postgraduate Education." Intuitively, one would think that greater satisfaction with 
these three factors would increase an individual's probability of being a "Careerist." In 
the case of "Work Hours," it may be that those who intend on making the Navy a career 
systematically spend more hours on the job. Members who have the lowest satisfaction 
with postgraduate opportunities may be the ones who plan to remain in the Navy long 
enough for that to be a concern. The coefficient for TeamJUnit leadership is not 
understood, but, once again, it was not found to be significant. 
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Table 5.13. Regression of Career Intention by Satisfiers 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R .46023 
R Square .211812 
Adjusted R Square .031185 
Standard Error .491864 
Observations 60 
ANOVA df SS MS F Sig F 
Regression 11 3.120691 .283699 1.17265 .330603 
Residual 48 11.61264 .24193 
Total 59 14.73333 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation T P 
Constant -0.630781 .490319 -1.28647 .20445 
Total Pay .024952 .070012 .356403 .723101 
Promotion .029289 .080533 .363693 .717684 
Opportunity 
Operational Tempo .119039 .072637 1.63882 .10779 
Opportunity for .09533 .072637 1.312413 .195622 
Command 
Quality of Family .024626 .090384 .272458 .786439 
Life 
Hours at Work - .027366 .093729 -.291968 .771569 
Family Separation .087132 .079314 1.098567 .277437 
TeamlUnit CO - .023741 .060437 - .392829 .696185 
Leadership 
Flag Leadership .060186 .065287 .921865 .361209 
Opportunity for - .004206 .067533 - .062285 .950594 
Graduate Education 
Enjoyment of the .017631 .069918 .25217 .801986 
Job 
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F. A MODEL OF CAREER INTENTIONS BASED ON ACTIVE DUTY 
SURVEY RESULTS 
A linear regression model of career intentions was once again estimated, this time 
using both demographic and attitudinal data culled from the Active Duty Survey. The 
dependent variable, Career Intention, was coded as follows: 
Careerist = 0 
Undecided = 1 
Resigner = 2 
For purposes of analysis, the distance between career groups was hypothesized to be the 
same. 
The regression model with ail of the independent variables was estimated as 
follows: 
Career Intention = n I + P 2 Command Potential + P 3 Marital Status + P 4 Children + p 5 ARG Deployment + 
p 6 SPECOPS Deployment + P 7 SDV Deployment + P 8 Morale + P 9 Fair Promotion + P 10 Vision + 
P II Utilized + P 12 PRODEV + P \3 Commissioning Source 
The independent variables, which consisted of both categorical and continuous 
variables, are discussed below. 
1. Command Potential 
This variable captures the respondent's perception of his likelihood to eventually 
command a SEAL Team or Boat Unit. Variables were coded on a one-to five-point 
scale: Very likely = 1, Somewhat likely = 2, Neither = 3, Somewhat likely = 4, Very 
likely = 5. 
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2. Marital Status 
This variable was measured on a three-point scale: Single = 0, Married = 1, 
Divorced = 2. 
3. Children 
This variable measured the number of children the respondent had and was coded 
as follows: No children = 0, One child = 1, Two children = 2, Three or more children = 3. 
4. ARG Deployment 
This variable was used to identify whether or not the respondent had completed 
an Amphibious Ready Group Deployment. It was coded as either: had not completed an 
ARG = 0, or had completed an ARG deployment = 1. 
5. SpecOps Deployment 
Coded similarly to the ARG Deployment variable above, this variable captures 
whether or not an individual has completed a Special Operations deployment. 
6. SDV Deployment 
Coded similarly to the ARG and Special Operations Deployment variables above. 
7. Morale 
This variable captures responses to a question concerning the overall wardroom 
morale at the respondent's most recent sea duty command. The variable was coded using 
a five-point scale: Very high = 1, Somewhat high = 2, Neither = 3, Somewhat low = 4, 
Very low = 5. 
8. Fair Promotion 
This variable attempts to measure the respondent's level of agreement with the 
statement, "The most qualified and deserving SEAL officers get ranked high and promote 
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well." Once again, it is coded on a five-point scale from Strongly Agree = 1 to Strongly 
Disagree = 5. 
9. Vision 
Using a five-point scale, this variable measures the respondent's agreement with 
the fact that W ARCOM and Group commanders have a clearly defined vision: Strongly 
Agree = 0 to Strongly Disagree = 5. 
10. UTILIZED 
This variable measures the degree to which people agree with the statement, 
"Overall, SEALs are properly utilized by operational commanders." This variable was 
coded with the same five-point scale as used above. 
11. PRODEV 
PRODEV captures the degree to which officers agree with the statement, "SEAL 
Team COs play an active role in the professional development of their junior officers." 
This variable was coded the same as Vision and UTILIZED. 
12. Commissioning Source 
This final explanatory variable relates to the respondent's source of 
commissioning. If the respondent was a graduate of the Naval Academy, he was coded 
as 0, otherwise he was assigned a value of 1. 
Several of the independent variables were found to be significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level (p < .10). The variable "Children" was found to be negative and 
significant, indicating that the greater number of children a service member has, the 
lower the probability of his intention to resign, all other variables held constant. It may 
be that, once a member has had a child or several children, he may enjoy the medical 
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benefits and job security associated with life in the service. Interestingly, SDV 
Deployment was found to be both significant and negative, implying that someone who 
has completed an SDV deployment is less likely to resign. The beta coefficient of -.3452 
means that a person that has completed an SDV deployment is roughly 35 percent more 
likely to be a "Careerist" than he is to be "Undecided." This finding is surprising in light 
of the low morale associated with the SDV Team in Hawaii. The input from officers 
stationed in Hawaii may have been heavily outweighed by the larger number of 
respondents with East Coast SDV experience. It may also be true that members who 
have completed a tour with an SDV Team look forward to duty at a SEAL Team, and 
therefore have more incentive to remain. The last statistically significant variable in the 
model was PRODEV. The positive coefficient on PRODEV indicates that the greater the 
service member's disagreement with the belief that SEAL Team COs play an active role 
in the professional development of junior officers, the greater the probability that the 
officer's career intention will be to resign. PRODEV was the only variable in the model 
to be statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval, with a p value of 
.03113. 
The regression equation, with all independent variables significant at the .10 level 
is: 
Career Intention = 1.54 - .189Children - .345SDV + .123PRODEV 
The regression results from the first model are presented in Table 5.14. 
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Table 5.14. Regression of Career Intention - Modell 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R .501124 
R Square .251125 
Adjusted R Square .146631 
Standard Error .718916 
Observations 99 
ANOVA df SS MS F Sig F 
Regression 12 14.9052 1.24219 2.40325 0.009852 
Residual 86 44.4483 0.516841 
Total 98 59.3535 
Predictor Coefficient Standard T P 
Deviation 
Intercept 1.54869 0.43657 3.54744 0.00063 
Command Potential - 0.06653 0.07762 - 0.85715 0.39375 
Marital Status - 0.06354 0.14305 - 0.44422 0.65799 
Children - 0.18909 0.11113 -1.70156 0.09245** 
ARG Deployment 0.14562 0.15333 0.94977 0.334889 
SpecOps Deployment - 0.28197 0.17243 -1.6353 0.10565 
SDV Deployment - 0.34532 0.19972 -1.7285 0.08748** 
Morale 0.06067 0.07229 0.83924 0.40366 
Fair Promotion 0.00314 0.07118 0.04412 0.96491 
Vision 0.09889 0.07546 1.31064 0.19347 
Utilized 0.04821 0.07815 0.61686 0.53896 
PRODEV .12262 .05596 2.19129 0.03113** 
Commissioning Source - 0.13842 .16246 - 0.85204 0.39656 
* * Indicates significance at the 10% confidence level. 
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A second model was created in a similiar fashion to the previous one. The only 
difference between the two models was the coding of the dependent variable. For the 
second model, the dependent variable was simply coded as: Careerist = 0 or Resigner = 1. 
In this model, the "Undecided" responses were removed. The purpose of this 
model was to examine the explanatory power of the independent variables on an 
individual's stated intention to either resign or remain in service until retirement. The 
variables in this model found to be statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence 
level were once again Children, SpecOps, and SDV. In this model, the variables 
Children and SDV were found to be even more -significant than in the first model, with 
SDV becoming statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The beta 
coefficient for the SpecOps variable, as that of SDV, was found to be negative. This 
result is not surprising, based on the overwhelming satisfaction expressed toward the 
SpecOps cruises. The coefficient of -.463 indicates that someone who has done a 
SpecOps deployment has a 46 percent greater probability of intending to make the Navy 
a career than someone who has not completed a SpecOps cruise. 
The regression equation, with all independent variables significant at the .10 level 
is: 
Career Intention = 1.35 - .068Children - .463SpecOps - .345SDV 
It is worth noting that the variable, ARG Deployment, has a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that doing an ARG will increase the probability that an individual will plan to 
resign. However, the results of this model do not indicate a significant difference in that 
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probability. This finding may be the result of the small sample size and may warrant 
further research. 
The coefficient for Marital Status was positive in the first model and negative in 
the second. In neither case was marital status found to be significant. This is interesting 
information, because the demographic characteristics of the SEAL Teams have changed 
considerably over past years, with a large percentage of the current officer population 
being married. It is also worth noting that, being a Naval Academy graduate reduced the 
probability of resigning, but not significantly so in either model. It is important to 
remember the basic point that variables may still be important even though they were not 
found to be significant. The variable, Utilized, for example, was not found to be 
significant. How operational commanders utilize SEALs may, however, play a 
significant role in a SEAL's stay/leave decision. Perhaps because both "Careerists" and 
"Resigners" feel that SEALs are improperly utilized, it has little explanatory power in 
this model. The regression results from the second model are presented in Table 5.15. 
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Table 5.15. Regression of Career Intention - Model 2 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.61062 
R Square 0.37286 
Adjusted R Square 0.21274 
Standard Error 0.88677 
Observations 60 
ANOVA df SS MS F 
Regression 12 21.97393 1.83116 2.32863 
Residual 47 36.95939 0.78637 
Total 59 58.93333 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation 
Intercept 1.35443 0.70855 
Command Potential - 0.03141 0.12154 
Marital Status 0.03155 0.23902 
Children - 0.32936 0.17622 
ARG Deployment 0.22878 0.24326 
SpecOps - 0.46314 0.26909 
Deployment 
SDV Deployment - 0.61375 0.28936 
Morale 0.09644 0.11249 
Fair Promotion - 0.01579 0.11723 
Vision 0.10690 0.11908 
Utilized 0.12764 0.13584 
PRODEV 0.14184 0.09273 
Commissioning - 0.23161 0.27599 
Source 











- 2.12107 0.03922** 
0.85728 0.39564 




- 0.83923 0.40558 
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VI. RESIGNATION SURVEY 
A. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS 
The Commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) conducted a 
survey of officers who had requested resignation in FY 1998. The researcher created the 
survey instrument on short notice so that it could be sent out with a letter from the 
CNSWC to the 38 officers who had requested resignation. A copy of the Resignation 
Survey is included as Appendix C. Only two out of the 38 officers returned the survey. 
The resignation survey was re-administered by the researcher to officers requesting 
resignation from the Navy at the end of FY 1998 and in FY 1999. During this second 
iteration, each officer who was sent a survey received a follow-up phone call by the 
researcher to ensure that he had successfully received the survey. Of the 15 officers who 
were contacted, 13 returned the survey, resulting in a total sample size of 15 (13 plus two 
previously collected). 
Although this sample size is extremely small, it represents a large percentage 
(approximately 76 percent) of the SEAL officers who, at the time of the study, were 
awaiting separation from the Navy. The researcher was unable to contact the remaining 
officers. 
As mentioned above, the Resignation Survey was created in a short time so that it 
could replace a questionnaire that was about to be sent out. Although a pre-test of the 
Resignation Survey was conducted, it was the first step in a learning process and, as a 
result, was not as complete as the Active Duty Survey. For example, it did not address 
several issues that proved to be of interest in the Active Duty Survey, including: 
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respondent's satisfaction with various deployments; and, respondent's beliefs regarding 
whether or not SEALs were properly utilized by operational commanders. This cannot 
be changed after the fact. The Resignation Survey did, however, ask two questions that 
were particularly gennane to this study. The first of these two questions was, "What 
three factors had the greatest impact on your decision to resign?"; and the second was, 
"What was/is the primary reason you have requested resignation?" A frequency 
distribution of the respondents' selected characteristics is provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Frequency Distribution of Survey Respondents, by Selected 
Characteristics (n = 15) . 
Characteristic (Name) Percent Number 
Paygrade 
Ensign 0 0 
Lieutenant Junior Grade 0 0 
Lieutenant 100 15 
Marital Status 
Single 20 3 
Married 80 12 
Divorced 0 0 
Number of Children 
Zero 66 10 
One 27 4 
Two 0 0 
Three or More 7 1 
Commissioning Source 
OCS/AOCS 13 2 
NROTC Scholarship 27 4 
NROTC Non-Scholarship 0 0 
Naval Academy 60 9 
Other (ECP, Seaman-to- O 
Admiral) 
Graduate Education 
With Master's Degree 7 1 
Without Master's Degree 93 14 
* OCS = Officer CandIdate School, AOCS = AVIatIOn Officer CandIdate School, 
NROTC = Naval Reserve Officer Training Center, ECP = Enlisted Commissioning 
Program. 
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The values in Table 6.1 are representative of officers who were awaiting separation from 
the Navy at the time the survey was conducted. Nevertheless, the reader is cautioned 
against drawing conclusions based on these characteristics, since the survey sample may 
not accurately represent the distribution of officers who request a resignation over time. 
Table 6.1 merely offers a "snapshot" of resigning officers' characteristics at the time of 
this study. 
B. RESULTS OF THE SATISFACTION SURVEY 
Similar to the Active Duty Survey, the first set of questions requested that 
respondents "Indicate your satisfaction with the. following aspects of the Navy." Once 
again, for purposes of statistical analysis, an interval scale was used, with the following 
numbers assigned to the possible responses: 
I=Very Satisfied, 2=Somewhat Satisfied, 3=Neither, 4=Somewhat Dissatisfied, 
and 5=Very Dissatisfied 
The aspect with the highest average satisfaction was "Promotion Opportunities," 
with a mean value of 2.26. This indicates that, on average, respondents are somewhat 
satisfied with their chances for promotion. This finding may suggest that many of the 
officers who were leaving considered themselves to be top performers and believed their 
chances for promotion were good. The aspect with the second highest average 
satisfaction was "Total Pay." If "Total Pay" is one of the greatest sources of satisfaction 
of officers leaving the SEAL Teams, then the initiative to increase pay may not solve the 
underlying problems behind the recent increase in voluntary resignations. 
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The aspect with the lowest average satisfaction was "Quality of Family Life" 
(Mean value = 3.60). Eighty percent of the officers surveyed were married. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that "Quality of Family Life" might be of greater importance to 
someone who is married than to someone who is not. However, "Quality of Family Life" 
was found to be one of the greatest causes of dissatisfaction in the Active Duty Survey as 
well. 
Satisfaction with "Postgraduate Education" was found to have the second lowest 
average satisfaction with a mean value of 3.47. The factors with the two highest and two 
lowest mean scores are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses To the 
Statement: "Indicate Your Satisfaction with the Following Aspects of the Navy" 
Aspect and N= % Very % % Neither % % Very 
Level of Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied nor Somewhat Dissatisfied 
Satisfaction * Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Promotion 15 20 53 13 7 7 
Opportunity 
Mean = 2.26 
Total Pay 15 20 53 7 13 7 
Mean = 2.33 
Quality of 15 0 13 27 47 13 
Family Life 
Mean = 3.60 
Postgraduate 15 7 7 27 52 7 
Education 
Mean = 3.47 
* Mean value for the level of satisfaction, based on frequency of response, where "Very 
Satisfied" = 1, "Somewhat Satisfied" = 2, ''Neither'' = 3, "Somewhat Dissatisfied" = 4, 
and "Very Dissatisfied" = 5. Thus, the lower the value, the higher the satisfaction 
(Percentage number, mean values are not rounded. % values are). 
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C. COMPARISON OF THE ACTIVE DUTY AND RESIGNATION SURVEY 
RESPONSES TO SATISFACTION QUESTIONS 
The average values of the responses to satisfaction questions for the Active Duty Survey 
and the Resignation Survey were compared to determine if there were any glaring 
differences. Surprisingly, the officers leaving the Navy appeared to be, on average, more 
satisfied than were their active duty counterparts with the following work-related factors: 
"Total Pay," "Promotion Opportunity," "Command Opportunity," Numbers of Hours at 
Work," "Amount of Family Separation," "Team Leadership," and "SEAL Flag 
Leadership. " The aspects that resulted in lower overall satisfaction for officers leaving 
included "Quality of Family Life," "Postgraduate Education Opportunities," and 
"Enjoyment of Job." Table 6.3 provides a summary of the comparison of means of 
satisfaction factors by survey. 
Table 6.3. Comparison of the Means of Satisfaction Aspects by Survey 




Total Pay 2.79 2.33 
Promotion Opportunity __ --1-__ 2_.4 __ 5--__-----2-.6-7-------11 
Operational Tempo __ --1-__ 2_.8 __ 5--_1_-----2-.7-3-------11 
Command Opportunity 2.82 2.57 ----I--~~~--I-----~~----~ Quality of Family Life 3.34 3.60 
Number of Hours at Work ----I--~2--,.9--0---I------2:-.5=3:-------I 
Amount of Family Separation 3.62 3.33 
--~-~~:---4-----~~----~ Team!Unit CO Leadership 2.48 2.47 
--~-~~:---4-----~~----~ SEAL Flag Leadership 2.96 2.60 
~~~-~~:---4-----~~----~1 Postgraduate Education Opportunities 3.11 3.47 
--~-~~:---4-----~~----~! Enjoyment of Job 1.98 2.47 
* Mean value for the level of satisfaction, based on frequency of response, where "Very 
Satisfied" = 1, "Somewhat Satisfied" = 2, "Neither" = 3, "Somewhat Dissatisfied" = 4, 
and "Very Dissatisfied" = 5. Thus, the lower the value, the higher the satisfaction. 
79 
D. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF THE RESIGNATION SURVEY 
1. Community Vision 
Responses to the statement, "The senior leadership (W ARCOM and Group 
commanders) within the SEAL community have a clearly defined vision" were 
distributed as shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Percentage Distribution of SEAL Junior Officer Responses to the 
Statement: "The Senior Leadership (W ARC OM and Group Commanders) within 
the SEAL Community have a Clearly Defined Vision" 
Senior % % % %So mewhat % 
Leadership Strongly Somewhat Neither Disa gree Strongly 
has a Clear Agree Agree Agree nor Disagree 
Vision Disagree 
% of Total . 0 7 40 2 0 33 
As seen in Table 6.4, only 7 percent of the junior officers surveyed (one officer) . 
somewhat agreed that W ARCOM and/or GROUP level leadership has a "clearly defined 
vision." At the same time, 15 percent (or 15 people) in the Active Duty Survey agreed. 
2. Command Potential 
In response to the question, "What do you think your chances would have been to 
command a TeamlBoat Unit if you stayed on active duty?," all of the respondents 
indicated that they were likely to command a SEAL Team or Unit if they had remained 
on active duty. In fact, two-thirds indicated their chances were "very likely." Clearly, 
these officers demonstrate high levels of self-confidence. They may be over-rating their 
abilities and likelihood of career advancement. If their self-appraisal is accurate, 




The two factors found to have the greatest influence in raising morale at a Team 
were "Command Leadership" and "Performance of platoon/squad on exercises." These 
were the same two factors identified in the Active Duty Survey. The two factors having 
the largest negative influence on morale were "Command Leadership" and "Deployment 
Schedule." As in the Active Duty Survey, command leadership had the largest single 
effect on morale, both in a positive and negative way. However, "Deployment schedule" 
was cited as frequently as "Command Leadership" to be the single most significant factor 
in reducing command morale. This finding was different than that found in the Active 
Duty Survey. Perhaps, the officers who chose to resign were, on average, more frustrated 
with deployment schedules than were officers who remained in service. In response to 
the question, "How would you describe the overall wardroom morale at your most recent 
sea duty command?," only 33 percent said morale was high, 40 percent felt it was neither 
high nor low, and the remaining 27 percent indicated low morale. 
4. Graduate Education 
Ninety-three percent of the officers surveyed did not have a Master's degree. 
Roughly 57 percent of the officers without a Master's degree indicated that they would 
"finish the Master's degree I had already begun." It is interesting that over half of these 
officers had already begun graduate-level education prior to leaving the Navy. Recall 
that "Postgraduate Education" was one of the two greatest sources of dissatisfaction from 
the responses to satisfaction questions. It may be that officers who have requested 
resignation are systematically more concerned with graduate education than are other 
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SEAL officers. Whether this dissatisfaction is resulting in the decision to resign, or 
whether it is the result of the resignation decision is not known. It is possible that once 
an officer decides to leave the Navy, he becomes more concerned with receiving an 
advanced degree. 
S. Pay 
"Total Pay" was one of the greatest sources of satisfaction from the satisfaction 
survey. From this result, it is at least fair to say that pay is probably not a primary source 
of dissatisfaction for the officers surveyed. This finding supports the notion that an 
increase in pay will do little to dismiss whatever is causing the dissatisfaction of these 
officers and, therefore, influencing their decision to leave the Navy. 
In response to the question, "If the Navy had offered you an annual bonus, what is 
the LEAST amount that would have persuaded you to remain on active duty?," over 50 
percent responded that "no bonus would have convinced me to stay on active duty." 
Roughly another one-third indicated that an annual bonus of at least $16,000 would have 
been required to change their decision. 
6. Marital ~tatus and Influence of Spouse on Resignation Decision 
Eighty percent of the officers surveyed were married. One hypothesis repeatedly 
given to the researcher for the rec'ent increase in voluntary resignations has been the 
changing demographics of the SEAL officer corps. More specifically, many within the 
community believe low retention rates can be attributed to the fact that more officers are 
married today than in years past. One question on the Resignation Survey asked the 
married respondents, "how much influence did your spouse have on your decision to 
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resign?" Possible responses, given in increasing amounts of influence, included "no 
influence," "some influence," "moderate influence," and "a lot of influence." None of 
the officers indicated their spouses had "a lot of influence" on their resignation decision, 
but 75 percent reported their spouse had at least "some influence." In most cases, the 
officers indicated that wives were supportive of a Navy career if their husbands were 
enjoying their job. 
Of the officers who were married, 58 percent had wives who had full-time jobs, 
17 percent had part-time jobs, and the remaining 25 percent had wives who were 
"homemakers." It may be significant that over half of the officers surveyed had wives 
with full-time jobs. Having a second source of income (perhaps in some cases greater 
than that of the husband) would clearly provide an officer with greater freedom to search 
for civilian employment. If an officer had to move geographically to execute a set of 
orders that would require his spouse to forfeit her earnings, this would increase 
considerably the cost of moving, and, therefore, might cause an officer to consider 
civilian employment. 
7. Top Three Reasons 
One question on the resignation survey asked respondents to pick from a list "the 
three factors that had the greatest impact on your decision to resign." The list contained 
11 possible options and can be seen in question number 25 in Appendix C. While every 
option was chosen at least once, two were selected more than the others. Those two 
reasons were "My future as a SEAL Officer is behind a desk," and "The SEAL 
community has no clearly defined mission." The first reason refers to the fact that once 
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an officer reaches his MSR, he faces a future that is comprised of administrative jobs, 
including tours as an Operations Officer, Executive Officer, a joint staff tour, and other 
administrative billets. 
The second reason cited may relate to the issue discussed in the results of the 
Active Duty Survey concerning SEALs not being properly utilized by operational 
commanders. It may be that, in the absence of a clearly defined mission, SEAL officers 
believe their chances of being operationally employed are slim. This point may require 
some elaboration. SEALs do have defined missions for which they train. However, it 
was explained to the researcher that frequently these missions are similar to missions 
other units conduct and, therefore, there is no single logical choice for a mission. One 
example of such a mission is Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR). Marine 
Expeditionary Units (MEV) conduct a similar mission, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
Personnel (TRAP). On paper, these missions are slightly different, but in practice they 
appear to be interchangeable. TRAP is generally thought of as consisting of a larger 
force package than a CSAR mission, because in a TRAP mission, a larger force is 
required to either recover or destroy a downed aircraft. It was pointed out to the 
researcher that the 0' Grady rescue conducted in Bosnia more closely fit the description 
ofa CSAR, yet it was the Marines (and their TRAP mission) who were chosen to conduct 
the mission. (SEALs were also on that ARG performing contingency CSAR support.) In 
this example, it is easy to imagine that the SEALs involved might have asked the 
questions "Why are we here?" and "What missions are we supporting?" 
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8. Single Most Significant Reason 
In an effort to force respondents to succinctly explain why they had chosen to 
leave the Navy, a fmal, open-ended question was asked: "Being as specific as possible, 
what was/is the primary reason you have requested resignation." Many of the 
respondents failed to answer this question, perhaps reflecting the fact that making a 
career decision is a complicated process incorporating many variables. Only one officer 
was able to express an overwhelming reason why he was leaving the SEALs, and that 
was "long family separations." All of the remaining officers who responded to the 
question gave several "primary" reasons. The reasons most commonly cited were "little 
chance of being employed," "family separation," and "a future career path that lacked the 
type of challenge" the officers desired. 
One officer captured the majority of the reasons (except family separation) cited 
for resignation: 
Over the past year I have been contemplating my career in the Navy. I 
spent 4 years at SEAL Team X as an AOIC and OIC of X Platoon, 2 years 
at a Unit as Assistant Operations, and 1.5 years at SEAL Team X as a 
platoon OIC. My experience has been rewarding and I truly cannot think 
of another job that I would rather have had. 
During my experience I have enjoyed my time with troops; seeing what 
type of motivation works with various types of men and trying to achieve 
my standards without micro-managing each task. The operational 
accomplishments and failures and the administrative lessons learned have 
helped me grow as a person. As I continue my career, I do not see the 
potential areas of growth in responsibility that I would like. From my 
perspective, a good staff officer is one who does not have any 
administrative problems. The operational lessons learned and 
implemented into post platoon commander billets are reflected little in the 
evaluation and promotion process. A good officer and deployment is an 
officer and deployment where nobody gets into trouble. 
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As I step back and analyze the world's political situation, I do not see 
significant SEAL involvement in any crisis situation in the near future. 
The world appears to be at peace and the political climate is focused on 
diplomatic or high technology type solutions during crisis situations. The 
human element of the conventional SEAL will only be utilized as a last 
resort and even then, actual readiness and ability seem to have little to do 
with selection for mission. Although I love conducting SEAL training, I 
feel the tangible results and the possibility of participating in a real 
operation are diminishing with time, and the current political infighting 
and organization offer little encouragement. 
At the closing of one of Admiral Richards' letters, he wrote, "if not you 
then who?" To take my experience and beliefs and engage the community 
with my personal positive solution is an agenda without support. To focus 
on good order and discipline, integrity and strict adherence to the chain of 
command in addition to operational capability are facets that would be 
painful to implement and not appreciated. I regret that I am part of the 
problem instead of part of the solution. My personal timing and location 
to world events can only be controlled by fate. The people and experience 
in the Naval Special Warfare community will be sorely missed; however, I 
feel it is time for the challenge of living in the civilian world. 
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VII. RESIGNATION INTERVIEWS 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
This section of the thesis uses in-depth interviews to examine the factors 
mentioned by SEAL officers as most responsible for their decision to leave the Navy. 
While previous chapters have had a quantitative focus, this chapter is qualitative in 
nature. As Mintzberg (1994b, p. 266) notes, "while hard data may inform the intellect, it 
is largely soft data that generate wisdom." With the inclusion of "soft data," this thesis 
attempts to do both. 
The interview sample consisted of 15 SEAL officers, all holding the rank of 
Lieutenant. The sample of officers represented various types of experience in terms of 
deployments (ARG, CVBG, SPECOPS, and SDV), geographic locations (EastlWest 
Coast, overseas), SEAL Team assignments (SEAL/SDV/SBU), and operational 
background (number of platoons/deployments). The researcher recorded the personal 
interviews on audiocassette. The interviews were later transcribed for purposes of 
analysis. 
A trial interview was performed on a SEAL officer who had not requested 
resignation to determine both the pertinence and clarity of the questions, and to determine 
approximate interview length. Copies of the interview introductory statement and 
interview questionnaire are presented in Appendices D and E respectively. 
While there was some initial concern by the researcher that respondents might not 
want to participate in detailed interviews or discuss personal experiences and opinions, 
this was not the case. In fact, most of the SEAL officers were eager to provide input, and 
sincerely hoped their input would be of value. The researcher frequently heard comments 
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such as: "I'm happy to contribute, and I hope my comments are of value to the 
community. I hope somebody takes the time to read this." In every case, the SEALs 
interviewed were not bitter with the Naval Special Warfare organization, and, in fact, still 
felt a part of the "Fraternal Order." The fact that the interviewer was a SEAL helped to 
establish a rapport with the respondents. 
The interview questions were open-ended to allow the subjects to discuss any 
matter they believed pertinent to the topic. Occasionally, additional questioning was 
required to clarify or elaborate on responses, not an uncommon procedure when dealing 
with open-ended questions. It should be noted, however, that great care was taken not to 
"lead" the respondent in any response. 
The respondents interviewed are members of the same cohort described 
previously in the "Resignation Survey" chapter. Interviewees consisted of officers who 
had recently (1997/1988) left active duty, and officers who, at the time of the interviews, 
had submitted letters of resignation for 1999. 
B. DATA ANALYSIS AND THEME DEVELOPMENT 
The data were transcribed from the audiocassettes and then analyzed to identify 
trends and recurrent themes related to the topic of SEAL junior officer retention. Themes 
were then developed by analyzing recurring issues or topics discussed by the 
interviewees. These issues or topics needed to be addressed by over 50 percent of the 
respondents to be considered a theme. A total of twelve themes emerged from the 
interviews. The themes are presented below with supporting justification. Each 
justification is reinforced with quotations that exemplify the opinions of the SEALs 
interviewed. 
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C. THEME I: OFFICERS BECOME SEALS FOR THE CHALLENGING 
TRAINING, THE ADVENTURE, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK 
IN SMALL ELITE TEAMS 
1. Theme 
All of the officers interviewed were attracted to SEAL Teams for the challenge of 
undergoing what is considered by many to be the toughest military training in the world. 
The SEAL Teams, many explained, represented the Navy's elite force and appeared to be 
more challenging and exciting than any other warfare specialtY. 
2. Justification 
This theme was derived from responses to a question asking respondents why 
they became SEALs. The SEAL officer community has a long queue of officers and 
officer candidates trying to "break into" the Naval Special Warfare community. The 
question was intended to determine the reasons why officers became SEALs, and to 
see if their expectations on entry were met. 
It appears that the SEAL Teams do well attracting and screening the type of 
person who is well-suited for this type of lifestyle, at least for the first few years of 
service. It may be true that the type of person who is attracted to service as a SEAL 
would also be the type of person most likely to leave ifhis expectations were not met. 
One SEAL officer explained his motivation for joining the SEAL Teams: 
From Annapolis I thought it was the biggest challenge offered in the 
Navy. I knew I was going to pursue a career as an officer and I was 
looking for whatever was the toughest thing to do and what appealed to 
me most. 
When the same officer was asked ifhis expectations were met, he responded: 
For a while, yes. Absolutely. The point where I got more and more 
disillusioned was as I got more and more senior. I got to see XOs more 
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close up. That's where the division came. As an AOIC I was in heaven. I 
loved my job. I loved being a SEAL. As I became more senior, I became 
more disillusioned, and I think that was a function of two things. One, 
SEAL Team X was better when I was an AOIC, and then it reached the 
level that SDVT-X is at, or was at when I was there. I had weaker 
leadership at SDVT-X. Secondly, as I became more senior, I was more 
exposed to the XOs and senior leadership. 
A second officer had this to say about his reasons for choosing the SEAL Teams: 
Well, the main reason I became a SEAL is because they do the things I 
like to do. When I first joined, I was thinking about being a Marine. I 
wanted to lead troops and work with men. I once did Marine Corps 
Bulldog, and after that I went out to Mini-BUD/S, and it was much more 
of a performance baseline as opposed to kind of the regulations of the 
military. SEALs, you know, believe in ~ission completion or you fail, as 
opposed to the Marines where you only have to do (the minimum) ten 
pushups and all that stuff. I like to be outside and work in that arena, and 
also it seemed like a hard, tough challenge. I think mini-BUD/S and 
BUD/S combined was a good experience and was something I was 
impressed with. I'd say once I got to the Teams, you know, I think as you 
learn a little bit more and you realize that you're not the secret warrior and 
stuff, but overall it was pretty close to what I expected. 
The fact that the job was physically challenging and provided an opportunity to 
work in small elite teams held special appeal to some: 
I guess, for the challenge and the opportunity to work with small elite 
teams in a challenging physical environment. Was it what I expected? 
Yes and no. I think I was somewhat disappointed by the ... 1 guess I 
thought that it would be a little bit "cooler" than it was for lack of better 
terms. The challenging aspect was certainly there. I thought it was more 
challenging in ways that I was not expecting, though, as far as 
administrativel leadership challenges to deal with. You know-liberty 
incidents and all that kind of stuff. So the actual SEAL stuff itself wasn't 
as challenging as I thought it was going to be, whereas the things 
surrounding it were more challenging. 
When asked if the SEAL Teams had met his expectations, the same officer 
remarked: 
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I think for the most part I came into this community kind of looking for a 
challenge and something I would fmd rewarding on a daily basis. For 
awhile it held that, but then you realized that it seems that, as it stands 
right now, the community is in a state that you're out doing busy work, but 
you're not doing it for any real reason or goal or focus. There's no focus 
or direction or opportunities to employ the skills you've been developing, 
and that's really the main thing. 
F or many, the opportunity to work in small elite teams was the primary attraction. 
One Lieutenant explained: 
I became a SEAL because I like the close teamwork-oriented group that 
all officers were working with when they went through the same training 
that the enlisted did. Also, the challenging environment and excitement 
that the SEAL Team offered. 
Most officers believed the SEAL Teams represented the best the Navy had 
to offer. One such officer explained his attraction to the Teams: 
The stated quality of the people, and the fact that it was .. .! guess you 
could call it the best of the best. I considered myself that kind of a person, 
so I guess that was the logical choice. 
D. THEME II: OFFICERS FIND THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAN AND 
LEAD OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AS THEIR MOST REWARDING 
EXPERIENCE 
1. Theme 
For the most part, the interviewees felt that being given the responsibility and 
freedom to make decisions, and then being able to observe the results of their efforts (be 
it training exercises, Full Mission Profiles, or actual missions) were the most rewarding 
parts of being a SEAL officer. Working with people was also reported as a very 
rewarding part of the job. 
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2. Justification 
There is a selection process that takes place for SEAL officers. It begins prior to 
selection for SEAL training-a self-selection. People who choose to undergo SEAL 
training probably enjoy physically strenuous work, enjoy challenging themselves, and are 
predisposed to working in teams. Selection again occurs when an officer is selected to 
attend BUD/S and continues throughout SEAL training. As a result of all this selection, 
SEAL officers may be more performance-oriented than are other officer groups. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that strong performers would cherish the opportunity to 
demonstrate their capabilities, and, after having performed well, would receive 
considerable satisfaction from their effort and success. It is reasonable to assume that 
officers who consider themselves strong performers would want the freedom to make 
decisions and the autonomy to implement those decisions. 
Several officers expressed their satisfaction at having accomplished a challenging 
task. A Lieutenant related two of his most rewarding experiences: 
The two most rewarding experiences were both my OREs (Operational 
Readiness Exams). The first one was at SDVT-X as the primary navigator 
for an SDV mission. Actually briefing, planning, running the whole op, 
which, as an AOIC was kind of unusual. I guess, at a normal SEAL Team 
you wouldn't get to run an ORE as an AOIC. But, we had to do three 
OREs at SDVT-X, one for each officer to check that you were a 
competent navigator so that the other members of the platoon that were 
involved, you know, throughout the planing and execution process. It was 
just a challenging and rewarding operation. Even more so was the ORE at 
SEAL Team ONE, being the platoon OIC and conducting a pretty difficult 
underwater Draeger, hydro-recon using a new technique, and then going 
back in and blowing up obstacles. Again leading that whole thing. 
Planning, executing and watching it come through to fruition 
successfully-I found that extremely rewarding. We were a test case for 
the West Coast, so proving that it could be done, should we have to do it, 
was real rewarding. 
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An officer who had the opportunity to conduct several real operations 
commented: 
Well, I was involved in 12 real world missions in Somalia. I really 
enjoyed that. I felt like I was a competent operator. I was really 
comfortable doing .the mission planning and going out and doing ops, and 
I felt like I had a lot of freedom, once we were in the area of operation, to 
make decisions and put missions together and do what I dreamed of doing. 
So that would be it I would say. The rest of it, well, it kind of went 
downhill. 
A Lieutenant who liked working with people over all else had this to say: 
I'd say my most rewarding experiences were all during the same positions, 
and that would be as an SDV Platoon Commander and as SEAL Platoon 
Commander, and that was watching my guys grow from more than just an 
individual focus to a team focus. I really enjoyed having them develop 
into a team. I liked that the most. More than just finishing an FMP or 
doing a mission or anything like that. I really liked working with the boys. 
One Lieutenant who shared that officer's sentiment explained his most 
rewarding experience succinctly: 
Taking care of the men. Having them feel like things are worth doing. 
After each training phase that they felt good about themselves, they felt 
like SEALs. That's the most rewarding. 
Another officer felt that completing tactical training gave him credibility 
and was rewarding, but not as much as being in charge: 
Being the officer-in-charge, being able to plan something and make it 
happen, and then seeing what the results were. Watching young sailors 
put out for something you're leading and then actually seeing the results, 
the product, and it being a good product, so to speak. That was very 
rewarding as a leader. 
After an officer completes a tour as a Platoon Commander, the opportunity to plan 
and lead operations and training is greatly reduced. Although there are still plenty of 
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opportunities to plan and lead, they are in a different context. The opportunity to lead 
small elite teams, the one thing the interviewers identified as their most rewarding 
experience as a SEAL, is no longer available. One officer captured this feeling of most 
officers best in his comments: 
I sure would have liked to have done something, but I didn't. And I would 
have hated to have sat on the sidelines and watch another platoon go in. 
Sitting on the sidelines means attached to the command or back at the 
Team as XO or CO being the onshore quarterback. My dream was to 
come in there and do something, and I didn't. That was my biggest wish-
it never happened. 
E. THEME III: OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE USED IN 
MISSIONS FOR WHICH THEY WERE TRAINED 
1. Theme 
Most officers expressed frustration in believing that they would never be used in 
missions for which they were trained. This was a prevalent theme for almost all officers 
interviewed. It was cited by many as having a strong influence on their decision to leave 
the Navy. 
2. Justification 
At one BUD/S graduation ceremony, the Captain of the Naval Special Warfare 
Center told the graduating class that, by completing the arduous training, they had earned 
what he called "the right to be the first to fight." Many officers said they simply did not 
believe this was true. Politics, poor marketing skills, operational commanders not 
understanding how to use Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the lack of senior SEAL 
leadership forward were all commonly cited as reasons SEALs would not be employed. 
Other reasons given include the current reluctance to risk human life and the reliance on 
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technologically advanced weapons for intelligence collection and precision strikes--
missions that may have previously required the use ofSOF. 
One officer explained that he had come into the Teams expecting to be 
"America's force of choice" for Special Operations. He expressed his disappointment as 
follows: 
I think everybody is disillusioned. You come in and you're ready to be 
sneaking around the jungles of Columbia shooting drug warlords and 
stuff; th~ fact is we're not doing that. We're conventional. I can accept 
that. I understand" that there is a mission for us out there and I wouldn't 
want to risk somebody's life for some bullshit no matter what. I'm just a 
little bit. .. reality has set in and I'm not so sure that it is something I want 
to be a part of. I think my third reason is my lack of confidence that 
SEALs will be utilized in an actual situation. I love training. I love doing 
the job. I think that ... there is no question in my mind that SEALs provide 
the best product. But I don't necessarily think SEALs will be used. I 
think we could be the best SEAL Team and I could have the best SEAL 
platoon, but it doesn't matter. It just means the Anny is going to win that 
battle. If technology isn't going to win the battle the Anny is. There are 
just too many barriers. They're not going to use us, man. That's my 
belief. You take that not being used, I'm moving out of my operational 
window. Let's imagine the terrorist thing gets going really good and 
maybe we could actually get some action. I'm out of my envelope. I'm 
not going to get to lead anybody to go get Bin Laden. I'm not doing that 
anymore. Someone else will get to do it, someone younger than me. 
Perhaps our boys will conduct the really high-speed mission, but no way--
the Anny's going to get that. The odds are against me getting a real 
mission and I'm moving out of my window. 
A SEAL who had conducted twelve missions in Somalia did not believe he would 
ever have the opportunity for combat again: 
I was told I was lucky to have twelve real-world missions and that I should 
count my blessings. That's the feeling I got from sitting in on classified 
meetings and hearing about how things had not gone our way. My gut 
feeling was that I was not going to get back and do an operational billet, I 
was not going to be the man playing a real mission. That definitely 
affected my decision. My gut feel as I looked toward the future was that I 
was not going to get back and be in a real-world situation doing a real 
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mlsslon. In my opinion that's what I was a SEAL to do and if I wasn't 
going to do that then I should devote my time to my family. 
Officers who had completed ARGs generally felt they were playing "second 
string" to the Marines, and if the chance for action did come, that they would be written 
out of the plan. As one officer put it: 
I did a MARG and some of the training we did wasn't valuable. I suppose 
it was the politically correct thing to do, but some stuff just didn't make 
sense. We cross-trained with the Marines, mostly because we relied on 
them for all of their assets. In reality, we'd never get their assets if 
something were to come down. It's all nice to say yes, yes, but deep down 
you knew that if something went down and the Marines said they'd do it, 
you were going to get excluded from the whole operation. I told everyone 
(we would be used) to keep moral up, bu~ I never really felt that we were 
an option because we never had anyone to go against them or have us 
included in the pie. 
An interviewee who had experience in three different geographic areas of 
operation believed that it really did not matter which theater a SEAL was in. His chances 
for combat action would be minimal in any theater: 
I think overall, I've been in Asia and Europe and in Southern Command 
and I think all theaters nearly do the same. You look back and see what 
you did in Asia or Europe and that, overall, we're not going to be out there 
doing the actual combat direct action mission. We're lucky if we get to go 
recon. There's not one deployment, but I definitely felt useless down in 
Panama. I mean, I felt like, yea, I am performing the mission of going 
down and doing JCETs, but other than that, I was just diving, jumping and 
patrolling for kicks. Which is fine. That's why we do it, 'cause we love 
this job, but in terms of ... do I feel like an integral cog--absolutely not. 
Recall, from the findings of the Active Duty Surveys discussed in Chapter V, that 
satisfaction with deployments varied both by coast and by type of operational 
commander. In general, SEALs who deployed to Naval Special Warfare Unit 2 believed 
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they were being utilized, while most others did not. One East Coast SEAL who shared 
this view observed: 
The missions we were doing in Bosnia I mean, basically, and I thought we 
were very fortunate in getting them, ·cause they easily could have gone to a 
Green Beret or Ranger battalion, so I... when we were at Unit 2, I feel we 
were definitely being used. For what little missions there were out there at 
that time period. I felt actually we were fortunate to have what we 
received. I really don't have an axe to grind like those poor guys stuck out 
on a ship. I felt really fortunate. 
Another officer who believed that SEALs deploying to Naval Special 
Warfare Unit 2 in Germany were being used by their operational commanders-
even Army commanders-had this to say: 
For Unit 2 and those deployments, they're getting work over there. 
They're starting to erase whatever bad memories that the old Army 
Colonels had in there mind, so as those guys go up the ranks they're 
starting to realize that, hey, SEAL Team is synonymous with good team 
and they're starting to get work. The Army Colonels we worked for loved 
us and they employed us. That happened for the last three deployment 
cycles that SEAL Team 2 sent over to Unit 2 for Bosnia. 
The West Coast SEALs tended to have a different outlook. For example, 
one West Coast officer explained his frustration as follows: 
The feeling that you were never going to get the opportunity to do 
anything for real. . I don't want to sound like a war-monger or anything 
like that, but other than OREs, most of the operations are pretty canned 
and boring, even the exercises you go on when you deploy are basically 
training up other countries that are so far behind you that you are not 
bettering yourself at all. I just felt like there were very few opportunities 
to be pushed and challenged in a real kind of way so that was certainly one 
of my frustrations. 
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Several officers believed the SEAL community needs to do a better job 
marketing its capabilities. An officer with SDV experience remarked: 
It seems to me it's somewhat foggy and people aren't really sure how to 
utilize SEALs and I don't know if it's our fault as SEALs. The senior 
leadership needs to be out there promoting, because you really have to sell 
Special Warfare to other warfare unit commanders. If they don't know 
how to use you, then they're not going to use you whether its 
SUBGROUP 8 or the carrier or whatever. I think its all marketing. I 
don't think the senior leadership markets themselves. Maybe it's out of 
the old mystic of being a silent warrior. I don't think the rest of the Navy 
knows how to use SEALs the way they should be. That's just my opinion. 
Some of the officers commented that the SEAL Teams could learn marketing 
skills from the Marine Corps. One officer felt strongly that the SEAL Team needed to do 
a better job of marketing or else risk losing future employment: 
My horseshit opinion after 9 Y2 years. I don't know if you've had much 
exposure to the Marine Corps. I've had quite a bit of exposure, especially 
in the last 2 years. The Marine Corps has a skill that I think we lack. We 
are good at our jobs, extremely good. We just aren't very good at telling 
people that. The Marine Corps is extremely good at telling people how 
good they are, they're just not very good at doing it. I think we've got to 
figure out how to be a little bit more like the Marine Corps. It kind of 
sucks. It's kind of staff like. And it's kind oflike people like to say, "Hey, 
we'll just do good and people will recognize us." Well, the times are a 
little different now. I think we got to do a little bit better at the public 
affairs, if you will. At selling us, selling ourselves, selling our 
community, selling SEALS as a whole. And, the Marine Corps, they're 
phenomenal at it. Unfortunately, they're a mile wide and an inch deep. 
We are a mile deep and an inch wide. And I've seen it affect us a great 
deal. Down in Latin America, I saw us lose or come very close to losing, 
and we still may, Peru. Because, the Marine Corps sold it. They sold their 
ability. Of their ability, they were lying for the most part. They couldn't 
do what they said. And they ended up relying on us when it came time. 
But they're leading the charge, and they're getting the credit. We can sit 
in the background and say, hey, we know that we're doing all the work 
and let the Marine Corps get all the credit. Well, that works for so long, 
but pretty soon you don't get asked to play anymore. I'm not positive that 
the senior leadership has figured out how to deal with that or that they 
think they should .deal with that. I don't know. I'm not naive. I don't 
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know exactly what goes on up there, but I've seen it at the grassroots 
level, and it isn't working very well at the moment. And who do they put 
out there? They got a big 0-6 out there, and he can sell it big time. And 
who do we send out there? An 0-3 sometimes, an 0-4 if you're lucky. 
Another officer explained that SEALs need to market themselves better to 
"get in the show": 
It's trying to impress whomever to try and get in the show when the show 
happens. The Marine Corps does it really well. They are "an ounce of 
appearance is worth a pound of performance." They do it very, very well. 
We suck at it. 
Some of the interviewees believed that operational commanders have a 
difficult time knowing when and where to employ SEALs, because SEALs no 
longer have a "niche role." These officers argued that, because SEALs have so 
many missions they could be called on to do, that they are no longer the logical 
choice for any single mission, with the possible exception of traditional DDT and 
Combat Swimmer operations. A West Coast officer explained: 
I think that ... I don't think they know how to properly utilize us a lot of 
times. They want to use us, but they don't exactly know how or what 
we're good at, and I don't think we know what we're good at. One of the 
thingsI think we need to do is clearly define our role and pick a few things 
we want to be experts in instead of looking at your FXP-6 requirements 
and however many, I can't even remember how many blocks you need to 
get checked off on to be C-l. There's no way any group can be that good 
at all those different things. If you talk to guys across the board each one 
spends a bunch of time doing different things. Some guys are real good in 
the water, some guys are good on land, each platoon ends up with some 
little niche, but I think you need to stabilize the end product at some point 
or pick your spots. We no longer are the resident experts on anything 
really if you think about, and I think that makes it hard for operational 
commanders to say "Oh, it's this mission, give it to these guys." Instead, 
it's like, "Well who can we use on this one? We could use these guys or 
. we could use these guys." There's no-we're the best at this-type thing. 
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F. THEME IV: OFFICERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SEAL 
COMMUNITY HAS A CLEAR VISION OF THE FUTURE 
1. Theme 
None of the officers interviewed thought that the SEAL community has a clear 
vision of where it is headed. Several officers discussed "Vision 2000" and "Quantum 
Leap," but most felt uncertain about what was developing with these initiatives and were 
not sure if they were part of a larger plan. Over half of the officers interviewed were 
concerned that many senior SEALs are reluctant to embrace new technology and to 
search for the new missions that technology will enable--missions that will make SEALs 
both relevant and highly desirable assets in the years ahead. 
2. Justification 
According to Bolman and Deal, in Reframing Organizations: 
"Around the world, middle managers say that their organizations would thrive if 
only senior management provided strategy, vision, and 'real leadership.'" (Bolman and 
Deal, 1991, p. 403) Many of the Lieutenants (the SEAL community's middle managers) 
interviewed relayed similar thoughts with regard to the SEAL Teams. What exactly that 
strategy, vision, and leadership should look like, and even what level it should come 
from, was not commonly agreed upon. This is not surprising. There is frequently much 
disagreement about what function senior leadership should provide. Many organizational 
theorists believe that the role of senior leadership is to set direction for an organization. 
How this occurs is largely a function of organizational configuration. (Roberts, 1998) 
Whatever organizational configuration is used, and however an organizational 
vision is crafted, it should be a shared vision. It was clear during the course of the 
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interviews that the majority of Lieutenants felt the SEAL community needed a direction 
and believed the Teams did not have a common vision. Many officers believed there 
were efforts being made to establish a vision, but expressed no ownership in that vision. 
One officer wondered how much thought was being given to the future: 
Sure, the Commodore comes and talks to you before you deploy, and has 
no idea what you guys are doing, and who you are, and understandably so. 
Those guys are so far removed. I think the Commanding Officer of the 
Team is the guy who should be still in touch with you. Above that, I don't 
know. But I often wonder what those guys are thinking about as far as 
where we are going in the future. I don't know if too many people are 
thinking about how to employ SEALs ten years from now or what our jobs 
are going to be. I think there's going to be a drastic change in how 
warfare is going to be viewed in ten to fi~een years, and all the technology 
that's coming down. Where we're going to be, and what we are going to 
. be capable of doing. They need to keep their eyes and ears on that. 
While a common vision can promote unity of effort, many officers believed that 
the reason the SEAL community does not have a common vision is because there is little 
consensus on what the future should be and not much teamwork at the Commander-and-
above level. One officer explained: 
Well, I don't think we have any vision. I don't think SEAL Team is a 
team when you get to the senior echelon. I see no teamwork at the senior 
echelon. It's like everybody forgets their team foundation when they were 
junior officers. When they become COs, there's no more team in there. 
Everyone's more concerned with how they're going to look on a Fitrep or 
getting promoted to Captain so they can retire as an 0-6. That's the 
feeling I got when I was with the inner workings with Group X. That 
hurts everyone else. No one wants to focus together on what a vision 
should be. I mean Vision 2000, in itself, was not the end-all-be-all answer 
to everything, but it was a step, it was a forward-thinking step. It may not 
be the right one, but it was the kind of thinking that we needed to have. 
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G. THEME V: OFFICERS DO NOT USUALLY HAVE MENTORS. THOSE 
WHO DO FEEL THAT HAVING A MENTOR IS A POSITIVE 
INFLUENCE TO STAY IN THE NAVY 
1. Theme 
Surprisingly, very few of the officers interviewed indicated that they had a senior 
officer who they felt was in the least bit concerned with their career. This was not true 
for all officers interviewed. The officers who said that they had a "sea-daddy" or mentor 
felt they were fortunate to have had such a relationship with a more senior officer. 
2. Justification 
Mentorship has been identified as an extremely effective way of teaching 
specialized skills. Throughout history, it has been used as a method to teach individuals a 
special trade. The Great Chinese Fleet used principles of mentorship to instruct their 
sailors, as did many great European navies. (Levathes, 1994, Cipolla, 1996) The 
difficulty with adopting a policy of mentoring is that it is inefficient (a mentor can 
usually instruct only one person at a time) and is time-consuming. Despite these possible 
drawbacks, the idea of mentoring has been recognized as valuable by many modem-day 
corporations and other organizations. One of the interviewees, who now works for IBM, 
explained that "Big Blue" strongly encourages new employees to seek mentors in their 
departments. In a military organization, it is not appropriate for a junior officer to seek 
out a "sea-daddy." The senior officer must initiate this type of relationship. 
According to interviewees, several Commanding Officers have assumed the role 
of mentor. Some COs apparently take it upon themselves to mentor several junior 
officers. Some people call this "mentorship," some simply refer to it as leadership. 
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Whatever we choose to call it, the results indicate that mentoring tends to be the 
exception, rather than the norm. 
Besides providing guidance, counseling, and acting as a role model, a mentor may 
also increase an individual's commitment to the organization by making that officer feel 
like an integral part of the organization. 
When asked if he had a mentor, one officer remarked: 
No, and I...that is one of the big factors for me. I've got really no one out 
there that's looking out for me. My first CO is out. My second CO is still 
in, but he kind of has the personality, well zero personality, and he's got 
his own agenda. My third CO is out. My fourth CO is still in but is not 
one to look out for JOs. My CO, when I.was at Four, was great but he is 
now out. My current CO, I've been deployed his entire reign so I don't 
really know him. _ And you look back on the XOs and perhaps now 
they've risen into a leadership position. I have an old XO I respect, and I 
guess I could call him if I needed advice. I think they would, but it's 
almost as if they don't want to because it's my own career. I don't know. 
There's no basis for it. 
An officer who struggled with the decision to leave the service confided that he 
could have been persuaded to stay in the Navy: 
At a point, I was -so close to deciding to stay in. I was borderline. I 
reckon if I did have a sea-daddy and he was pushing hard for me to stay 
in, I reckon he could have talked me out of it. I was that close. 
One officer felt that senior enlisted personnel often filled the role of 
mentor: 
I never really did at the Teams, but when I came here to the Academy I 
met a Commander who I talked with for a very long time, probably over 
the past year, should I stay in or should I get out. He was a fantastic guy. 
He is a Naval Flight Officer, though. If I ever had anything close to a sea-
daddy, it was probably a chief more than a senior officer. Commander X 
was a fantastic guy, but I would never speak personally to him. Never 
anyone who was senior to me. Don't know why. But I did a lot more 
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with the chiefs, and learned a lot more from them because of their 
experience. If I did have one in the Teams I would have to say it was a 
senior enlisted. 
Although the senior enlisted personnel are well suited for providing technical guidance in 
tactical matters, they are probably not as well suited for counseling officers on their 
professional development and career planning. 
Another officer found career guidance and advice from officers close to his 
paygrade: 
It was mostly peers. No one who was more than one paygrade ahead of 
me. Actually, by the time I got out, I was the same paygrade as all of the 
people I would consider mentors. 
Several officers did indicate they had a more senior officer as a mentor. One East 
Coast SEAL, for example, considered himself to be fortunate: 
Yes I did. It wasn't like the guy put his arm around me and said from here 
on out I'm going to be your guardian angel or anything. I certainly felt 
that I could go to myoid CO, CDR X, for that. He had me over for dinner 
and said, "Hey, what's this latest thing I heard you're going to 
DEVGRU?" He talked to me about my platoon. And I felt that for me, 
for the other platoon commanders, that was a unique relationship that we 
had. Most platoon commanders couldn't call up an old CO or even an 
active one and do that sort of thing. I was fortunate with that one. 
H. THEME VI: OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND FAMILY SEPARATION 
PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE DECISION TO RESIGN 
1. Theme 
Almost all officers, whether married or single, suggested that family separation 
and operational tempo played a significant role in their decision to leave the Navy. 
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2. Justification 
Recall, from the Active Duty Survey, that the majority of SEALs indicated 
satisfaction with most deployments (except the East Coast ARG). Six months away from 
home can be difficult, but most officers indicated that, if the time was well spent, it was 
not cause for separation. Many officers explained that six-month deployments are 
planned and generally occur once every two years. What appeared to cause more 
frustration was the considerable time spent away from home training, frequently on short 
notice. Most acknowledged that, in order to be a SEAL and be proficient in different 
environments, travel was a necessity. Nobody was sure how to resolve this issue, but 
many suggested somehow training "smarter." Other suggestions included not deploying 
for six months. As one officer explained: 
We are not ships. We don't have the same required maintenance cycle 
that ships do. Why do we deploy for six months? You know the Airforce 
PJs and Combat Controllers do something like three-month rotations. We 
should explore some of those options. 
Everyone did not agree on a solution to the operational tempo issue, nor did 
everyone have a proposed solution. Nevertheless, the interviewees agreed that family 
separation and operational tempo played a substantial role in their decision to leave. One 
officer responded to a question regarding the amount of influence operational tempo had 
on his decision to resign: 
Significant. I would say on a scale of 1-10, I would say eight or so. Being 
top of my peer group ... the better you do, the more you're needed and I 
think I was gone eight months out of the last year, and I wasn't even 
deploying. I was just ... opportunities come up where they need someone 
who is knowledgeable in such and such, and since I'd worked in that area 
and done well, I was the logical choice. Because I was very 
motivated ... at work I would say, "yea, send me," it wouldn't be until later, 
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when I got home, that I realized what it was doing to my family life. So 
upon reflection, it took me awhile to realize how often I was going and the 
reason I was. There were several other officers at the team and I would 
think, "Why didn't they send him?" Well it's because he's completely 
incompetent, so he's happy working a 9-5 job, has a great family life, and 
gets the same medal I got. That's the whole equity thing. 
Many of the single officers were reluctant to admit operational tempo had any 
impact on their decision, but most eventually indicated that it was a significant factor. 
One single officer observed: 
I'm single. Very little influence-almost none. On the other hand, I've 
been underway probably out of the last five years, four of those five. My 
OpTempo (Operational Tempo) is roughly 80 percent lets say. How can 
you have a wife and a personal life when- you're gone that much? On the 
other hand, I feel that if you're going to be a SEAL, you've got to deploy. 
So I'm kind of caught on this issue, and I'm not sure how to do both. To 
be a SEAL, and have your own life. As a JO, I was like, "Hey send me 
baby." I don't know about you, but that's the attitude I've had the whole 
time. Now I'm getting in to nine years and you're like shit. If I keep 
going, I'm going to be like 35, swinging single, looking for some kind of 
root, which you have none because you've been living out of a Para 
(Parachute) Bag. That is a concern. The married guys do the same thing 
and then they have this wreck of a family. Some guys can work it out, but 
a lot of them don't. 
One officer expressed the basic thought conveyed by the majority of the officers 
interviewed: if one is deployed for a good, purposeful reason, the deployments are worth 
the time away; if however, there is a perception that one will not be employed, officers 
begin to question the reason for the family separation. As the officer stated: 
My first inclination is to say not much, but I think when you're gone a lot, 
travelling a lot, if you're doing something that's rewarding and 
worthwhile, I don't think most guys have a problem with that. When 
you're gone just to be gone, and spending time twiddling your thumbs 
somewhere, then it starts to be a factor because you get frustrated and 
you're like, "Man I don't mind being away from the wife and family for 
how many months, whatever, but when I'm just sitting here doing nothing, 
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then, yea, it is kind of bullshit." I think that's when it starts to be a 
negative thing and starts to weigh in on your mindset and attitude. 
I. THEME VII: SPOUSES TEND TO PLAY A MINOR ROLE IN THE 
DECISION TO LEAVE SERVICE IF THE OFFICERIHUSBAND IS 
SATISFIED WITH IDS JOB 
1. Theme 
This theme was developed based on responses from married respondents to a 
question regarding the amount of influence a spouse played on the decision to leave the 
Navy. In many cases, wives were willing to support their husband's decision for a career 
in the Navy as long as the husband was happy. If the service member was generally 
dissatisfied with work-related factors, however, then most officers interviewed felt the 
family separation was not worth it. 
2. Justification 
Clearly, this theme relates to the previous one. The demographics in both society 
and the SEAL Teams have changed considerably over the past twenty years. In society, 
more and more women have entered the labor force in professional roles. At the same 
time, more SEAL officers are married today than in years past. Perhaps the nomadic 
"live out of your parachute bag" lifestyle that is appealing to many single officers is not 
as much so for married officers. Also important is the fact that many wives have a career 
of their own. In the cases of several of the officers interviewed, the civilian spouse 
earned more money than the officer did. When these officers' orders required them to 
move, they were facing a substantial reduction in family income as their spouse would be 
forced to give up her earnings, at least temporarily. 
107 
Although some members of the SEAL community believe that changing 
demographics are responsible for the recent increase in voluntary resignations, the 
interviews suggest that the reason is not simply the fact that more officers are married 
. than in years past. Marriage is considered to be important when husbands become 
dissatisfied or frustrated with their time away from home. In fact, it is fair to assume that 
married officers would become dissatisfied more easily than single ones. The challenge, 
then, is to give officers, whether married or single, every reason to believe that their 
sacrifice is for a good, meaningful cause. 
Most officers suggested that their wives were generally supportive of their Navy 
careers. One officer said his wife played only a small part in his decision to leave, until 
he viewed his time away as meaningless: 
A small amount. I kind of told her from day one that if I had the 
opportunity to go to Damneck, that I was going to do that. She kind of 
agreed with that. She also said that she didn't want me to be a miserable 
civilian. She wanted to make damn sure I didn't pull the plug and blame it 
on her. So I was careful not to do that. It comes back to spending time 
busting your butt, travelling all over, being gone a lot and really not doing 
a whole lot. That's what made the decision a lot easier. I don't mind 
spending time away from the family if I'm doing something worthwhile, 
but when it comes down to wasting time, and I saw that for the next 10 
years looking at me in the face, I was like, "I don't think so, I'll go make a 
little bit more money and have a better life. 
Several officers suggested that their wives had almost no influence. One such officer 
responded: 
One-hundred percent none. She was wonderful about that. She was 110 
percent supportive for me to go to DEVGRU or getting out. She was 
ready to stay in for the long hall. And that's something that kind of pissed 
me off, to tell you the truth. When X came out, his first comment was, 
"Well let me tell you, I know why everyone's getting out. It's because ten 
years ago 30 percent of the officers were married and now its 52 percent 
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so it's the wives that are making everyone get out." Horseshit. At least 
forme. 
J. THEME VIII: PAY TENDS TO INFLUENCE AN OFFICER'S DECISION 
TO LEAVE WHEN HE IS INVOLVED IN AN ACTIVE JOB SEARCH 
1. Theme 
None of the officers interviewed were attracted to the SEAL Teams because of 
money. Almost all said that dissatisfaction with pay did not cause them to first consider 
resigning. When other job-related factors caused them frustration, pay did playa role in 
the service member's decision process, although how much, and what aspects of pay, 
were different for each individual. For example, some were attracted by high paying jobs 
now available in the civilian sector, while others were more concerned about their income 
after retirement. Almost all officers expressed forward-looking behavior, and considered 
how marketable they would be upon retirement from the Navy. 
2. Justification 
Recall from the literature review the discussion about how an individual makes 
career choices. It was suggested that an individual weighs both the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs of leaving against the perceived benefits of staying. A raise in pay 
clearly represents an increase in the monetary costs of leaving, and, therefore, would 
likely provide an incentive for an individual to stay. The difficult question to answer is, 
"What is driving people away?" Is it dissatisfaction with the pay, or is it dissatisfaction 
with something else? The responses to interview questions indicate that it is 
dissatisfaction with the non-pecuniary factors that cause people to re-evaluate their 
employment decisions. After they have reached this point, they initiate job-search 
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activities, which make them more aware of their civilian opportunities. One officer 
explained: 
Pay was not that big a motivator, but I would say ... well I was not that 
unhappy with my pay in the Navy, but the fact that I knew I could get out 
and step up into a higher pay scale was a serious thing. You know, I was 
looking at having to be a L T for a bazillion years; that's what my next 
significant raise was going to be-LCDR. I could get out and make a lot 
more money, enjoy stock options-things the Navy cannot do, but civilian 
companies can do great things for you monetarily. If I had been satisfied 
with work, I would have been satisfied with the level of pay. Once I 
became dissatisfied at work, money became more of an issue. 
My brother-he's a year younger than I am. He went to Georgetown and 
studied international business and went to work for a technologies 
company in Silicon Valley and is already a multi-millionaire. He was an 
influence. I was having some hellacious experiences at SDVT-X and my 
brother came out for Christmas in '95 and basically hit me with a big clue 
bat. He asked me, "Why are you killing yourself out here and getting 
nothing when you can get out and have a good family life and be ready for 
a good retirement when you're 40-something?" That was pretty heavy. I 
turned my resignation in about a month later. 
Many officers said pay was not an influence on their decision whatsoever: 
Pay didn't have any effect on my decision. I think JO's are paid a lot 
better than they think they are. I'm making more money now than I did in 
the Teams, but I wasn't complaining about the money that I made. What I 
was going to do was going to be there no matter what I did. 
The officers interviewed were split fairly evenly with regard to their response on 
how much influence the strong economy of 1998 had on their decision to resign. Some 
believed that the strong economy, the abundance of available jobs, and the timing with 
regard to their careers, taken together, did affect their decision. An East Coast officer, for 
example, observed: 
The strong economy did factor in, to be honest with you because I thought 
about .. .! thought well I'd go to Damneck for three years and get out. And 
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I just thought, man, the economy is so nice right now, this is probably the 
best time to get out, and I was also at the age where you're not too far 
behind your peers. The direct pay not so much, but the economy certainly 
did because I think a lot of people are hiring and that's a better feeling to 
step out into that, so that had somewhat of a factor. 
Many officers were concerned with their long-term income potential, such as 
retirement and second-career income. An officer who turned down orders to the SEAL 
Development Group described how pay affected his decision: 
Where the pay affected my decision was through retirement. Probably the 
number-one reason why I got out. Because ... and when it really hit me, I 
was sitting in as the XO at STX; I was XO for about 45 days. I would go 
with the CO to CO meetings and the Admiral had a meeting with all COs 
and XOs on the East Coast. I'm sitting in this room and I'm looking 
around at everybody and all these guys ... a lot of the guys were like, "well 
I'm getting out at 20." The retirement I would get is dramatically reduced 
from what even they would get. So I was forward thinking about my 
family. If I'm going to go out into the mainstream at 45 and start another 
career, SEAL Team doesn't set me up for anything. Especially at less 
than 50 percent retirement, I mean that's .. .it just seemed ludicrous for me 
to stay in. And I put that question in with the Admiral about, hey, "is 
there any way of attacking retirement to at least bring it back to 50 
percent," and he didn't even answer that question. That was a really big 
factor for me. 
After more questioning, the officer quoted above explained that it was not 
actually pay that made him think about leaving. It was only after he was considering 
leaving that pay weighed in on his decision to leave: 
I've been thinking about leaving since 1995. It was not the pay system 
then. To tell you the truth I really didn't even fmd out about my decrease 
in retirement until about a year and a half ago. It was a whole bunch of 
things. Retirement was probably the straw that broke the camel's back. 
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K. THEME IX: DEPARTING OFFICERS BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE 
EVENTUALLY COMMANDED A TEAM OR UNIT IF THEY HAD 
STAYED IN SERVICE 
1. Theme 
Most officers interviewed believed that their promotion to Lieutenant Commander 
was virtually "automatic" and that their chance for Command was very good. Most 
officers reported having "unblemished" records, and although it was not specifically 
asked of the respondents, about one-half reported to have "broken-out" (been 
recommended for early promotion under the new fitness report system). 
2. Justification 
Some turnover is believed to be healthy in an organization. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
1994) If people who are not well-equipped for a job leave, then they make room for 
those better suited. The result is a better fit between the organization and the individuals 
who are employed. (Muchinsky, 1992) This theme was developed from responses to a 
question that tried to determine if people were leaving due to their "poor fit" with the 
SEAL Teams. If many of the officers leaving felt that their chances for promotion were 
slim, then we might assume that they had not excelled at their jobs and that they were not 
top performers. This addresses the issue of the functionality of turnover. That is, it 
addresses the question of not only the number of people leaving, but also the quality of 
people leaving. The reader may be skeptical at this point as to the honesty of the 
respondents. Nevertheless, it was clear to the researcher that the interviewees gave their 
best estimate of their chances for advancement. Many recognized that the opportunities 
for major command were few, but others felt confident that, if they could avoid trouble, 
their chances, even for major command, were good. 
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One officer rated his chances for command as almost certain: 
I'd say 99 percent. Is promotion equitable? Yes. I think it's alinost a 
fault of the system that it's so equitable. The system leaves little room for 
judgement. If an officer has one poor fitrep he is finished. I think if I 
stayed in the Navy that I would have commanded a SEAL Team, just by 
mere attrition. And making 0-4, that's a no-brainer. 
An officer who felt promotion was largely a function of not getting in trouble 
observed: 
I think I would have done fine. I think I did a good enough job of not 
stepping on myself, that I would have advanced. To me, I think there's 
something in that. Just not doing bad things is not good enough for me. It 
seemed like I lost a little bit of the challenge there. It seemed like the 
people I was seeing advanced to 0-4 were just people who kept their nose 
clean. They weren't your real risk takers or dominating leaders that I 
looked up to. Do I think promotion is equitable? No I don't. Seems like 
if you just put your time in you'll make 0-4. I saw people who I didn't 
think should be advanced get advanced. 
L. THEME X: OFFICERS TEND TO FEEL FRUSTRATED WITH THE 
NAVY'S PROMOTION. AND REWARD SYSTEM, AND PREFER A 
SYSTEM THAT IS PERFORMANCE-BASED 
1. Theme 
Many of the officers expressed some level of frustration with the Navy's 
promotion and rewards system. Although most officers believed that many excellent 
officers were being promoted, they expressed concern that some officers were being 
promoted that should not be. 
2. Justification 
It is rational to expect that top performers would prefer a reward system that links 
rewards--be it promotion, pay, awards, or some other form of recognition--to 
performance. Under the Navy's hierarchical system, this is not always easy. Pay and 
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promotion are tied to years' of service, not performance. Since the majority of officers 
(historically, around 80 percent in the SEAL officer community) are selected to 
Lieutenant Commander, it is a long time before performance plays a significant impact 
on rank or pay. The fact that an officer is a Lieutenant with little hope for promotion for 
five or more years also caused frustration. 
One ex-SEAL officer, who had been out of the service for about 10 months at the 
time of his interview, expressed concern with the promotion system: 
You know, I was looking at being a Lieutenant for a bazillion years. 
That's when my next significant pay raise was going to be--Lieutenant 
Commander. I got out of the Navy last Yl?ar and I've been promoted twice 
in my civilian job. That's a good feeling. In the Navy it felt like 
promotion was never going to come. Do your time. I think for some of 
the less motivated individuals, I think they just settle into that. They were 
fine; they were comfortable with that. That wasn't enough for me and I 
felt I was on the fast track. I felt if I worked hard I could make any rank I 
wanted, but it was going to happen too slow. 
Another officer expressed concern for the way that officer rankings frequently are 
based on time spent at a command or the specific needs of an officer rather than on 
performance: 
I've been pretty competitive throughout, so I haven't had a problem with 
the zero-defect thing, although I don't know if there's a question later 
about the Fitrep (Fitness Report) system or evaluation system at all or 
should I address that now because I have a beef with that. Basically, it 
kind of ties to the zero-defect thing, I guess, but the way things are 
running now .. .1 was lucky enough to sit on the XO/CO screening board 
here. It was the first one the SEALs actually ran for themselves and I got 
to watch that whole process, go down and look at about a million records 
you know, see what guys had, and how their Fitreps looked and 
everything. It was pretty educational, but one of the things I kind of saw 
was how .. .1 always thought that Fitreps were no big deal. You do your 
job and everything falls into place. The guy says, "well look I have to 
rank so and so ahead of you because he has been here longer than you and 
that whole thing, it's no big deal." Well, that stuff does come into play 
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and I often wonder, with the way they've written the system now, I 
understand there's competition and everything, but when guys aren't 
straight grading you for your performance and they're looking at different 
things like, "well, this guys at this stage of his career, and what do I need 
to give him to keep him around," or the things that get tied into an 
evaluation or Fitrep are somewhat frustrating. It seems like ... I guess in 
an ideal world you do your job and get graded on doing your job and 
that's .. .if you did your job better than the next guy then you should be 
ranked ahead of him, not if he's going on to be Ops Officer or something 
and needs this Fitrep, or he's two years senior to you and needs to make 
LCDR, or whatever it is. I guess I'd like to see some of that go away. As 
far as the zero defect goes, it's somewhat of a reality now that if you have 
a bad Fitrep or two you are done as far as screening for XO and making 
LCDR. 
M. THEME XI: OFFICERS FEEL THAT THE NAVY'S DETAILING 
PROCESS IS INEQIDTABLE, BUT rms DOES NOT PLAY A MAJOR 
ROLE IN THEIR DECISION TO LEAVE SERVICE 
1. Theme 
All of the officers believed the detailing process is in need of revision. 
Interestingly, most of the officers interviewed either were pleased with the assignments 
they had, or believed they had benefited from the inequitable system. 
2. Justification 
The issue of detailing was brought up at each of the three Junior Officers 
Conferences held in 1997. Many respondents to the Active Duty Surveys (discussed in 
Chapter V) wrote comments in the margins of the survey regarding the need to fix what 
was referred to as "the broken detailing process." The results from interviews with the 
officers leaving the SEAL Teams indicate that, although the detailing process may not be 
perfect, it is not the cause of the recent increase in junior officer resignations. Although 
many of the officers believed that detailing relied on "the good old boy network," most 
officers interviewed still felt that they had benefited from it. 
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One East Coast SEAL commented on the detailing process: 
I was very fortunate with my detailing. Fair system? (Laughs) No, but I 
was fortunate. You kind of get the feeling; well if you have a good 
rapport with X, well then you can pretty much say you are going where 
you want to go. At least that's the feeling I always had. She was always 
good to me. I never dealt with the last three detailers. It was always X 
that's why I bring her name into it. I don't have a single complaint about 
my detailing, but I don't know how equitable it is. 
An East Coast SEAL officer who deals with the detailer regularly remarked about 
the workload in the detailing office: 
Man, it's a busy, busy office in that place. I mean X right now I 
think ... there hasn't been a detailer for the past month and a half. X is the 
detailer. They gapped the billet. And' I'm like, "wow that's a pretty 
important job to gap." 
Although the officers felt the detailing system was in need of revision, opinions 
regarding the efficiency of the system varied. One officer explained that an officer 
simply needed to be pro-active in managing his career, and that detailing had no 
influence on his decision to leave the Navy: 
It didn't have any influence on me. You just needed to call ahead and find 
out what was available and just be pro-active. You couldn't call X a week 
before you're supposed to get orders and say, "I want to go to Hawaii." 
You're going to Guam. If you didn't plan ahead, that's where you were 
going. She has stuff to be filled. If you didn't give her a heads up, that's 
where you were going. I didn't have much contact with her, but every 
time I needed something she was always there and always went above and 
beyond what she needed to do. I had no grudge with X. She always 
helped me out. Even after I was getting out, she helped me out. She 
definitely does more than is required. 
It is interesting to observe that not everyone thinks the system should be fair. 
Some officers feel that, while pay and promotion are not tied to performance, maybe 
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receiving good billets should be. When asked if he thought the detailing system was 
equitable, an officer currently stationed overseas responded: 
Is it equitable? No. It's the total good old-boy system. Is that bad? 
Probably not. If somebody is good, they should get good jobs, so I'm for 
it--being inequitable. I think the 0-4s and 0-5s should be more involved 
and should try and communicate more with each officer. This is tied to 
the mentor thing. I've never really been spoken to about the career path I 
was taking. When I think about it, nobody ever said "hey you should go 
here or here, and this is a good job." No, that has never happened. 
A West Coast officer who believed he knew how the system worked shared his insights: 
I knew how the system worked. I knew who buttered the bread. Who to 
talk to and who not to piss off. Some guys refuse to play the game and 
they get punished by it. I don't know if its equitable or fair, but that's the 
reality, so I don't know how you arJ.swer that and I think there are some 
timing issues that end up forcing people into bad deals or good deals. You 
just get lucky or you don't. You just call on the right day. And so I think 
it might be better if it were a more formal system where the jobs were 
posted for everybody to see when they were available, that sort of thing. 
Seems like there is a hidden jar where all the cool jobs are and if you don't 
have the key to that, you're going to be looking at the same things all the 
time. For the most part, I didn't have a problem, but I can see where 
people might. 
N. THEME XII: OFFICERS FEEL THAT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED 
1. Theme 
The majority of the officers interviewed expressed concern that, while SEALs do 
an exceptional job of training enlisted personnel and officers in tactical matters, officer 
professional development is haphazard and left largely up to the individual. Most 
believed a more formal system would be beneficial. 
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2. Justification 
SEAL officers undergo a Junior Officer Training Course sometime after 
completion of BUD/S training. Professional Development then occurs at the individual 
Teams where an officer learns through on-the-job training. Most officers explained that, 
by the time they completed their OIC tour, they had just about figured out what it was 
they were supposed to be doing, and those who were fortunate enough to have two OIC 
tours said they were much better prepared for the second one. 
One senior Lieutenant explained: 
I'm ready now to be a Platoon Commander. I could be so much more 
effective than I was three and a half years ago, but that's not what we do 
with our Lieutenants, or not with our senior Lieutenants. 
After the OIC tour, an officer's next big "ticket" is his Operations Officer tour, for 
which there is no formal training. The officers interviewed who had held the position of 
Operations Officer explained that this job requires a different skill set than that of Platoon 
Commander. 
A post-Operations officer commented on how his professional development 
prepared him for the jobs he has held: 
No, I don't think I was given proper preparation for several of the billets 
I've held. I was Ops Officer at Team X right after I was a Platoon 
Commander and that was sink or swim big time. That was mach five the 
whole time ... Shit, life's not perfect. You're not going to get a year of 
training to be Ops Officer. I was able to do it well enough to keep the 
Team above water. I also saw people who were thrown in there shortly 
after me who didn't survive. They were relatively inexperienced, which I 
would say I was, but they didn't have what it took to put in the time or just 
didn't naturally have the ability to swim. And they flailed and they were 
replaced. 
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Other significant jobs a senior Lieutenant might have include Task Unit 
Commander positions on ARG staffs or as a SDV Task Unit Commander. There is no 
fonnal training for these jobs, either. Perhaps because of their competitive nature and 
their desire to perfonn well, most SEAL officers seem to do fairly well at these jobs, 
despite the lack of fonnal training. 
Several officers believed that Platoon Commanders are generally well trained 
tactically, but not professionally. A West Coast officer offered this opinion: 
I don't think we teach junior officers to sell our capability. I think 
professional development in that sense lacks, big time. We send a lot of 
young Platoon Commanders out there \yho go maybe four years in the 
Teams and all they've done is shot and blown things up and partied with 
the boys. Then they're standing in front of some 0-6 on an ARG and are 
expected to' know everything about Naval Special Warfare. What we do, 
how we do it, how we plan, what's going on up above as this happens, and 
I think a lot of guys aren't ready for it when they go. That's been my 
experience. 
While discussing how he felt about the SEAL officer career path, an officer currently 
stationed overseas commented on professional development: 
I think it lacks professional development and I also think we are poor at 
developing our JOs. For example, nobody ever really taught me at all 
throughout my career. Now you know I've stumbled along and I've 
figured it out fme. But to develop the kind of officers we want out in the 
fleet, there needs to be some actual educating, whether its from senior L Ts 
or 0-4s, but that needs to happen at the lower levels, the STT level. I was 
the Joint Operations Officer for Matador this time for the whole SOC and 
I definitely felt that I didn't have the professional development as an 
officer who can right plans and do the bigger picture stuff with the Anny. 
The guys who had been to the Anny and Marine Officers Advanced 
Courses, were definitely more prepared and knew what needed to be done, 
therefore they were able to sell their product. I think that has a lot to do 
with the fact that the Marines are able to sell their product better. SEALs 
simply ... yes we can figure it out after working on the job and, in general, 
our people are much better, but there's nothing that takes the place of a 
good education. 
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An officer who said the lack of professional development was a primary reason 
for his resignation also commented that, if he were able to change one or two things in 
the Teams, he would focus on improving professional development: 
I don't have a solid plan for professional development. I'd probably start 
with seeing what the Anny has for their officer corps. Something where 
you could say, Hey I'm going to go to the Naval War College for a 
year .. .I'd have language training built in. I would professional 
development built in. I would have War College and equivalents built in 
so people can make the transition from a small-scope focus to a big scope. 
That's where I think we lose a lot. F or instance, Group X was such a 
micro-managing machine because they didn't seem like they had any big 
focus. The leadership couldn't change their thought. They were focused 
at times on a damn vehicle and who's going to drive what vehicle, when 
they should be thinking about how many. vehicles a Team should have or 
things much bigger than focusing on small items. 
Respondents also raised a slightly different concern regarding professional 
development. Most of the officers were concerned that the professional development 
they believed they would receive in the Navy would not prepare them well for a second, 
post-retirement career. Even graduate education programs, such as Special Operations in 
Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), offered at the Naval Postgraduate School, was not 
viewed as significantly enhancing an individual's future marketability. Many respondents 
suggested that they could have been enticed to stay in the Navy if they would have had 
the opportunity for professional development that they saw as both relevant . and 
enhancing in their second careers. 
O. DISCUSSION 
Although it did not warrant discussion as a theme, the researcher found that many 
of the interviewees felt that the Naval Special Warfare organization was reluctant to 
embrace technology. Of course, SEALs are trained to rely on personal skills rather than 
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on "gadgets," which tend to break in the rigors of the surf-zone. However, SEAL Teams 
have traditionally had equipment like the Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Radios, 
Laser Designators, Digital Imagery devises, high-speed boats and other items that gave 
them capabilities unmatched by Marine Force Reconnaissance and Army A-Teams. 
Clearly, this equipment, while not advanced compared to what is commercially available, 
was far superior to that of even other elite Special Operations teams. A Lieutenant 
expressed his view of how "high-tech" the SEAL Teams are: 
The SEAL community is so far behind in the technology it has available to 
it. You can buy better stuff off the store shelf. It gives you unlimited 
capabilities to do.... With your GPS ~d your cell phones and all that 
stuff we could eliminate tons of stuff you have to carry. With your 
IFF ... there's a lot of stuff out there. There's a lot of stuff out there that's 
better than what we have. But, where do you stop spending the money? 1 
think what we need is a single vision of where we're going. 
A SEAL, who presented some new technology to several senior SEAL Officers, 
had this to say: 
1 briefed some of the stuff 1 worked on in DC and some of the stuff was 
fairly technical and out of the realm of most SEALs' world. As 1 briefed 
some of the stuff to some of the guys, 1 got the standard, "I don't need 
anything but UDTs and a knife because 1 haven't been stopped yet." Well, 
that's great but we haven't been in combat since Vietnam except for a few 
incidents, and 1 don't know how guys can say that. That was at the 
Commodore or Captain level. 1 had someone at the Commodore level say 
to me, "This fancy stuff is all nice, but nobody can stop me as it stands 
right now, and until they prove they can, I'm not wasting my money or my 
time on technology. Kind of blew my mind. It's unbelievable. 1 found 
that to be a little bit cave-man-ish. 
Several officers said that there is a reluctance to embrace technology because it is 
new, and it tends to require new skills and possibly even new missions. As one officer 
who had proposed using computer simulations to plan missions put it: 
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We still think that writing your PLO on toilet paper in the shithouse is the 
way to go. That's cool stuff. It's warrior, it's frogman all the way. It just 
ain't '90s. And it sure isn't 2000, which is coming up real soon. I'm not 
saying my idea is the greatest in the world. It's going to work if they 
would finally use it, but just the fact that people balk at anything like that 
is a sign we're not ready. 
P. SUMMARY 
SEALs enjoy the challenge of working in small elite teams, but do not feel they 
are properly utilized. In fact, because they are unaware of a unifying vision of the future, 
they see little hope that the situation will improve in the near term. Once these SEAL 
officers believe they that will not be used, they begin to question if the sacrifices they 
make (in terms of high operational tempo and family separation) are worth it. These 
frustrations combine with others, such as dissatisfaction with the reward system and 
future professional development, to cause the officers to consider civilian employment 
opportunities. Unfortunately for the Navy, this is occurring at a time when the economy 
is strong and the opportunities for employment (perhaps at a greater wage) appear 
abundant. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the reasons for the recent increase in SEAL junior officer 
voluntary resignations. To accomplish this, several data sources were generated: an 
Active Duty Survey, a Resignation Survey, and Resignation Interviews. 
The Active Duty Survey captured data concerning junior officers' satisfaction 
with a variety of work-related factors. An analysis of variance was conducted to 
determine if the mean levels of satisfaction were significantly different for respondents 
with different career intentions. The study then matched the responses to satisfaction 
questions with an officer's stated career intention. A regression model was developed to 
investigate the explanatory power of responses to satisfaction factors on career intention. 
Two additional linear regression models were estimated using both demographic and 
attitudinal data culled from the Active Duty Survey. 
The Resignation Survey data were compared with those of the Active Duty 
Survey to determine if there were any differences in responses to survey questions 
between the two groups. 
Resignation interviews were conducted with officers who left the Navy in 1997 or 
1998 or were awaiting separation during the 1998-1999 period. Common themes were 
extracted from the interviews. These themes provided insight into the reasons why the 
respondents chose to leave the Navy and highlighted opinions on work-related issues. 
The results of the Active Duty Survey provided information regarding the level of 
satisfaction of junior officers serving in SEAL billets with various work-related factors. 
Of the officers surveyed, 34 percent planned to resign prior to completing 20 years of 
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service, while 26 percent expected to remain in the Navy for a full career. One officer 
planned to transfer laterally to another community. The remaining officers (39 percent) 
were undecided on their career plans. SEAL officers who are "on the fence" are probably 
the ones that future policies should target to convince them to stay in service. 
Unfortunately, the officers who have left the service will most likely provide a model for 
those who are "undecided" about the opportunities that exist in the civilian labor market. 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the satisfaction questions 
indicated that satisfaction with "Operational Tempo," "Quality of Family Life," and 
"Family Separation" distinguished individuals who plan on making the Navy a career 
from those who intend to resign. Specifically, the results of the ANOVA indicated that 
the mean values of the responses to satisfaction questions for these three factors were 
significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level. Other findings include the fact 
that 85 percent of the respondents said they did not believe senior leadership has a 
clearly-defined vision. Also, 85 percent indicated that they would be willing to move 
geographically to increase their operational opportunities. Of the officers who intend to 
resign, over two-thirds said they would remain in service if they could remain 
"operational. " 
None of the officers who were surveyed strongly agreed (on a scale from 1-5 
where "strongly agree" = 1 and "strongly disagree" = 5) that SEALs are properly utilized 
by operational commanders, and about 13 percent somewhat agreed. The major cause of 
dissatisfaction and apparent operational misuse seems to come from the East Coast ARG 
deployment, although frustration with deployments to Guam was also expressed. 
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Results of the regression analysis using career intention as the dependent variable 
indicate that officers with children, officers who had completed a tour at an SDV Team, 
and officers who had completed a Special Operations deployment are more likely than 
other officers to plan on making the Navy a career. Officers with children may enjoy the 
benefits or job security the Navy offers. Recall that this analysis was based on stated 
career intentions. What career decision the respondents actually make is not yet known. 
Therefore, an officer with children may, at a later date, find that family separation 
becomes a more important issue as his children get older. Because the Active Duty 
Survey analysis relied on an officer's stated career intentions and not actual behavior, the 
remainder of the study focused on the officers who had actually made the decision to 
leave the Navy. 
The results of the Resignation Survey indicate that, on average, resigning officers 
are satisfied with their promotion opportunities and with their pay. They are least 
satisfied with "Quality of Family Life" and "Opportunities for Graduate Education." 
Similar to the findings of the Active Duty Survey, the officers surveyed disagree that the 
SEAL community has a clearly defined vision. All of the officers surveyed believed their 
chances for command were good. Many were enrolled in graduate-level education 
programs prior to leaving the service. The two most frequently cited reasons for 
voluntary resignation were "My future as a SEAL is behind a desk," and "The SEAL 
community has no clearly defined vision." 
Twelve themes were identified from responses to the open-ended interview 
questions used in the Resignation Interview. These themes are summarized below: 
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THEME I: OFFICERS BECOME SEALS FOR THE CHALLENGING 
TRAINING, THE ADVENTURE, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN 
SMALL ELITE TEAMS. 
THEME II: OFFICERS FIND THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAN AND LEAD 
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING AS THEIR MOST REWARDING 
EXPERIENCE. 
THEME III: OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE USED IN 
THE MISSIONS FOR WHICH THEY WERE TRAINED. 
THEME IV: OFFICERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SEAL COMMUNITY 
HAS A CLEAR VISION OF THE FUTURE. 
THEME V: OFFICERS DO NOT USUALL Y HAVE MENTORS. THOSE 
WHO DO FEEL THAT HAVING A MENTOR IS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE 
TO STAY IN THE NAVY. 
THEME VI: OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND FAMILY SEPARATION PLAY A 
SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE DECISION TO RESIGN. 
THEME VII: SPOUSES TEND TO PLA Y A MINOR ROLE IN THE 
DECISION TO LEAVE SERVICE IF THE OFFICERIHUSBAND IS 
SATISFIED WITH HIS JOB. 
THEME VIII: PAY TENDS TO INFLUENCE AN OFFICER'S DECISION TO 
LEAVE WHEN HE BECOMES INVOLVED IN AN ACTIVE JOB SEARCH. 
THEME IX: DEPARTING OFFICERS BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE 
EVENTUALL Y COMMANDED A TEAM OR UNIT IF THEY HAD STAYED 
IN SERVICE. 
THEME X: OFFICERS TEND TO FEEL FRUSTRATED WITH THE NAVY'S 
PROMOTION AND REWARD SYSTEM, AND PREFER A SYSTEM THAT IS 
PERFORMANCE-BASED. 
THEME XI: OFFICERS FEEL THAT THE NAVY'S DETAILING PROCESS 
IS INEQUITABLE, BUT THIS DOES NOT PLA Y A MAJOR ROLE IN THEIR 
DECISION TO LEAVE SERVICE. 
THEME XII: OFFICERS FEEL THAT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED. 
Unquestionably, making a career decision is a difficult and complicated process 
that incorporates many variables. Despite the fact that every officer interviewed 
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attributed varying levels of importance to different reasons for leaving, some factors were 
identified by the majority of respondents to have had a significant influence on the career 
decision. The two factors mentioned more often than any of the others were family 
separation and the belief that the officers would not ever be used in a real mission. The 
majority of officers believed that, if they were not going to be properly used, family 
separation and high operational tempo were not worth the sacrifice. 
A third reason frequently cited was the perceived lack of community vision, 
which gave officers the impression that the current situation was not going to change in 
the near future. Officers indicated that they had very much enjoyed their time in the 
SEAL Teams ("Enjoyment of Job" was the most frequently mentioned satisfier among all 
of the work-related factors), but had reached a point where they felt they had to find new 
and different challenges. Officers who become SEALs generally thrive on continual 
challenge and feedback. These officers often feel the need to test themselves. Many 
indicated that they did not see their future in the SEAL Teams as challenging or 
rewarding as in previous years, nor did they see the kind of professional development in 
their future that would entice them to stay or prepare them for a second career once they 
retired from the Navy. 
Pay and marital status were not found to be related to resigning from the Navy. 
On the other hand, frustration and/or dissatisfaction with work-related factors such as 
family separation and the perception that SEALs are not a viable contender for missions 
were found to prompt an individual to look for a civilian job. Once an officer became 
aware of other job opportunities, then both pay and an individual's marital status played a 
role in the stay/leave decision. 
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It is likely that a large proportion of the officers leaving are top performers. 
Fitness Report performance data were not collected for the present study; however, 
historically inflated grades would probably provide little variation among officers. 
Nevertheless, officers were asked to gauge their own chances of success in gaining a 
command. The overwhelming majority believed that, had they stayed in the Navy, their 
chances for at least a team-level command were very good. Other performance indicators 
included selection for highly sought billets. For example, several of the officers turned 
down the opportunity to go to the SEAL Development Group, while one officer 
requesting resignation is currently stationed there. Another officer turned down orders to 
a Joint Special Operations Command billet. 
Another indicator of performance is an officer's reputation. In a relatively small 
officer community such as the SEALs, an officer's reputation is generally well known. 
Many of the officers leaving had a solid operational reputation and were highly respected 
by their peers. The final performance indicator used was an officer's destination when 
separated from service. Several officers who have since left the Navy are enrolled in 
business school programs at top universities such as Harvard, Carnegie-Melon, and 
Georgetown. Others are employed in managerial positions in competitive firms. For 
example, one officer is at IBM, another is studying for an Electrical Engineering degree 
while managing a team that engineers advanced medical and surgical devices, while yet 
another is the project manager for a multi-million dollar development project. The 
graduate education programs and jobs these officers have chosen may not be perfect 
indicators of how well the officers performed as a SEAL, but they do suggest high levels 
of motivation, talent, and determination, which are skills valuable in any profession. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Current Initiatives 
The Commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command has addressed many of 
the issues discussed in this thesis, as outlined in a 19 November, 1997 message to SEAL 
junior officers. (Richards, 1997) These efforts should continue and information 
regarding progress should be made available throughout the chain-of-command. At the 
same time, a feedback mechanism should be established that allows junior and senior 
officers to offer recommendations regarding these issues without fear of any negative 
consequence. 
2. Articulate a Vision of the Future 
By providing a common vision for the organization, leaders provide a sense of 
both purpose and direction. A shared vision can help focus individual decision making 
and channel efforts in a common direction toward a common goal. In the words of the 
baseball Hall of Fame player and manager, Yogi Berra, "if you do not know where you're 
heading, you're likely to end up somewhere else." Berra's observation captures the idea 
that, without a sense of purpose and without a common goal, organizations are basically 
lost. (Bryson, 1995) A vision can help provide that sense of purpose. 
The responsibility of creating vision does not fall solely on senior leadership, but 
senior leadership is responsible for creating the environment and designing the 
organization to promote visionary thinking. As a designer, the leader does more than 
create boxes and lines that represent reporting authority. Peter Senge describes a leader's 
role with regard to organizational design, "The first task of organizational design 
concerns designing the governing ideas of purpose, vision, and core values by which 
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people will live. Few acts of leadership have a more enduring impact on an organization 
than building a foundation of purpose and core values." (Senge, 1990, p. 10) 
Roberts (1998, p. 26) describes the skills required of a general manager who 
assumes the roles of designer, teacher, and steward: "To fulfill these roles, the manager 
has to be skillful in focusing on key organizational questions, structuring and facilitating 
around those questions, and engendering trust among the key stakeholders so they 
willingly collaborate in their search for answers that all can support." Putting this in 
context, this could mean identifying a future direction for the Teams, bringing in 
stakeholders (including CO's, JO's, operational commanders, etc.) for discussion and 
problem solving, and creating a system whereby it is everyone's best interest to work 
toward a common goal as opposed to a personal agenda. 
Stakeholders are more likely to take ownership in an organization's outcomes if 
they have been included in this process. In this way, too, the leader does not espouse "his 
vision," but rather "our vision." "Vision 2000" and other visionary initiatives have 
percolated up from the middle management ranks. New ideas that challenge old ways of 
doing things and old beliefs are vital to a learning organization. Despite all of the great 
ideas that may come from the operating core or middle management, it is only the more 
senior leadership that has both the wisdom and frame of reference to best understand how 
Naval Special Warfare might best support USSOCOM and the theater CINCs. However, 
it is important for senior leaders to be willing to ask the question, "Is this vision worthy 
of your commitment?" It is through this continual questioning that the organization will 
be able to adapt rapidly to a changing environment and organizational learning will 
occur. Why must the Naval Special Warfare organization value learning? As Eric 
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Hoffer noted in The Ordeal of Change (1963), "In a world of change, the learners shall 
inherit the Earth; while the learned shall find themselves perfectly suited for a world that 
no longer exists." 
3. Develop a Marketing Strategy 
All of the officers interviewed believed the SEAL Teams needed to do a better job 
marketing their capabilities. The focus of the marketing effort should be directed at the 
fleet operational commanders. Part of the solution may be having more senior leaders 
forward to represent the deployed platoons. If more senior officers are deployed forward, 
great care should be taken to avoid removing some of the autonomy and decision making 
opportunities that junior officers find so rewarding. 
4. Define the Organization's Competitive Advantage 
Many of the respondents believed the SEAL Teams no longer have a "niche role" 
that makes them distinct, with the exception of Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) type 
missions and combat swimming. The officers believe that because many SEAL 
capabilities are, at least theoretically, duplicated by other teams (Force Reconnaissance 
and A-Teams), operational commanders do not have a clear choice on which team to use. 
If there is no one logical choice for conducting a mission, the decision is then perceived 
as a political one. 
A marketing strategy or plan is the short-term fix. For the future, however, Naval 
Special Warfare, like any competitive organization, needs to identify its competitive 
advantage. What are the factors that make the SEAL Teams unique? What is it that only 
SEALs can provide for operational commanders? What is it that SEALs can provide that 
will make Naval Special Warfare forces crucial in future conflicts? If conventional units, 
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because of technology or other enablers, can now accomplish missions that used to be 
unconventional, then perhaps SEALs should explore other avenues. The SEALs of 
tomorrow may have unique capabilities that operational commanders may not yet 
envision. 
One thing that clearly sets the SEAL Teams apart from other organizations is the 
people. Naval Special Warfare selectively recruits and then rigorously trains its people to 
have special capabilities. This is true today, and it will be true tomorrow. 
S. SEAL Officer Retention Bonus 
A SEAL officer retention bonus may increase retention of junior officers; 
however, the recent increase in junior officer turnover should be viewed as a symptom of 
other problems. Though pay does not appear to be one of the problems, increased pay 
may help alleviate the symptom of low retention. In particular, it may have a significant 
influence on the large percentage of officers who remain undecided on their career 
intention. It should be remembered that increasing pay would do little to correct the 
underlying causes of low retention. 
6. Officer Career Path 
The officer career path should be re-evaluated. It may be that a revised pipeline 
could be designed that would both encourage SEAL officers to remain in service longer 
and improve the combat readiness of the platoons. For example, one possibility might be 
somehow splitting an AOIC and OIC tour with a tour at SBU or as an assistant Task Unit 
Commander, thereby providing the officer with some valuable experience and holding 
the "carrot" of a Platoon Commander tour later in the officer's career progression. 
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7. Professional Development 
Closely related to the officer career path is the issue of professional development. 
There are two elements of professional development that should be addressed. The first 
deals with improving the capability of the officer. The second involves using 
professional development as an enticement to encourage officers to remain in service. 
The current professional development "system" appears to be somewhat haphazard. 
Many officers interviewed indicated this results in our officers being less skilled at staff 
work and marketing skills; skills not considered glamorous, perhaps, but certainly 
important if SEALs hope to "sell" their capabilities. Even more desirable than staff and 
marketing skills are those skills that enable an officer to think systematically. More than 
just recognizing trends or patterns, this capability enables an officer to understand what 
causes those patterns or trends. Instead of responding to symptoms, an officer with this 
skill is able to address the underlying causes of the behavior. In this way, he is able to 
influence future events. Presently, there is not a structured professional development 
system that supports this type of learning. 
In order for the promise of professional development to entice people to remain in 
service, it must somehow provide skills perceived as relevant to a second career. This 
might include education opportunities other than a National Security Affairs Masters 
Degree from the Naval Postgraduate School, and might include management and 
business-related education. 
8. Demonstrate Commitment to Deployed Forces 
There is a common saying, "If something is worth doing, it is worth doing well." 
This statement is especially relevant in the case of ARG deployments. If it is important 
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deploy on an ARG, then SEAL leaders must demonstrate commitment to those deployed 
forces. This means sending out capable officers with staff experience as Task Unit 
Commanders. If that tour is used as a tool for the officer to gain staff experience without 
any prior training, it may be at the expense of that platoon that is in his charge. This 
operational billet should be desirable, and officers doing a good job at it should be 
rewarded accordingly. It should not be a "get well" job for a Lieutenant who failed to 
select for Lieutenant Commander. 
9. Mentor Program 
Senior officers should adopt or continue to employ some form of mentorship 
activity. The results of the study indicate that most officers did not feel they had anyone 
looking out for them. At least one of the officers interviewed was never even called in by 
a senior officer to discuss his decision to leave. If people really are the Navy's most 
valuable assets, they should be treated as such or expected to find work elsewhere. 
10. Leverage Intellect 
Every quarter, students at the Naval Postgraduate School are in search of a thesis 
topic. With minimal funding, NA VSPECW ARCOM could have studies conducted 
relating to a number of topics, including manpower planning, retention, and information 
technology management, to name a few. NA VSPECW ARCOM should provide the NPS 
Systems Management Department with a list of research topics it is interested in 
pursuing. 
11. Review Selection Criteria 
The criteria used to select SEAL officer trainees may need to be revised. For 
instance, it is possible that patterns of teamwork and leadership are more important than 
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academic achievement. To use a stereotypical example, research may show that the 
captain of the Naval Academy football or wrestling team is more inclined to make the 
Navy a career than is an honor graduate who has many civilian employment 
opportunities. The decision to change selection criteria should be made based on the 
vision of the future. If SEALs are going to be the "Cyber-Warriors" of the twentieth 
century, then academic performance is the correct criterion to use. If, on the other hand, 
the skills required of future SEALs will not appreciably change, then teamwork and 
leadership may be more appropriate criterion. 
12. Innovation Cell 
Each service has established groups for purposes of long-range planning and 
innovation. Although the SEAL community may not have the manpower resources to 
dedicate to this type of effort, a small group of people could be used to follow the ideas 
that emerge from the considerable investment that the services are making. For example, 
the Army has its "Army-After-Next" group and the Navy has its "CNO Strategic Studies 
Group." Additionally, the Marine Corps is engaged in some innovative activities such as 
observing how Stock Traders on Wall Street manage information and make decisions 
under stress. The Marine Corps is also observing Extreme Sporting events (or "X 
Games") to develop new methods of mobility in urban terrain. By creating networks of 
information and expertise with these outside innovation cells, Naval Special Warfare 
might be able to leverage others' investment and exploit ideas that are applicable. 
13. Explore New Deployment and Training Cycles 
The high operational tempo that is a reality for SEALs is affecting officer 
retention. Efforts should be made to reduce time away from home, whenever possible. 
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Resigning officers suggested several alternatives to the traditional six-month deployment 
cycle including three-month overseas rotations, and a four-month cycle that was 
comprised of four months training, four months deployed, followed by four months at 
home in local schools or in stand-down. These undeveloped suggestions represent the 
"out of the box" type thinking that may be required to develop new and better ways of 
doing business. 
14. Use a Systems Model Approach to Analyze Officer Retention 
As discussed previously in Chapter II, junior officer turnover may be a symptom 
of a greater problem within the community. The data collected in this study indicate the 
possible lack of congruence between several of the design factors (e.g., people, reward 
system, organizational structure, planning, and information management, etc.) of the 
Naval Special Warfare organization. A future study using a systems model to analyze 
officer retention may help detennine if, in fact, misalignment exists among the different 
design factors. A systems model that might support this analysis is provided as Appendix 
E. 
15. Conduct an Analysis to Determine How Value is Added to the SEAL 
"Product" at Various Stages within the Organization 
Most officers interviewed felt that the key product that the SEAL Teams supply 
operational commanders is a combat-ready SEAL platoon. Although it was not 
developed as a theme, many of the officers interviewed believed that many senior officers 
had lost sight of that fact. Considerable concern was expressed that frequently the 
training and combat readiness of SEAL platoons was not given the priority it deserved, 
and that many of the time-consuming activities SEAL Teams find themselves involved 
with do not add to (and often reduce) the combat readiness ofthe platoons. 
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If there is agreement that a combat-ready platoon is the product, then the 
focus of all efforts should be on producing the best product possible. In the 
business world, this would mean getting rid of steps in the process that do not add 
value to the product. Frequently, in a military organization it is difficult to 
measure how value is added at various stages of the "production process." F or-
profit organizations have the luxury of accounting tools to determine costs and 
benefits. While the challenge of measuring value added might be more difficult 
in a military organization, it is certainly no less important. A study to' determine 
where and how much "value" is added at various places within the NSW 
organization may provide valuable information. 
16. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Historical Data Files 
A historical data file containing biographic and demographic information 
on SEAL officers over several years was created from data files at the Defense 
Manpower Data Center, in Monterey, California. This data file could be used to 
conduct a historical data analysis of SEAL officers. 
C. A FINAL WORD 
Naval Special Warfare provides the nation with highly trained, rapidly deployable 
forces that are capable of conducting special operations anywhere in the world. SEALs 
have been called upon to conduct special operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, 
both in support of conventional operations and on independent missions. They have been 
called on because they possess unique skills that can only be acquired by quality people. 
These are the very same people who took the time to fill out surveys and spend hours 
with the researcher during interviews. A true strength of this exceptional organization is 
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the quality and commitment of its people. The officers who had chosen to resign were 
still willing to assist the organization as best they could and be "part of the solution." 
Despite their reasons for leaving the service, every officer surveyed or interviewed was 
proud to be a member of the "Fraternal Order," otherwise known as the SEAL Teams. 
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APPENDIX A. ACTIVE DUTY SURVEY 
I. Indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects ofthe Navy: 
Very Somewhat Neither Somewhat Very 
Satisfied Satisfied satisfied nor dissatisfied dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
Total Pay ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Promotion ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
opportunity 
Operational ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
tempo 
Command ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
opportunity 
Quality of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
family life 
Number of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
hours at work 
Amtof ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
family 
separation 
TeamlUnit ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
CO 
leadership 
SEAL Flag ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
leadership 
Postgraduate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Education 
Enjoyment of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Job 
2. During your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many hours a week 
did you work? 
() less than 40 hrs per week 
( ) 41 to 50 hrs per week 
() 51 to 60 hrs per week 
( ) 61 to 70 hrs per week 
() 71 to 80 hrs per week 
( ) more than 80 hrs per week 
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3. If you could increase the pay of SEAL officers, which ONE option would you 
chose? (Assume that the total cost to the Navy is the same for each alternative) 
( ) Start a "SEAL pay" that would pay a monthly amount while on sea and shore duty 
and would begin upon Warfare Qualification. 
( ) Pay an annual "SEAL bonus" in return for a commitment to stay in the Navy for a 
specified length of time. 
( ) I would not increase the pay for SEAL officers. 
( ) Other (please specify) 
4. What are your current career plans? I plan to: 
( ) Serve 20 or more years with my current designator 
( ) Lateral transfer to a second designator 
( ) Keep my designator and resign before 20 years 
( ) Undecided -
5. If you answered above that you were going to resign before 20 years: Would the 
option to remain operational within your community change your mind? 
( ) Yes, I would stay in the Navy if! could remain operational 
( ) No, I would still resign 
6. If you answered above (Ouestion 4) that you were going to resign before 20 
years: If the Navy offered you an annual bonus, what is the LEAST amount that 
would persuade you to remain on active duty? 
( ) No bonus is necessary to keep me on active duty 
( ) $8,000 per year 
( ) $12,000 per year 
( ) $16,000 per year 
( ) No bonus can convince me to stay on active duty 
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7. What do you think your chances are to command a TeamIBoat Unit if you 
remain on active duty? 
( ) Very likely 
() Somewhat likely 
( ) Neither likely nor unlikely 
() Somewhat unlikely 
( ) Very unlikely 
8. What is your current marital status? 
( ) Single 
( ) Married 
() Separated 
( ) Divorced 
9. Is your spouse currently: 
( ) NI A, I am not currently married 
() On active duty in the military 
() Working fill-time in a civilian job 
( ) Working part-time in a civilian job 
( ) A homemaker 
10. How many children do you have now? 
( ) None 
( ) One 
( ) Two 
( ) Three 
( ) More than three 
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11. Which of the following operational jobs have you had? Circle your 
corresponding level of general satisfaction with each job completed. 
( ) Platoon AOIC Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Platoon OIC Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Training Officer Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Operations Officer Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (ARG) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (CVBG) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (SDV) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Other (please specify) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
12. Which of the following deployments have you done? How many (#)? Circle your 
corresponding level of general satisfaction with each deployment completed. 
( ) No deployments 
( ) ARG deployment 
( ) CVBG deployment 
( ) Spec Ops deployment 
( ) SDV deployment 
( ) UNITASS deployment 
















13. Do you currently have a master's degree? 
( ) Yes 








14. Iryou answered NO to the question above, do you intend on pursuing 
Graduate Education? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
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15. How would you describe the overall wardroom morale at your most recent sea 
duty command? 
( ) Very high 
( ) Somewhat high 
( ) Neither high nor low 
() Somewhat low 
( ) Very low 
16. What was the ONE most significant factor in raising your most recent 
command's morale? 
() Command leadership 
() The amount of time at home 
( .) Performance of the platoon/squad on exercises 
( ) Deployment schedule 
( ) Other (please specify) 
17. What was the ONE most significant factor in reducing your most 
recent command's morale? 
() Command leadership 
() The amount of time at home 
() Performance of the platoon/squad on exercises 
() Deployment schedule 
() Other (please specify) 
18. The most qualified and deserving SEAL officers get ranked high and promote 
well. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
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19. What is your rank? 
( ) Ens () Ltig () LT () LCDR 
20. How many months has it been since you were last assigned to a TeamlBoat 
Unit? 
( ) I am currently assigned to a Team/ Boat Unit. 
( ) I was last assigned to a Team __ months ago. 
21. What was your last operational command? 
() SEAL Team 
() SDVTeam 
() Special Boat Unit 
() Other (please specify) 
22. The senior leadership (W ARC OM and Group commanders) within the SEAL 
community have a clearly defined vision. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
23. Overall, SEALs are properly utilized by operational commanders. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
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24. SEAL Team CO's play an active role in the professional development oftheir 
Junior Officers. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
( ) Somewhat disagree 
( ) Strongly disagree 
25. As a SEAL officer, I have a clearly defined career path. 
() Strongly agree 
( ) Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
( ) Strongly disagree 
26. I am willing to move geographically to increase my operational opportunities. 
( ) Strongly agree . 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
( ) Somewhat disagree 
( ) Strongly disagree 
27. What type of commissioning source, did you receive? 
( ) OCS or AOCS 
( ) NROTC Scholarship 
( ) NROTC non-scholarship 
( ) Naval Academy 
( ) Other 
145 
28. In what year were you commissioned? 
( ) 1986 
( ) 1987 
( ) 1988 
( ) 1989 
( ) 1990 
( ) 1991 
( ) 1992 
( ) 1993 
( ) 1994 
( ) 1995 
( ) 1996 
( ) 1997 
29. Do you understand the detailing process (the way in which detailers 
fill requirements)? 
( ) Yes, I have a clear understanding 
( ) I somewhat understand the detailing process 
( ) I do not understand how detailers fill requirements 
30. Given your current understanding of the detailing process, what is your level 
of satisfaction with it? 
( ) Very Satisfied . 
() Somewhat Satisfied 
( ) Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied 
() Somewhat Dissatisfied 
( ) Very Dissatisfied 
31. How would you improve the process if improvement is 
needed? 
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APPENDIX B. ACTIVE DUTY SATISFACTION SURVEY SUMMARY (n=100) 
Aspect: LEVEL OF SATISFACTION* 
Mean Value Standard Deviation 
Total Pay 2.79 1.047 
Promotion Opportunity 2.45 .957 
Operational Tempo 2.85 1.067 
Command Opportunity 2.82 1.001 
Quality of Family Life 3.34 1.007 
Number of Hours at Work 2.90 .926 
Amount of Family 3.62 .982 
Separation 
TeamlUnit CO Leadership 2.48 .982 
SEAL Flag Leadership 2.96 1.127 
Postgraduate Education 3.11 1.063 
Opportunities 
Enjoyment of Job 1.98 1.035 
* Mean value for the level of satisfaction, based on frequency of response, where "Very 
Satisfied" == 1, "Somewhat Satisfied" = 2, "Neither" = 3, "Somewhat Dissatisfied" = 4, 
and "Very Dissatisfied" = 5. Thus, the lower the yalue, the higher the satisfaction. 
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APPENDIX C. RESIGNATION SURVEY 
1. Indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects of the Navy: 
Very Somewhat Neither satisfied Somewhat Very 
satisfied satisfied nor dissatisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied 
Total Pay ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Promotion ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
opportunity 
Operational ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
tempo 
Command ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
opportunity 
Quality of ( ) ( ) (.) ( ) ( ) 
family life 
Number of hours ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
at work 
Amt of family ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
separation 
TeamlUnit CO ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Leadership 
SEAL Flag ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
leadership 
Postgraduate Educ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Enjoyment of Job ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
2. During your most recent sea tour, while in home port, how many hours a 
week did you work? 
() less than 40 hrs per week 
. () 41 to 50 hrs per week 
() 51 to 60 hrs per week 
() 61 to 70 hrs per week 
() 71 to 80 hrs per week 
() more than 80 hrs per week 
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3. If you could increase the pay of SEAL officers, which ONE option would you 
chose? (Assume that the total cost to the Navy is the same for each alternative) 
( ) Start a "SEAL pay" that would pay a monthly amount while on sea and 
shore duty and would begin upon Warfare Qualification. 
( ) Pay an annual "SEAL bonus" in return for a commitment to stay in the 
Navy for a specified length oftime. 
( ) I would not increase the pay for SEAL officers. 
( ) Other (please specify) 
4. If the Navy had offered you an annual bonus, what is the LEAST amount 
that would have persuaded you to remain on active duty? 
( ) No bonus would have been necessary to keep me on active duty 
() $8,000 per year 
() $12,000 per year 
() $16,000 per year 
( ) No bonus would have convinced me to stay on active duty 
5. What do you think your chances would have been to command a Team I 
Boat Unit if you stayed on active duty? 
( ) Very likely 
() Somewhat likely 
( ) Neither likely nor unlikely 
( ) Somewhat unlikely 
( ) Very unlikely 
6. How much influence did your spouse have on your decision to 
resign? 
( ) Not Applicable - I'm not married 
( ) No influence 
() Some influence 
( ) Moderate influence 
( ) A lot of influence 
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7. Is your spouse currently: 
( ) NI A, I am not currently married 
() On active duty in the military 
() Working full-time in a civilian job 
( ) Working part-time in a civilian job 
( ) A homemaker 
8. How many children do you have now? 
( ) None 
() One 
( ) Two 
( ) Three 
( ) More than three 
9. Which of the following jobs have you had? Circle your corresponding level of 
general satisfaction with each job completed. 
( ) Platoon AOlC Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Platoon OlC Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Training Officer Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Operations Officer Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (ARG) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (CVBG) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Task Unit Commander (SDV) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
( ) Other (please specify) Satisfied Undecided Dissatisfied 
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10. Which of the following deployments have you done? 
Number of Qarticular we of deQloyments comQleted 
( ) No deployments 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) ARG deployment 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) CVBG deployment 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) Spec Ops deployment 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) SDV deployment . 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) UNITASS deployment 1 2 3 more than three 
( ) Other (please specify) 
11. Did any particular deployment have a significant impact on your decision to 
resign? Comment. 
12. Do you currently have a master's degree? 
( ) No 
( ) Yes 
13. After I leave active duty: 
( ) I plan on enrolling in a masters program within a year 
( ) I plan on enrolling in a masters program eventually 
. ( ) I have no intention of pursuing post-graduate education 
( ) I will finish the masters degree that I have already begun 
() I already have a masters degree 
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14. How would you describe the overall wardroom morale at your most recent 
sea duty command? 
( ) Very high 
() Somewhat high 
( ) Neither high nor low 
() Somewhat low 
() Very low 
15. What was the ONE most significant factor in promoting your most 
recent command's morale? 
() Command leadership 
( ) The amount of time at home 
( ) Performance of the platoon/squad on exercises 
( ) Deployment schedule -
() Other (please specify) 
16. What was the ONE most significant factor in reducing your most recent 
command's morale? 
() Command leadership 
() The amount of time at home 
() Performance of the platoon/squad on exercises 
( ) Deployment schedule 
() Other (please specify) 
17. The best SEAL officers get ranked high and promote 
well. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
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18. How many months has it been since you were last assigned to a 
TeamlBoat Unit? 
( ) I am currently assigned to a TeamlBoat Unit. 
( ) I was last assigned to a Team __ months ago. 
19. What was your last operational command? 
() SEAL Team 
() SDV Team 
() SpecialBoat Unit 
( ) Other (please specify) 
20. Had I been able to "stay operational" I would not be submitting my 
resignation. . 
( ) Strongly agree 
( ) Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
( ) Somewhat disagree 
( ) Strongly disagree 
21. The senior leadership (W ARCOM and Group commanders) within the 
SEAL community has clearly defined goals. 
( ) Strongly agree 
( ) Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
( ) Strongly disagree 
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22. I would have been willing to move geographically to extend my operational 
opportunities. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
23. What type of commissioning source did you receive? 
() OCS or AOCS 
( ) NROTC Scholarship 
( ) NROTC non-scholarship 
( ) Naval Academy 
() Other 
24. As a SEAL officer, I have a clearly defined career path. 
() Strongly agree 
() Somewhat agree 
( ) Neither agree nor disagree 
() Somewhat disagree 
() Strongly disagree 
25. Pick the three factors that had the greatest impact on your decision to 
resign. 
( ) High operational tempo (away from home too much) 
( ) My future as a SEAL Officer is behind a desk 
( ) The SEAL community has no clearly defmed mission 
( ) I was forced to spend my time as an OICIAOIC micromanaging and not 
leading 
( ) Platoon Commander ranking is more a function of platoon liberty 
incidents than leadership and operational capability 
( ) Little opportunity for Post-Graduate education 
( ) Currently there is a strong economy and the opportunities for civilian 
employment are great 
( ) Being a SEAL officer is not what I expected it to be 
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( ) Limited command opportunities 
( ) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) deployment 
( ) None of the above reasons had an impact on my decision to resign 
26. Being as specific as possible, what was/is the primary reason you have 
requested resignation? 
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APPENDIX D. RESIGNATION INTERVIEW INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
My name is LT Keith Davids. I am conducting research for my thesis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, with the intention of sharing my findings with the Commander of 
the Naval Special Warfare Command. As I discussed with you earlier, I'm doing a study 
on SEAL junior officer retention, and particularly I would like to learn what factors have 
influenced your decision to request separation from the Navy. During the interview, I 
will ask you questions about your family, your opinions on several aspects of life as a 
SEAL, why you are choosing to leave the SEAL Teams, and what your future career 
intentions are. I want to emphasize that this int~rview is confidential. Anything I hear 
today will only be used in the aggregate form. Mention of individual places, names, or 
commands will be deleted upon transcript of the information to paper. I'd like for you to 
state for the record that you consent to being recorded. I would like to start the interview 
with some simple demographic and background data. 
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APPENDIX E. RESIGNATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Career Motivations: 
1. Why did you become a SEAL? Was it what you expected when you joined? 
Satisjiers/Dissatisjiers: 
2. What was your most rewarding experience as a SEAL officer. Who was 
involved? Where did it happen? When did it happen? What made it so 
rewarding? Please explain. 
3. What were the two or three things about being a SEAL that caused you the 
greatest dissatisfaction? Please explain. 
Community Loyalty and Leadership: 
4. Is the senior (CO/Group/W ARCOM) leadership in touch with important 
community issues? 
5. Did the notion of a "zero defect" mentality affect your decision to leave? Do you 
feel team COs reasonably support their junior officers? (If not, why not?) 
6. Do you have a mentor or "sea daddy" who has been following and supporting 
your career? (If not, why not?) 
Operational Opportunity: 
7. Do you feel operational commanders properly utilize SEALs? (Ifnot, explain.) 
8. Have any operational deployments significantly influenced your decision to 
resign? If so, explain. 
9. If you could have remained in an operational billet, would you have still decided 
to leave the service? 
10. How would you describe the current status of the SEAL Teams in terms of 
operational employment and future vision? 
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Professional Development: 
11. How do you feel about the SEAL officer career path? Is it well defined? 
12. Did you receive proper training for the jobs that you have held? 
13. Would the opportunity for graduate education have influenced you to remain 
in the service? 
Promotion: 
14. If you had decided to stay in the Navy, how would you rate your chances for 
command? Is the promotion system equitable? Please explain. 
Family Separation/Operational Tempo: 
15. How much influence did operational tempo and family separation have on your 
decision to leave the service? 
16. How much influence did your wife/family have on your decision to leave the 
Navy? 
EconomylPay: 
17. How heavily did pay affect your decision to resign? 
18. Apparently, civilian job opportunities are abundant now. Did this fact influence 
your decision to leave the Navy? 
Detailing: 
19. How do you feel about the detailing process? Is it equitable? Understandable? 
Did this influence your decision to leave the service? 
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Future Plans/Reasons for Separation: 
20. If you could change one thing within the SEAL community to make it a better 
place to work, what would that be? 
21. . How long have you been thinking about leaving the service? What are your 
future plans once you separate from the Navy? 
22. In summary, what are the three most important reasons you have requested 
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